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ABSTRACT

Canada’s two-tier occupational pension plans provide public sector workers (who are nearly
all registered in defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) with more than
twice as much retirement income as the vast majority of private sector workers who either
have no employer sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in defined contribution
plans offering no income guarantees. Since 2000 the number of workers enrolled in private
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada has declined by
500,000 from 2 to 1.5 million, while the number of public sector workers enrolled in DB
plans has remained stable at approximately 3 million. This thesis focuses on the 1.5 million
workers who continue to be registered in private sector single employer defined benefit
pension plans. It argues that the complex and often times confusing regulatory regimes
governing pension actuaries affords them too much scope for discretion, contributing to DB
plan underfunding, insolvency, and retirement income losses in the hundreds of billions of
dollars.
In contrast to the Canadian Public Accountability Board’s external oversight of the
accounting profession, the actuarial profession has remained relatively immune from such
external oversight, raising legitimate concerns about the impact of actuarial discretion on
pension funding estimates. Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have
consistently overestimated returns on private sector single employer defined benefit (DB)
pension plan investments, lowering employer contributions below the “fully funded” level
required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets must be sufficient to meet its
liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and insolvencies. Telecom giant
Nortel’s 2009 bankruptcy is a prime example of opaque funding. Actuaries underestimated
Nortel’s DB pension funding requirements by $1.5 billion, resulting in benefit reductions of
up to 43% for 20,000 pensioners and former employees. In United Steel’s (formerly
Stelco’s) 2014 restructuring, actuaries underestimated the company’s DB pension funding
requirements by $840 million, triggering potential income reductions of up to 30% for 2000
employees and 10,000 pensioners.
Considering that private sector single employer defined benefit pension plans must be fully
funded by law, the legal issue emanating from their systemic underfunding is whether or not
actuaries have been using their discretion in a manner which is within a reasonable
interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance
with the principles of the rule of law. This thesis discusses the merits of potential legal
remedies to arrest the underfunding and decline in the number of private sector single
employer defined benefit pensions in Canada, including the introduction of single employer
target benefit plans, increasing employers’ access to surplus, making actuaries fiduciaries,
legislating external oversight, abolishing employer-actuary agency, and mandating specific
discount rates. It concludes that the best legal remedy is the establishment of an independent
external actuarial oversight board.
ii
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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION

Canada’s two-tier occupational pension plans provide public sector workers (who are nearly all
registered in defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) with more than twice as much
retirement income as the vast majority of private sector workers who either have no employer
sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in defined contribution plans offering no income
guarantees. Since 2000 the number of workers enrolled in private sector single employer defined
benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada has declined by 500,000 from 2 to 1.5 million, while the number
of public sector workers enrolled in DB plans has remained stable at approximately 3 million. This
thesis focuses on the 1.5 million workers who continue to be registered in private sector single
employer defined benefit pension plans. It argues that the complex and often times confusing
regulatory regimes governing pension actuaries affords them too much scope for discretion,
contributing to DB plan underfunding, insolvency, and retirement income losses in the hundreds of
billions of dollars.
The actuarial profession has a long history of providing critical expertise to society. However,
despite the fact that the services it delivers are some of the most complex and mysterious of all
professions (including estimating billions of dollars in pension funding requirements decades into
the future), little has been written in the academic literature (outside of the actuarial profession
itself) about actuaries’ conflict of interest issues which are, in principle, similar to those which
faced the audit profession prior to the 2001 Enron (a Texas based energy company) accounting
scandal (the most significant corporate collapse in United States history since the failure of savings
and loan banks in the 1980s). Enron’s executives pressured consulting auditors to hide billions of
dollars of debt (from failed business deals) in offshore entities, artificially inflating the company’s

1

profits and share prices. The eventual exposure of these accounting irregularities resulted in $60
billion of the company’s market value being wiped out, thousands of job losses, and over
$2 billion in pension plan losses.

The Enron accounting scandal motivated the American government to enact the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA)1 to "enhance Corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures
and combat corporate and accounting fraud”. The SOA established the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to provide external oversight of auditors. Canada followed
suit in 2003 by creating the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB). In stark contrast,
Canada’s actuarial profession has remained relatively immune from external oversight, raising
legitimate concerns about the impact of actuaries’ discretion on pension funding estimates.
Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, leaving them susceptible to the conflict between
providing advice based on objective analysis on the one hand, and serving the needs of DB plan
sponsors on the other (whose objective may be to justify ways of spending as little as possible on
their plans, especially in these times of increased funding requirements resulting from chronically
low investment returns). As long as an employer can threaten to find another actuary to provide its
actuarial services, such implied leverage might well have an effect on an actuary’s work product.
The reality is that at the stroke of an actuary’s pen (by virtue of the vagaries of actuarial science),
companies can make heroic assumptions about the returns their pension assets will earn, reducing
the rate at which their funding obligations grow.

1

H.R. 3763 (107th).
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The funding requirements of defined benefit (DB) pension plans are in a constant state of flux due
to their dependence on discount rates. As market returns increase and/or decrease daily, so do
funding requirements. Actuaries are charged with the difficult (if not impossible) task of
forecasting investment returns decades into the future in order to estimate the level of funding
required to meet a plan’s obligations. Overestimating/underestimating investment returns by as little
as ½ of 1% can reduce/increase an employer’s contribution requirements by tens of millions of
dollars or even more, highlighting the significant impact of actuaries’ discretion on the funding
levels of DB plans in Canada.

Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have consistently overestimated returns on private
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plan investments, lowering employer
contributions below the “fully funded” level required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets
must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and
insolvencies. In short, funding has become opaque. Increasingly, funding policies have been
concentrating on reducing contributions, both by directing increasing proportions of plans’
investment portfolios to categories that have historically provided higher long-term returns and by
deferring costs through pre-recognition of expected higher returns from equity investments (which
often never materialize). In short, employers have been pushing deficits down the road (only18% of
defined benefit pension plans in Canada had a surplus (assets exceeding liabilities) in the first
quarter of 2015 compared to 36% a year earlier (Aon Hewitt)), reducing retirees’ pension cheques
by up to 50% (or even more) in cases of insolvency.

The use of actuarial discretion to reduce funding requirements (in attempting to sustain DB plans)
in Canada has resulted in opaque funding, making it difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain a
3

plan’s true funding status. Telecom giant Nortel’s 2009 bankruptcy is a prime example of this
opaque funding. Actuaries underestimated DB pension funding requirements by $1.5 billion,
resulting in benefit reductions up to 43% for 20,000 pensioners and former employees. In United
Steel’s (formerly Stelco’s) 2014 restructuring (wherein the Hamilton company was granted
protection from its creditors), actuaries underestimated the company’s DB pension funding
requirements by $840 million, triggering potential income reductions up to 30% for 2000
employees and 10,000 pensioners.2 An additional $40 million and $100 million in underfunded
pension obligations are projected for 2015 and 2016 respectively. United Steel’s proposed Business
Preservation Plan (permitting it to default on tens of millions of dollars of pension obligations 3 )
was approved by the Ontario Superior Court in 2015:

In light of the difficult financial circumstances now facing United Steel (USSC), the company no
longer has the financial resources and flexibility to continue to make these pension and retirement
plan contributions and payments during its restructuring proceedings. 4
Furthermore, the Court endorsed United Steel’s request to suspend health-care benefits (at least
temporarily) to 20,000 of its pensioners. 5
Considering that private sector single employer defined benefit pension plans must be fully funded
by law, the legal issue emanating from their systemic underfunding is whether or not actuaries have

2

Since the start of its 2014 restructuring process, the company has paid about $5.9 million a month into its
main pension plans and expects to pay another $23.6 million by the end of the year. Through 2016, pension
costs could be as high as $18.6 million per month under normal pension funding rules. (Note that in 2006 the
Ontario Government gave the company 10 years to cover its pension shortfalls and provided it with a $150million forgivable loan if it succeeded, which it obviously it did not.)
3

Mark McNeil, “Today Is Decision Day for U.S. Steel, Hamilton Spectator” (09 October, 2016). Online: <
www.thespec.com › Home › News › Business >.
4
Steve Arnold, “U.S. Steel Canada Wants to Scrap Pension Fund Payments, Retiree Benefits, and Hamilton
Taxes” Hamilton Spectator (18 September, 2015). Online: < www.thespec.com › Home › News › Business >.
5

Samantha Craggs, “Judge Approves U.S. Steel Transition Plan, Suspends Retiree Benefits” CBC News
(13 October 2015). Online: < www.cbc.ca/.../judge-approves-u-s-steel-transition-plan-suspends-retireebe...>.

4

been using their discretion in a manner which is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of
manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law.
This thesis discusses the merits of potential legal remedies to actuarial underfunding and
insolvencies, including the introduction of single employer target benefit plans, increasing
employers’ access to surplus, making actuaries fiduciaries, legislating external oversight, abolishing
employer-actuary agency, and mandating specific discount rates. It concludes that the best legal
remedy is the establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board.
Chapter 1 begins by introducing the concept of defined benefit (DB) pension plans and the
magnitude of the underfunding problem in Canada. It then discusses provincial and federal pension
standards legislation (the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and the federal Pension Benefits
Standards Act (PBSA), the focus of this thesis), before concluding with a literature review of
“professional discretion and the law”.
Section 1-Background
Canada’s Two Tier Defined Benefit Pension Plans
A. The Concept of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and their Current Status in Canada

The rise of workplace pensions in Canada is very much a 20th century phenomenon. However,
occupational pensions in Canada date back to 1870 when the federal government passed the first
superannuation act authorizing the payment of an annual retirement allowance to public servants at
the of age 60 or upon disability. The railroads became the first industrial sector to offer
occupational pensions in 1874, followed by commercial banks around 1900. 6

6

The first workplace pension plan recorded in Canadian history was a plan that the Hudson Bay Company
established in 1840 (before Confederation in 1867). These plans generally deferred payment of a portion of
employees’ wages and were not classical “defined benefit” plans per se. (National Union, A Brief History of

5

Defined benefit pension plans (which guarantee workers a monthly retirement income based on
their earnings and years of service) were introduced in the Canadian federal public service in 1924
and subsequently in the private sector (the focus of this thesis) beginning in the 1940s when
employers began offering generous defined benefit pension plans to attract and keep the best
workers in times of labour shortages.7 The most important factor influencing the growth of private
sector occupational pension plans since the 1940s was the rise of the trade union movement and
collective bargaining.8

Government regulation of occupational pension plans was initially non-existent as they were
considered small fringe benefits. (Consequently, retaining actuarial advice on funding issues was
optional depending on whether or not an employer was interested in knowing the costs and risks
inherent in funding its plan). In sharp contrast, Canadian pension funds (spanning both the public
and private sectors) are now one of the fastest growing pools of institutionalized capital in the
country, dominated by large funds. 9 Regulation is omnipresent with $1.6 trillion in assets held in
employer sponsored pension trust funds (75% public and 25% private).10 (Canada’s top 10 pension

Pensions in Canada, 2007. Online: <
www.nupge.ca/files/publications/Pensions%20Documents/History_of_Pensions.pdf >.)
7
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Public Service Pension Plan History, 2012. Online: < www.tbssct.gc.ca >.
8
National Union, A Brief History of Pensions in Canada, 2007. Online: <
www.nupge.ca/files/publications/Pensions%20Documents/History_of_Pensions.pdf >.
9
Jack Mintz and Vijay Jog, Sovereign Wealth and Pension Funds Controlling Canadian Businesses: Tax
Policy Implications, University of Calgary, 2013. Online: <
www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/.../jogmintz-pensionwealth.p >.
10
Statistics Canada,The Daily- Employer Pension Plans (trusteed pension funds), First Quarter, 2015. (Just
over 6.2 million Canadian workers are members of employer-sponsored pension plans. Of this
group, 5.2 million (83.3%) workers belong to pension plans with assets managed by trusteed funds. The
remaining members have assets managed by insurance company contracts. Data in this release refer only
to trusteed plans and their pension funds.)

6

funds account for about 2/3 of this $1.6 trillion dollar total. 11) Approximately 30% is held in fixed
investments, 15% in Canadian equities, 17% in global equities, 10% in real estate and the remainder
in other investments.12 Considering that 2 out of 3 active pension plan members belonged to a
defined benefit plan in 2013 (down from 3 out of 4 in 2009), it is not surprising that DB
investments (valued at over 1.2 trillion dollars) account for the lion’s share of occupational pension
plan investments in Canada. 13

The vast majority of defined benefit plans in Canada were fully funded in the latter part of the
twentieth century when stock markets were booming and bond yields were high, meaning returns
on pension investments were not only high enough to cover plan liabilities, but also to yield
surpluses. However, the investment climate changed rapidly by the year 2000 when the stock
market bubble burst, causing real returns on the Toronto Stock Exchange to plummet to minus
13.18 % and minus 15.71% in 2001 and 2002 respectively. 14 The net result was that pension
solvency (asset/liability) balance sheets (closely tied to changes in financial markets) swung quickly
from surplus to deficit positions, resulting in regulators demanding increased employer
contributions. This increased cost resulted in fewer companies offering defined benefit plans to
their employees. In fact, the number of workers enrolled in private sector single employer defined
benefit pension plans in Canada declined approximately 25% from 2.0 million in 2000 to 1.4
11

The Top Ten's $1.1 trillion in pension assets under management in 2014 has more than tripled since 2003,
over a period in which the world faced one of its most challenging economic periods. The increase has been
driven by solid investment returns of over $240 billion vs. net inflows to the funds made by members and
their employers of over $125 billion. (CNW Newswire, Canada’s Top Ten Pension Funds Help Drive National
Prosperity, 2013. Online: < www.newswire.ca/.../canada-s-top-ten-pension-funds-help-drive-national > &
BNN Business Network, Canada’s Top 10 Pension Funds Tripled in Size Since 2003: Study, 2015. Online: <
www.bnn.ca/.../10/Canadas-top-10-pension-funds-tripled-in-size-since-2 >.)
12
Canadian Institutional Investment Network, Chronicle-An Overview of Pension Plans in Canada, 2014.
Online: < https://account.invesco.ca/institutionalPortal/.../CIIN_chronicle_1214.pdf >.
13
Ibid (Defined contribution and hybrid plans (discussed later) account for the remaining share of
occupational pension plan investments).
14
Bob Baldwin, Determinants of the Evolution of Workplace Pension Plans in Canada (Toronto: The
Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2007) at 29.

7

million in 2013. 15 According to the 2012 Canadian Retirement Trends Survey conducted by the
consulting firm Aon Hewitt,16 50% of all private defined benefit pension plans in Canada have
either been closed or frozen (not offered to any new employees) over the past decade.17

There are currently about 11.5 million private sector and 3.5 million public sector employees in
Canada.18 Less than half of these workers (6 million) are registered in occupational pension plans
(approximately 3 million in each of the private and public sectors).19 In other words, while nearly
all of Canada’s 3.5 million public servants are covered by a workplace pension plan, only about one
quarter of the country’s 11.5 million private sector employees are covered. As mentioned above, the
number of private sector employees registered in single employer defined benefit plans fell from
2.0 to 1.4 million from 2000 to 2013, while public sector enrolment increased from 2.5 to 3.0
million over the same period.20 This raises the public policy issue of why the number of public
sector workers being offered so-called “gold plated” defined benefit pension plans has been

15

This is an estimate based on Statistics Canada, Registered Pension Plans and Members by Jurisdiction of
Plan Registration, Sector and Type of Plan, 2013. Online: < www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sumsom/l01/.../famil120a-eng.htm > & Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services
Commission of Ontario Annual Report: (Toronto 2012) at 8 & Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada Annual Report: Federally
Regulated Private Pension Plans: (Ottawa, 2013). Online: < www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca > & Report of the Ontario
Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008).
16

Aon Canada offers a range of sophisticated advisory and consulting services in risk control and risk
management, reinsurance, and human capital. It designs, structures and implements solutions that may
involve traditional insurance products or risk-transfer programs, alternative financing techniques, or entirely
new products to address a specific problem.
17
The Wall Street Journal, News Release “Canadian Pension Plan Sponsors to Focus on Improving
Member’s Understanding of Retirement Benefits” (02 May, 2012) The Wall Street Journal online:
<wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20130502-909056.html.>.
18
Statistics Canada, “Employment by Age, Sex, Type of Work, Class of Worker, and Province, Monthly
(August, 2013)”.Online :< Cansim, Tables 282-0087 and 282-0089 > (2.7 million self-employed workers are
not included in these numbers).
19
Statistics Canada, “Registered Pension Plans (RPPs) and Members, by Type of Plan and Sector (20072011),” Online: < Cansim, Table 280-0016 >.
20
Ibid.
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increasing while the number of private sector workers receiving them has been steadily decreasing
in recent years.

The Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) recently conducted a study estimating
the financial costs of offering a defined benefit pension plan in Canada.21 It compared the future
retirement incomes of two people currently working in the private and public sectors (Mary and
Jane, respectively) with similar jobs earning equivalent salaries ($79,511 in 2012) throughout their
projected 35 year careers from 1995 to 2029 (See Appendix 1 on page 269 for the study’s
assumptions and calculations). Mary and Jane each contributed an equivalent percentage (6.2 % in
2012) of their annual income into their respective workplace pension plans since they began
working in 1995. However, Jane’s retirement funds were invested in a Registered Retirement
Savings Plan (RRSP)22 (in which returns and therefore pension incomes fluctuate with markets),
while Mary’s funds were invested in a defined benefit pension plan in which her employer (the
federal government) guarantees her pension income (equal to 2% of her annual income for each
year of service up to a maximum of 70%).23 The study projects that upon retirement at age 65 (in

21

Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB), Canada’s Two-Tier Retirement System (Toronto,
2013). Online: < www.cfib-fcei.ca/english/article/5423-two-tier-release.html >.
22

An RRSP is a type of defined contribution plan in which the pension payout varies with investment returns.

23

Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, “Report on the Public Service Plan Pension Plan for the Fiscal
Year Ended 2012”.Online: < www.tbs-sct.gc.ca >. (The public service pension plan provides pension benefits
for federal public service employees. It was established and is governed in all aspects by the Public Service
Superannuation Act. The plan is a contributory defined benefit plan covering substantially all of the
employees of the Government of Canada, which includes the federal public service, certain Crown
Corporations, and territorial governments. The government has a statutory obligation for the payment of
benefits relating to the pension plan).
The public service pension plan is the largest pension plan in Canada, covering 313,652 active contributors
in more than 145 departments and agencies, and 246,166 retired members and survivors. During the fiscal
year ended March 31, 2012, pension plan member and employer pension contributions on a cash basis
totaled $4.4 billion, while benefit payments to retired members and survivors reached $5.6 billion, creating a

9

2029), the private sector employee (Jane) will receive $605,000 in benefits over 20 years of
retirement, while Mary (the public sector employee) will receive a guaranteed pension income of
$1.4 million over the same 20 year period. The CFIB study attributes this $776,000 difference to
massive federal subsidies from Mary’s public sector employer (the federal government) and a
defined benefit formula that guarantees her benefits regardless of the amount of investment returns
earned by her workplace pension fund. In other words, Mary has been contributing (and will
continue to contribute) about 7% of her annual salary to receive 70% income replacement upon
retirement, while Jane is projected to receive only about 30% income replacement from the same
annual contributions of 7%. The CFIB study estimates that Jane’s annual pension contribution
would have to increase from $218,000 to $654,000 (or by $436,000) over her career in order to
increase her retirement income by$776,000 to equal Mary’s $1.4 million DB pension income. In
other words, Mary’s public sector defined benefit pension is being subsidized by taxpayers to the
tune of $436,000, based on the assumptions (investment returns, longevity etc.) in the CFIB study
(see Appendix 1 on page 269).24 Looking at it another way, Jane would need to contribute an

fiscal year deficit of $1.2 billion in the federal public service defined benefit pension plan. The value of the
plan’s total pension obligations increased to $145.9 billion by March 3, 2012.
24

Ibid. (The Office of the Chief Actuary, an independent unit within the federal pension regulator (the Office
of the Superintendent of Financial Institution of Canada), provides a range of actuarial services and advice to
the Government of Canada that includes the federal Public Service Pension Plan. The Office of the Chief
Actuary is responsible for conducting an annual actuarial valuation of the federal Public Service Pension
Plan for accounting purposes as well as a triennial (i.e., once every three years) funding valuation. The
Government is required by legislation to make additional payments into the plan in the event of plan
underfunding reported in the actuarial valuation.)
(Following Royal Assent of the federal Jobs and Growth Act, 2012 in December 2012, public sector pension
reforms came into effect on January 1, 2013. These changes will bring contribution rates for public service
defined benefit pension plan members more in line with the private sector by introducing a 50/50 costsharing model. This new model is expected to generate ongoing savings to taxpayers of $900 million
annually once it is fully implemented in 2017. This change is accounted for in the CFIB pension report
calculations.)
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additional 13 % of her pay every year throughout her career to accumulate the extra $776,000 by
age 65 (i.e.13 per cent more per year than the amounts Mary contributes to her pension plan).

This 13% gap is considered by the CFIB to be a conservative estimate because although the study
assumes both employees earn the same salaries, CFIB research (based on Statistics Canada Census
data), estimates that federal government employees are paid up to 17 per cent more in wages than
similarly employed individuals in the private sector. Furthermore, the average retirement age in the
public service is 61, while the study assumes that Mary will work until age 65, the average
retirement age in the private sector. Factoring higher wages and early retirement for Mary into the
calculation, the gap between her total retirement benefits and those of Jane grows to over one
million dollars according to the CFIB study.

Assuming only half of the remaining 1.5 million workers registered in private sector single
employer DB plans in Canada have their pensions converted to DC plans, and that the average
employee has completed half of his or her 35 years of maximum pensionable service (making them
eligible for half of the DB pension subsidy of $436,000 or $218,000), the economic loss would
amount to 750,000 (no. of employees) x $218,000 = $163,000,000,000 or approximately 160 billion
dollars in employer subsidies. Applying the same assumptions to the CFIB’s $800,000 estimate of
the difference between DB and DC retirement benefits per employee, the economic loss would
amount to 750,000 (no. of employees) x $400,000 =$300,000,000,000 or approximately 300 billion
dollars in lost pension income.25

25

These estimates are considered to be conservative estimate because although the CFIB study assumes
both private and public sector employees earn the same salaries, CFIB research (based on Statistics
Canada Census data), estimates that federal government employees are paid up to 17 per cent more in
wages than similarly employed individuals in the private sector. Furthermore, the average retirement age in
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It is evident that private sector workers like Jane cannot count on taxpayers to match their private
pension plan contributions or to bail out their RRSPs in times of low investment returns. In other
words, they have no hope of generating occupational retirement incomes comparable to Mary’s.
However, private sector workers and their employers are being counted on by governments to
indirectly fund public sector pension income guarantees through income, payroll and other taxes.

Regulatory Jurisdictions

This thesis focuses on the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act

26

(PBSA) and the Ontario

Pension Benefits Act 27 (PBA), the largest of Canada’s 11 regulatory jurisdictions (P.E.I. is the only
province without a Pension Standards Act as of 2014). The PBSA oversees federally regulated
companies (including crown corporations) offering workplace pensions across Canada while the
PBA regulates both private and public pension plans registered in Ontario. There are approximately
660,000 and 360,000 private sector single employer defined benefit pension plan workers registered
under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Ontario PBA and federal PBSA respectively. 28
Ontario PBA
This thesis focuses on the declining number of employees registered in private sector single
employer defined benefit pension plans in Ontario (Canada’s largest pension jurisdiction with
approximately half of all private plan members in the country), down by almost 200,000 members

the public service is 61, while the study assumes that the public sector worker (Mary) will work until age 65,
the average retirement age in the private sector. Factoring higher wages and early retirement for Mary into
the calculation, the gap between her total retirement benefits and those of Jane grows from $776,000 to over
one million dollars.(Plame Petkov, Canada’s Two Tier Retirement, CFIB Pension Research Series at 4,
2013. Online: < www.cfib-fcei.ca/english/article/5423-two-tier-release.htm: >.
26
Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.)
27
Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990.
28
Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report:
(Toronto 2012) at 8 & Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada Annual Report: Federally Regulated Private Pension Plans:
(Ottawa, 2013). Online: < www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca >.
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(850,000 to 676,000) from 2005 to 2014.29 The market value of pension assets registered under the
PBA was estimated at $420 billion in 2013, reflecting a 15 per cent increase from $357 billion in
2009 and a 28 per cent increase from 2008. In 2012 there were about 8000 pension plans (public
and private) registered under the PBA with approximately 4 million members (2.1 million active
and 1.7 million retired).30 1.3 million of the 2.1 million active members were in the private sector.31
However, only about half (660,000) of private sector workers were registered in single employer
DB plans, 32 the focus of this thesis.

33

29

Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report:
(Toronto 2014) at 9 & Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario
Annual Report: (Toronto 2005) at 11.Single Employer Pension Plans (SEPPs) are the focus of this thesis
because they have been steadily declining in recent years. SEPPs are riskier propositions than Multiple
Employer Pension Plans (MEPPs) because they each address the issue of “full funding” rather differently.
While surpluses for MEPPs may be used to fund contribution holidays or benefit improvements (as with
SEPPs), unfunded liabilities in MEPPs are usually dealt with by reducing accrued or future benefits, including
pensions already in pay — an option generally unavailable to SEPPs. In other words, the SEPP employer
(sponsor) must make up any funding deficiencies, as accrued or future benefits cannot be reduced. Of
course, if MEPP sponsors and their unions agree, benefit reduction can be avoided by renegotiating the
sponsor contributions that are fixed in their current collective agreement; and in MEPPs that provide for
member contributions, those contributions may be increased as well. But as a practical matter, these
alternatives are often difficult to implement. Consequently, benefit reduction is a real and present danger for
most MEPPs and their members. (Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe
Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair Rules (Toronto: Minister of Finance, 2008) at 68).
30

Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report:
(Toronto 2012) at 8.
31
Ibid.
32
Most DB plan members (80%) are represented by unions, and of those, a significant majority (69%) are
enrolled in plans that are classified as either jointly sponsored and governed (public JSPPs), or governed by
boards of trustees, at least half of whose members must be union nominees (private MEPPs). Consequently,
either indirectly through the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or directly through their
representatives on boards of trustees, active plan members typically have an opportunity to influence plan
design and decision-making. (Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Toronto, Queen’s
Printer, 2006).
33
SEPPs are characteristically (but not exclusively) located in the private sector, as are some MEPPs and,
potentially, JSPPs. Private sector SEPPs are therefore especially vulnerable to fluctuations in the sponsor’s
fortunes and to the risk of the sponsor becoming insolvent. They are also more likely to face restructuring as
corporate sponsors reconfigure themselves, merge with other corporations or simply decide to redesign or
close their plans. Public sector plans — largely MEPPs and JSPPs — have faced divestments or
reorganizations as well, but with somewhat less frequency.
A SEPP is sponsored by a single employer; the chances of that employer getting into financial difficulty to
the prejudice of the plan are much greater than in the case of a MEPP (or most JSPPs), where multiple
employers are available to sustain the plan, even if one goes under. Many MEPPs and most JSPPs are
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The percentage of defined benefit pension plans that fell below the 80% funded level (i.e. a plan’s
assets are only sufficient to pay 80% of its liabilities) in Ontario more than doubled between 2001
and 2002, from 23.4% to 50.6%.34 Fast forwarding ten years, the Financial Services Commission of
Ontario’s (FSCO’s) 35 2012 Report on the Funding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans36 revealed that
54% of Ontario’s defined benefit pension plans were less than fully funded versus 52% in its 2011
report.37 (Incidentally, this underfunding problem also existed in Canada’s other 10 regulatory
jurisdictions).
Note that strong equity returns and rising long-term interest rates in 2013 resulted in a dramatic year
of improvement in the funding status of Canadian pension plans. Almost 40% of pension plans
tracked by Mercer38 were fully funded at the end of 2013 compared to 6% a year earlier.
Furthermore, only 6% were less than 80% funded, down sharply from 60% in 2012. 39 The volatility
in defined benefit pension plan funding was evidenced by falling long term interest rates in 2014.
(Note that pension plans use long-term interest (discount) rates to calculate the size of their pension

more able to spread risks and amortize costs over a larger member base than almost all SEPPs. Funding
rules should therefore be designed to take account of the different risks inherent in each plan type. (Ontario
Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Toronto, Queen’s Printer, 2006).
34
Ibid.
35
The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) is an agency of the Ministry of Finance that
regulates registered pension plans in Ontario in accordance with the Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and
Regulation 909, as amended.
36
Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), 2012 Report on the Funding of Defined Benefit
Pension Plans in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2013) at 6. (This report is based on the latest
filed funding valuation reports for defined benefit plans that had valuation dates between July 2, 2009 and
June 30, 2012, and financial statements for the fiscal year ending between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012).
37
These funding percentages are based on a going concern basis where the plan is assumed to continue
operating on the valuation date as opposed to a being based on a solvency basis where the plan is assumed
to wind-up on the actuarial valuation date.
38
Mercer is one of the largest consulting firms in the world, operating internationally in more than 40
countries with more than 19,000 employees. (Wikipedia). Online: <
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercer_(consulting_firm) >.
39

Barbara Shecter,”Defined Benefit Plans Healthier than Ever But Don’t Expect to See More of Them”
Financial Post, (2 January 2014) FP Street. Online: < www.business.financialpost.com/2014/.../canadianpension-plans-start-2014-at >.
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liabilities; i.e. lower rates raise the level of funding required to meet a plan’s obligations). FSCO40
reported that the percentage of fully funded defined benefit plans in Ontario fell from 54% to 23%
over the 2 year period from 2012 to 2014(according to FSCO’s 2014 Annual Report on the Funding
of Defined Benefit Pension Plans41).
Federal PBSA
Under the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, Pension Benefits Standards Act,
1985 (PBSA) and the Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985 (Regulations), the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) regulates and supervises private pension plans in
federally regulated business, works and undertakings such as banking, telecommunications and
inter-provincial transportation. OSFI is also the regulator for pension plans established in respect of
employment in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. It supervised 1226 private
pension plans covering 631,000 employees or about 6% of all workers registered in workplace
plans in Canada in 2014.42 Approximately 1/4 of these plans were DB, covering 340,000 employees
(over half of the total) a decline of 60,000 members from the 400,000 DB plan membership in 2003.

Defined benefit pension assets regulated by FSCO increased by $17 billion from $ 95 billion in
2005 to $112 billion in 2014. Similar to the Ontario PBA, the funding status of federally regulated
plans also improved dramatically in 2013 due to improved investment returns. 39% of OSFI’s plans
were fully funded at the beginning of 2014 compared to only 10% a year earlier.43 However, similar

40

The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) is an agency of the Ministry of Finance that
regulates registered pension plans in Ontario in accordance with the Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and
Regulation 909, as amended.
41
Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report:
(Toronto 2014) at 8.
42
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions Canada Annual Report: Federally Regulated Private Pension Plans: (Ottawa, 2015). Online: <
www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/ar-ra/1415/eng/ar1415.pdf >.
43
Ibid.
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to Ontario, the percentage of fully funded defined benefit pension plans decreased to 21% over the
next 12 months due to falling interest rates.44

Air Canada was placed on OSFI’s “watch” list in the early 2000s. 45 In its 2004 restructuring
(bankruptcy protection filing) the airline asked permission from OSFI to extend the funding of its
1.2 billion dollar defined benefit plan pension shortfall from 5 to 10 years. Despite receiving
permission to extend its funding, Air Canada’s pension deficit continued to balloon to 4.4 billion
dollars by 2011. In response, the federal government passed special legislation allowing Air Canada
more flexibility in funding its pension deficit. 46 There have been several factors that have since
contributed to the elimination of Air Canada’s solvency deficit (which sat at $3.7-billion at the start
of 2013), not the least of these was an increase in its discount (interest) rate from 3.0 % in 2013 to

44

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, “Newsletter from the Private Pension Plan Division at
Osfi” Issue 13, 2015. Online: < www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/pp-rr/Pages/default.aspx>.
45

Nicholas LePan (Superintendent, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions) (Remarks delivered
at the General Meeting, Canadian Institute of Actuaries, 2004. online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.cal>.
46
CNW, “Air Canada Provides Update of Solvency Update in Registered Pension Plans” A PR Newswire
Company (07 Feb. 2011) online: <www.newswire.ca/.../air-canada-provides-update-of-solvency-deficit-inr...>. (In July 2009, the Government of Canada adopted the Air Canada 2009 Pension Regulations. These
regulations relieved Air Canada from making any past service contributions (i.e. special payments to
amortize the plan solvency deficits) to its ten domestic defined benefit registered pension plans in respect of
the period beginning April 1, 2009, and ending December 31, 2010. Based on these regulations, for the
period from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013, the aggregate annual past service contribution equals
the lesser of (i) $150 million, $175 million, and $225 million in 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, on an
accrued basis, and (ii) the maximum past service contribution permitted under the Canadian Income Tax
Act.).
CBC News, “Air Canada Emerges from Federal Pension Deal” The Canadian Press (15 May 2015) online:
<www.cbc.ca/.../air-canada-emerges-from-federal-pension-deal-1.3089370 >. (Air Canada announced that it
had a pension surplus of $1.2 billion and was opting out of the Air Canada Pension Plan Funding
Regulations, 2014, effective May 26, 2015. Under these regulations, Air Canada was required to make
solvency deficit payments of $200 million per year, on average, over a seven-year period. The agreement
also contained several restrictions, including a prohibition on share repurchases, dividends, executive
bonuses and plan improvements. As a result of opting out, Air Canada will now fund the pension according
to normal funding rules. The company will make pension solvency payments of approximately $90 million in
2015 versus the $200 million it would have had to contribute under the special regulations for past service
costs, in addition to the $125 million they will pay in current service costs. (Note that the plan remains in a
$445 million deficit given that, under normal funding rules, a plan’s financial standing is based on a three
year average.)).
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3.9 % in 2014. For every 1% rise in the discount rate, Air Canada’s solvency liability was reduced
by $1.5 billion, translating into $1.35-billion in savings. 47 This was in addition to the $970-milllion
in savings from the implementation of changes to its pension benefits, including moving new hires
into a hybrid (defined benefit/contribution) pension plans as part of its 2012 contract negotiations.
The carrier also contributed $225-million in cash to its DB plan in 2013. 48

In 2009 Nortel Networks (another federally regulated company) also filed for bankruptcy protection.
(However, unlike Air Canada, it did not survive bankruptcy proceedings.) Upon dissolution,
Nortel’s $5 billion plan carried a 1.5 billion dollar deficit, resulting in benefit reductions up to 43%
for its 20,000 pensioners and former employees.49

1. Significance of Defined Benefit Pension Plan Funding Estimates
It is evident from the Air Canada and Nortel bankruptcies that employers, employees, and
pensioners all have a vested interest in understanding the complex and crucial issues involved in
defined benefit pension funding. Employers need to know what their pension promises will cost
them, while actively contributing employees and retirees need assurances that their plans have
sufficient funding to meet current and future obligations. Funding is also critically important to
those parties one step removed from the day to day operations of defined benefit pension plans,
including:50
1. Pension regulators (preventing plan failures).

47

The higher the interest (discount) rate, the lower the investment level required to pay future liabilities.
“Air Canada Eliminates $3.7 Billion Dollar Pension Deficit” The Financial Post (22 January, 2014).Investing.
Online: < business.financialpost.com/2014/01/22/air-canada-pension-deficit-2014 >.
48

49

Wikipedia, Nortel Retirees and Former Employees Protection Canada, 2013. Online: <
www.nortelpensioners.ca >.
50
Report of the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008)
at 53.
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2. Tax collectors (preventing the illicit sheltering of corporate income).
3.

Union members (preventing the loss of much-valued and hard-won benefits).

4. Investors and creditors (preventing the unanticipated “legacy” costs of maintaining a
pension plan gone bad).
5. Policy makers (require an accurate idea of the overall funding status of pensions to plan for
the social and economic well-being of retirees).
Valuing the funding requirements of defined benefit pension plans is challenging for several
reasons including:51
1. The pension promise is typically made good over decades. For example, an employee 30
years of age in 2013 may not retire for 30 years and will continue to draw his or her
pension for another 20 years until 2063 or longer.
2. The factors that define the value of the pension promise (employees’ years of service
and income) vary with changes in factors such as life expectancy, salaries, benefits,
business conditions and regulatory requirements.
3. The cost of paying for the pension promise is constantly changing as asset requirements
change to meet evolving long term liabilities (which fluctuate with interest rates, among
other factors).

2. Chapter Summaries
This thesis focuses on the Ontario Pension Benefits Act 52 (PBA), the largest pension jurisdiction in
Canada, and the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act 53 (PBA). It is divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1(the Introduction) introduces the concept of two tier defined benefit (DB) pension plans in
Canada, highlighting the stark contrast between public sector workers (who are nearly all registered
in defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) and private sector workers, the vast
majority of whom either have no employer sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in
defined contribution plans offering no income guarantees. It then discusses the magnitude of the
51

Ibid.
Pension Benefits Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.).
53
Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.O. 1990.
52
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funding problem in private sector single employer DB plans, before concluding with a literature
review of “professional discretion and the law”.
Chapters 2-7 focus on the current regulatory environment facilitating the underfunding of defined
benefit pension plans in Canada. Chapter 2 discusses the general regulatory regimes overseeing DB
plan funding while Chapter 3 provides an overview of specific legislation, regulations, and
professional bodies governing actuarial funding. It highlights the disconnect between short-term
funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of DB funding.

Chapter 4 examines the impact of the governance of discount (interest) rates54on pension funding,
concluding that public policy in Canada permits actuaries to use their discretion to estimate higher
than market discount rates to reduce employers’ funding requirements. It proposes the
establishment of an independent external oversight board to establish a common framework for
estimating discount rates, promoting a common understanding amongst actuaries of how to improve
the consistency of their estimates.
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the governance of actuarial methods on the underfunding of
defined benefit pension plans. It examines asset/ liability valuations, asset allocation policy, and the
role of the actuary, revealing that actuaries are using actuarial methods to push DB funding
problems down the road in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concludes by proposing that an
independent external oversight board be established to monitor the reliability and usefulness of
actuarial methods in Canada.

54

The discount rate is the interest rate that a sum of money invested today would need to earn to equal a
specified value at a future date. For example, a discount rate of 10% applied to a $100.00 sum expected to
be received in one year results in a present value of $90.90. In other words, $100 received in one year is
worth $90.90 today.
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Chapter 6 examines the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding
that courts’ surplus policy over the past three decades (from the “Dominion Stores” case in 1986 to
Manitoba Telecom in 2014) has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting
actuarial underfunding and insolvency.
Chapter 7 discusses the reasons for the economic failure of the traditional DB model and proposes
the adoption of fixed funding “target benefit” plans (which effectively eliminate the impact of
actuaries’ discretion on funding) as one possible remedy to the current underfunding dilemma.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion. It proposes various legal remedies to the underfunding of private sector
single employer defined benefit pension plans including increasing employers’ access to surplus,
making actuaries fiduciaries, and establishing an actuarial oversight board. It concludes that the
establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board would be the best legal remedy.

Section 2-Literature Review
Professional Discretion and the Law
1. Overview

Professional discretion is regulated by administrative bodies empowered by legislation. David
Mullan defines administrative law as "the body of law that establishes or describes the legal
parameters of power that exist by virtue of Statute or residual Royal prerogative.”

55

This section

reviews the curial and academic treatment of professional discretion in Canada.

55

David Mullan, Administrative Law (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2000).
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Canadian administrative law addresses the actions and operations of governments and
governmental agencies. It concerns itself with the manner in which courts can review the decisions
of administrative decision-makers such as a board, tribunal, commission, agency or minister.
Administrative law is concerned primarily with issues of substantive review (the determination and
application of the appropriate standard of review to either accept or reject an administrator’s
decision) and with issues of procedural fairness (the enforcement of a person’s participatory rights
in an administrative process).56
An "appeal" of an administrative agency’s decision is known as "judicial review," a process
whereby a court of law is asked to rule on the appropriateness of an administrative agency’s or a
tribunal’s decision. Judicial review allows a court to consider the entire decision-making process of
an administrator, including the process and the findings of fact and of law. The power of judicial
review is found either in the enabling statute or by virtue of the common law. 57
Historically in Canada all administrative decisions classified as “legal” were reviewable while those
classified as “discretionary” could only be reviewed on limited grounds such as the bad faith of
decision-makers, the exercise of discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant
considerations.58 In other words, judges determined whether or not an administrative decision was
reviewable simply by classifying it as “legal” or “discretionary”. The Supreme Court of Canada
repudiated this dichotomy in the 1999 case Baker v. Canada.59 In Baker the Court held “there is
great difficulty in making rigid classifications between discretionary and non-discretionary [legal]
decisions” and that “all decisions should be subject to the same standards of judicial review.”
56

Ibid.
Ibid.
58
See, for example, Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Government of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, at pp. 7-8; Shell
Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231.
59
Baker v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
57
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Consequently, virtually all administrative decisions made in Canada are now potentially reviewable
by the courts.

2. Discretion Defined
Discretion is about power and judgement. It arises in the public domain when officials are
empowered to make decisions on how authority should be exercised in particular circumstances.
Not surprisingly, discretion has been the focus of countless law and policy initiatives designed to
preserve, enhance, check, limit, shape, or eliminate it. 60 The conventional paradigm of discretion is
captured by the observation that where the law ends, discretion begins. In other words, the rule of
law has historically been equated with the notion of justice whereas discretion has been viewed as
the antithesis of the law.61

Philip Anisman observed in 1975 (in the first significant attempt to catalogue discretionary power
in Canada) that the exercise of discretion does not in and of itself suggest any particular value. He
noted: “Depending on the context and the actions of a discretionary decision maker, discretion may
mean beneficence or tyranny, justice or injustice, reasonableness or unreasonableness.”62 Recent
academic articles seem to concur with Anisman’s generalized concept of discretion, stating that
discretion works in varied, historically specific, empirical contexts to enable different forms of
governance. These various forms of governance include progressive dialogic and democratic forms,

60

Anna Pratt & Lorne Sossin, “A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of Discretion” (2009) 24:3 CJLS 301.
[Sossin and Pratt, Discretion] at 301.
61
Ibid.
62
Philip Anisman, ed., A Catalogue of Discretionary Powers in the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975) at Preface.
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hotly political and authoritarian forms, racialized, classed, risk-based, biopolitical, sovereign,
disciplinary, and other oppressive forms.63

Sossin and Pratt discussed the standard dictionary definition of discretion as: "The power or right to
decide or act, according to one's own judgement or choice.” 64 In the context of the administration of
public law and policy, the "freedom to choose" by autonomous decision makers is defined in
natural opposition to the constraints imposed by legal rules. Indeed, the same dictionary defines
"arbitrary" (arbitrariness being the most prevalent concern associated with discretionary decision
making), as "subject only to individual will or judgement, without restriction; contingent only on
one's discretion: an arbitrary decision... having unlimited power; uncontrolled or unrestricted by law;
despotic; tyrannical." 65 In other words, discretion is all about the power of law, autonomy, and
freedom of choice.66

The development of administrative law was shaped by a particular interpretation of A. V. Dicey’s
conception of the rule of law, as expressed in his Introduction to the Study of the law of the
Constitution. 67 Dicey abhorred discretion, which he viewed as antithetical to the rule of law because
he believed that it inherently led to the exercise of arbitrary power. The dominant scholarly view of
discretion (until the advent of the welfare state) was articulated by Dicey in his book Law and
Constitution, first published in 1915:
63

Supra, see note 60 at 302.
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., sub verbo "discretion" as cited in Sossin and
Pratt, Discretion at 302.
65
Ibid. sub verbo “arbitrary”.
66
Supra, see note 72 at 302.
67
First published in 1885, it will be referred to here, unless otherwise indicated, in its 10th edition edited by
E.C.S. Wade: A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (London, MacMillan
and Co. Ltd., 1959) [Dicey, Law of Constitution] as quoted in Genevieve Cartier, Reconceiving Discretion,
from Discretion As Power to Discretion As Dialogue (Doctor of Juridical Science Thesis, University of
Toronto Faculty of Law, 2004). [Cartier, Thesis]
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No man is punishable or can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except for a
distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of
the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based
on the exercise of persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or discretionary powers of
constraint….It means that absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to
the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, or prerogative,
or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. Englishmen are ruled
by law, and by law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be
punished for nothing else.68
Dicey believed that government decisions classified as “legal” should be reviewable while
“discretionary” decisions should not be reviewable. However, considering that all decisions involve
at least some degree of discretion, he failed to explain how to differentiate (in practice) between
“legal” and “discretionary” decisions.
Sharp v. Wakefield, 69 an 1891 English House of Lords case, held that legal and discretionary
decisions were mutually exclusive. It held:
Discretion means that when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of
the authorities that that something is to be according to the rules of reason and justice, not
according to private opinion….according to law, not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague
and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be within the limits to which an honest man
competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. 70
Unfortunately, similar to Dicey’s conception of judicial review, Sharp v. Wakefield failed to
provide any useful guidelines on how to differentiate “discretionary” decisions from “legal” ones.
Amazingly, this arcane notion of discretion was the law in Canada up until Baker in 1999.
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Ibid. at 188 and 202.
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3. Academic View of Discretion
Historically, academics in Canada have viewed discretion as a top-down exercise of state power
that could not be reviewed by ordinary courts.71 In fact, with the notable exception of the 1959
Supreme Court of Canada decision Roncarelli v. Duplessis72 (where Rand J. clearly questioned both
the view of discretion as power and the unchallengeable nature of discretion), this kind of thinking
exercised an overwhelming influence on the conception of discretion and on the structure of judicial
review in Canada.73 In essence, courts limited themselves to policing the boundaries within which
discretion was to be exercised, on the basis that discretion was intrinsically political and outside of
their legitimate domain of intervention. 74

In concert with the rise of the welfare state in the 1960s, students of jurisprudence began to develop
a more progressive view of discretionary decision making. They saw discretion as a "humanizing"
device, permitting decision makers to apply the rules of law to specific circumstances. However,
this individualized application of the law in determining people’s rights provoked many academics
to cling to the traditional power model. Scholars (most notably Kenneth Culp Davis) returned to
their earlier views that administrative discretionary powers were a serious threat, both real and
potential, to individual justice. Since Davis' influential 1969 study Discretionary Justice,
administrative discretion in Canada has most often been posited as an oppositional threat to the rule
of law; as a potential source of abuse and arbitrary state action, that needs to be constrained and
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limited by rules and principles of legality. 75 Davis believed that "discretionary justice" could only
be achieved by minimizing the injustice caused by discretionary authority given to government
officials such as police officers. He wrote “A public officer has discretion whenever the effective
limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.” 76
It was Davis who advanced the notion that all public administration had to be subjected to “fairness
and reasonableness” standards.77

Since the 1960s most jurisprudence on discretion has focussed on the application of legal standards
to constrain the exercise of discretion. In 1986 D.J. Galligan made a significant contribution to the
study of legal discretion as he advanced a framework for approaching discretion as a distinct sphere
of legal action and criticized Davis for, among other things, his failure to include any consideration
of policy making in his study of discretion, arguing that policy making is "the very heart of the
discretionary process:
[It refers to] powers delegated within a system of authority to an official or set of officials,
where they have some significant scope for settling the reasons and standards according to
which power is to be exercised, and for applying them in the making of specific decisions.
The process of settling the reasons and standards must be taken to include not just the more
obvious cases of creating standards where none is given, but also individualizing and
interpreting loose standards, and assessing the relative importance of conflicting standards.
Central to this sense of discretion is the idea that within a defined area of power the official
reflects upon its purposes, and then settles upon the policies and strategies for achieving
them. There may be discretion in identifying and interpreting purposes; there may also be

75

Davis' primary paradigm for discretionary decision-making was police oriented. It was here, in his view,
that "huge concentrations of injustice" invited "drastic reform". Davis' prescription for unchecked discretion
was to advocate for more internal administrative rule-making. K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1969) at 215. For further discussion, see K. Hawkins, "The Use of Legal
Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science" in K. Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992) at 11 as cited in Lorne Sossin, “Discretion and the Culture of Justice” (2006) Sing.
J...L...S. 375. [Sossin, Discretion].
76
Ibid.
77
Sossin and Pratt, Discretion at 303.

26

discretion as to the policies, standards, and procedures to be followed in achieving these
purposes.78

Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to concur with
Galligan’s viewpoint, noting in 1992 that "things are not as simple as Dicey perceived them. The
law is not as certain as he would have it, nor are administrators as arbitrary." 79 In the 1990s legal
scholarship began exploring discretion as a mechanism for dialogue, democratization, and the
enhancement of human dignity. 80 Social scientific scholarship, drawing from a slightly different
conceptual tool kit, also began to explore discretion as a specific mode of governance in its own
right.81
4. Curial Treatment of Discretion
In the 1999 case Baker v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) 82 (in which an
immigration officer denied a Jamaican lady’s application to stay in Canada on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds without providing any reasons) L’Heureux-Dube J. wrote: “The concept of
discretion refers to decisions where the law does not dictate a specific outcome, or where the
decision-maker is given a choice of options within a statutorily imposed set of boundaries.” Robert
Dworkin seemed to concur with her concept in his famous doughnut analogy stating, “Discretion,
like a hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt
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restriction.”83 L’Heureux-Dube and Dworkin effectively encapsulated this conventional view of
discretion in which three main assumptions are embedded: 84
1. The law is the primary instrument of social regulation.
2. Discretion is a residual category of law
3. Discretion is exercised by individuals who, though influenced in a wide variety of ways, are
essentially autonomous. It is…a relative concept.

5. Academic Arguments Re Discretion
The traditional legal debates on discretion have been spearheaded by two main groups of academics
- A. V. Dicey, Lord Hewart, and F.A. Hayek, on the one side, and W. A. Robson, I. Jennings, J.
Willis, and H. Arthurs, on the other. Dicey and company perceive discretion as a threat to
individual liberty, permitting the state to intervene in a way that is uncontrollable by the courts,
either on a procedural or substantive basis. In other words, discretion is conceived as a means of
escaping the rigidities of the law because it does not require any form of communication or
dialogue with the individual or groups affected by its exercise. 85
The second group of scholars view discretion as a practical method of implementing the legitimate
projects of the welfare state, controlled by specialized courts dedicated to the values inherent in
“welfare policies.” In their view, the executive (management) of the civil service provides the
expertise required to implement the projects of the legislative branch, while professionals use their
discretion in administering them. The delegation of discretion to professionals does not imply that
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the executive plays an active role in day to day administration. Quite the contrary, the executive
confers freedom on bureaucrats to make decisions. 86
6. Discretion and the Common Law
As indicated above, Canadian courts have traditionally limited themselves to policing the
boundaries within which discretion is to be exercised, on the basis that discretion is intrinsically
political and outside of their legitimate domain of intervention. The transitional period in the
evolution of legal discretion commenced with two Supreme Court of Canada decisions, Canadian
Union for Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation 87 in 1979 and
Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police 88 in 1981. In both of
these cases, the Court de-emphasized the binary distinction between law and discretion in the
judicial review of administrative decisions. More specifically, CUPE mandated that courts defer to
administrative determinations of the law unless a decision is patently unreasonable (clearly
irrational) while Nicholson recognized that procedural obligations could be imposed on
administrative decision makers by the courts. The CUPE decision in particular created tensions in
the area of judicial review because imposing procedural obligations on administrative decision
makers was difficult to reconcile with the idea of discretion as a top-down exercise of power
unreviewable by the courts (assumed by the majority of judges). 89
These tensions eventually resulted in a major restructuring of judicial review in the 1999 Supreme
Court of Canada case Baker v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration). 90 Baker
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effectively shattered the Nicholson and CUPE distinctions of differentiating legal decisions from
discretionary decisions, suggesting that procedure and substance cannot be conceived as water-tight
compartments. Baker saw discretion as a “space controlled by law” as opposed to being inherently
political, giving the executive branch of government “free reign within legal limits” to make
decisions. 91 Supreme Court Justice L’Heureux–Dube stated “there is no rigid dichotomy between
discretion and law-interpretation, and therefore no justification for different kinds of reviews for
each.” Moreover, she expressed the view that the “pragmatic and functional approach, 92 (developed
for review of interpretations of the law) was also suitable for the review of discretion, since it
(discretion) reflected the two central ideas incorporated in the traditional approach to the review of
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the law: that the decision maker must be given suitable leeway, but that he or she must nonetheless
act within certain limits. 93 L’Heureux-Dube stated:
The pragmatic and functional approach can take into account the fact that the more
discretion that is left to the decision maker, the more reluctant courts should be to interfere
with the manner in which decision makers have made choices among various options.
However, though discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, that
discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the
principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamentals of
Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.94
By applying the pragmatic and functional approach to the control of discretion, Baker marked the
end (at least temporarily) of the dual approach to judicial review of administrative law in Canada.
Baker also held that the test for determining the reasonableness of an administrator’s discretionary
decisions would be based on whether or not written reasons (i.e. procedures) were consistent with
the statute in question. Scholar Genevieve Cartier commented on the transition of administrative
law in Canada:
I submit that courts, through Roncarelli, Nicholson, and Baker, have interpreted formal law
in accordance with principles that internalize those ideals. By imposing on decision makers
exercising discretion both a duty to act fairly (essentially, a hearing requirement that allows
for exchange of information and deliberation on the applicable norms) and a requirement
that they make reasonable substantive findings (including, among other conditions, that
discretionary decisions be faithful to the values underlying the grant of the power and to the
process that preceded their making), these decisions legally impose principles that articulate
participation and accountability. 95

Professor Genevieve Cartier notes that the events of September 11, 2001 revived the idea in Canada
(and in many other common law jurisdictions around the world) that some executive discretionary
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decisions cannot and should not be subject to any substantive judicial control. 96 (In the Supreme
Court of Canada case Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),

97

the Minister

formed the opinion that a refugee who was a risk to Canada’s national security should be deported.
The Court declared that the executive was free to weigh the factors relevant to the decision and that
the reviewing court was limited to ensuring that those factors had been taken into account by the
Minister). Cartier continues that Suresh reflected the judiciary’s unwillingness to undertake a
substantive review of discretionary decisions dealing with matters of national security, returning to
the traditional interpretation of discretion as an exercise of power unreviewable by the courts.98
However, the Court unanimously expressed its commitment to protecting the fundamental values of
Canada's democratic tradition, finding that a discretionary decision to deport an individual to a
country where he or she faced a substantial risk of torture could be made only after a hearing, with
reasons disclosed by the Minister. In other words, the executive is still procedurally constrained in
the exercise of discretion, even in matters of national security. Cartier concludes that the extent to
which procedure constrains any substantive issue is likely to be minimal in national security
decisions.

Note that the Suresh Decision is in stark contrast to Baker, wherein Justice L'Heureux-Dube clearly
indicated that courts could legitimately "re-weigh" the considerations taken into account in the
decision-making process in order to determine the reasonableness of the decision challenged. In
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effect, Suresh retreated from the view of “discretion as dialogue” and reverted back to the more
traditional view of “discretion as power” in circumstances of national security. 99
In the 2012 case Dore v. Barreau du Quebec 100 the court decided that the normal method used by
the courts to determine whether a law infringing a right or freedom is justifiable (i.e. the Oakes
Test)101 does not replace the administrative framework. Instead, whether an adjudicated decision
violates the Charter depends on whether an administrative decision-maker has “disproportionately,
and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right.” This “reasonable analysis” centres on
proportionality, to ensure that a decision interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee “no more
than is necessary given the statutory objectives.” In particular, the court noted the established
principle in Baker that “though discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect,
that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed by the statute, the
principles of the rule of law, the principles administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian
society, and the principles of the Charter.”

7. Modern Legal Theories on Discretion

Scholar Genevieve Cartier maintains that since Baker, a proper understanding of the legal
constraints imposed on discretion implies a conception of discretion as dialogue as opposed to the
traditional conception of discretion as power where courts have no authority. She argues that the
normative foundations for this new conception of discretion can be found in a combination of a
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relational theory 102 exemplified in writings by J. Nedelsky, a democratic theory103 of the kind
expressed by H. Richardson,104 and a vulnerability theory,105 articulated by J.Handler and L. Sossin.
She suggests that vulnerability, relationality and democracy can be linked together in a number of
illuminating ways:

[A] relational view of autonomy better encapsulates the reality of the modern welfare state
than the traditional atomistic understanding of that notion. Discretion as dialogue not only
understands what is important about the relational aspect of autonomy, but provides the
space for that aspect to be realized. And here, Richardson’s democratic theory helps us to
understand how democracy requires that the administrative state be reconfigured to structure
that space in the right way. In turn, vulnerability theories remind us that for vulnerable
people to be autonomous within a relational framework, the state must itself abide by values
that provide relational autonomy. Hence, vulnerability requires the state to participate in the
development of fruitful relations with the individuals and as a result, to sustain autonomy
and democracy. 106
Cartier further argues that her view of discretion as dialogue contributes to the recognition of the
legitimacy of the administrative state. In other words, her conception of discretion as dialogue
favours the realization of the legitimate projects of the welfare state, while at the same time
recognizing a role for the rule of law in government. She states:
Indeed, solutions to contemporary legal questions can hardly be crafted in the light of
obsolete theoretical principles and assumptions. As an alternative, I have suggested that a
102
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dialogic model of discretion and a "rule-of-law project" can together help to alleviate the
tensions between discretion as a fundamental attribute of a welfare state and the necessity of
preserving individuals from arbitrary exercises of state power. However, conceptual models
that seem well adjusted to the contemporary challenges of the welfare state are not
necessarily easily transferable to practice. I suggest that discretion as dialogue is a
promising way ahead in thinking about the principles and values that must be protected in
the context of today's legal institutional arrangements, but we still need to appraise the
concrete challenges raised by dialogue and to understand the effect that it produces on the
very persons involved in its exercise. 107
In a series of essays, 108 Lorne Sossin claims that it is both necessary and possible to democratize
bureaucracy, and that discretionary powers can contribute significantly to democratization. 109
Sossin suggests that we should apply Haberman’s theory110 of communicative action to
bureaucracy, and argues that administrative discretion can be legitimated on communicative
grounds;111 that is, on the basis of reasons that are good in the sense that they are consensually
agreed to.112 This, Sossin remarks, is deeply opposed to the traditional academic view of public
administration, premised on the need to separate administration from politics, and therefore
administrative decision makers from political influence writ large. 113 Sossin believes that public
administration can be transformed in order to operate rationally from a communicative perspective.
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He finds Dworkin's "hole in the doughnut" analogy for discretion (in which the law is a belt

surrounding discretion) unsatisfactory. In its place he offers up the analogy of a sponge (in which
discretion is intertwined with the law, similar to water embedded in a sponge). Sossin believes that
the law must capture discretion's potential as a forum for politics. 115

Sossin further develops a conception of “discretion as engagement,” with the aspiration to nurture
dialogue and interdependence between decision makers and individuals affected by discretionary
decisions. His theory of engagement is premised on the idea that “people will accept a judgment as
legitimate when they believe that the means by which the decision was rendered were just” but also
if the determination itself is just.116 While he admits that “it is not possible to assume that all
citizens can or should be allowed to take part in all administrative decisions which have a public
dimension, it is necessary... that those affected are engaged in [and by] the discretionary judgments
which public officials are called upon to make.” 117

In summary, discretion has been at the centre of some of the most controversial issues relating to
the idea of administrative law and the administrative state for over a hundred years in Canada. It has
been viewed from many perspectives including the embodiment of arbitrariness, 118 a threat to the
rule of law,119 and as a necessary condition for the realization of the many missions of the welfare
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state.120 However, discretion as a binary contrast to law remains the dominant paradigm in Canada
today. This paradigm is best expressed in Baker:
Though discretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, that discretion
must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the
rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society,
and the principles of the Charter.121

8. Impact of Administrative Guidelines on Discretion
Canadian law currently dictates that guidelines may not restrain the choices available to a
discretionary decision-maker. For instance, in the 1994 Ontario Court of Appeal case Ainsley
Financial Corporation v. Ontario Securities Commission 122 the court distinguished between policy
and law in acknowledging the practical reality of the functionally binding nature of guidelines. In
Ainsley the Ontario Securities Commission acted under a broad regulatory authority, but not one
that empowered the Commission to issue binding policies. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in
reviewing a policy statement issued by the Commission regarding the marketing and sale of penny
stocks, stated:
There is no bright line which always separates a guideline from a mandatory provision having the
effect of law. At the centre of the regulatory continuum one shades into the other. Nor is the
language of the particular instrument determinative. There is no magic to the use of the word
"guideline," just as no definitive conclusion can be drawn from the use of the word "regulate." An
examination of the language of the instrument is but a part, albeit an important part, of the
characterization process. In analyzing the language of the instrument, the focus must be on the thrust
of the language considered in its entirety and not on isolated words or passages. 123
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The Court concluded that the policy was ultra vires the Commission because it purported to bind
the Commission’s staff, an authority reserved to the legislature. The first issue addressed by the
court was the policy's format. Rather than containing general principles, standards, or factors to be
used as a guide to decision making, the policy read like a "minutely detailed regime complete with
prescribed forms, exemptions from the regime, and exceptions to the exemptions." 124 Secondly, the
Court found that the coercive tone of the policy (which included the suggestion of a threat of
sanction against a broker for non-compliance) demonstrated that Commission staff "would treat
Policy Statement 1.10 as if it were the equivalent of a statutory provision or regulation." 125

The court’s ruling in Ainsley meant that the Ontario pension regulator, the Financial Services
Commission of Ontario (FSCO), could not issue explicitly binding pension policies, nor could its
employees’ discretion be restricted by any particular guideline without statutory authority.126 In
other words, pension plan members or a plan sponsor (i.e. employer) may challenge the pension
regulator’s decision in court if the decision was fettered by guidelines which were too restrictive in
allowing a decision maker (i.e. actuaries valuing DB pension plans) to exercise his or her
discretion. 127
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Professor Gerald Heckman discusses how specific statutes define the concept of discretion either
broadly or narrowly. 128 He contrasts the broad nature of the 1995 Ontario Labour Relations Act
(which states that the labour relations board "may inquire into the complaint of a contravention of
this Act129) to the Ontario Human Rights Code (OHRC), which states “where the Ontario Human
Rights Commission has not affected a settlement of a complaint, it may refer the subject-matter of
the complaint to the board of inquiry if it appears that the procedure is appropriate and that the
evidence warrants an inquiry.” 130 In reference to the Patent Act,131 he states that although the Act
does not expressly confer discretion on a re-examination board to initiate a re-examination, the
board's interpretation of what is a "substantial new question" involves "the exercise of an implicit
discretion to elaborate unclear legislative instructions." 132 The Act states:
A re-examination board under the Patent Act shall cause a re-examination of a patent claim
if it finds that a request for re-examination raises a substantial new question affecting the
patentability of the claim.
Both the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) and the Ontario Pension Benefits
Act (PBA) defer to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries for the oversight of actuarial discretion. The
PBSA states:

Except as otherwise specified by the Superintendent, the actuarial reports must be prepared
in accordance with the standards of practice adopted by the Canadian Institute of
Actuaries.133
Similar wording is used in the PBA.
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Section 3210 of The Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of Practice Guidelines discusses the
duties of actuaries which require professional discretion. Note how general many of the guidelines
actually are, providing actuaries with significant leeway in their valuation of DB plans:134

.01 The

actuary’s advice on the funded status or funding of a pension plan should take account of the
circumstances of the work.
.02 The

actuary should select an actuarial cost method that is consistent with the circumstances of the

work.
.03 The

actuary should select an asset valuation method that is consistent with the circumstances of the

work.
.04 The

actuary’s advice on the funded status of a pension plan should take account of the pension
plan’s benefits at the calculation date, except that the actuary’s advice may anticipate a pending
amendment to the pension plan that increases the value of its benefits .
.05 The

actuary’s advice on the funded status or funding of a pension plan should take account of
expenses if they are expected to be paid from the pension plan’s assets.
.06 The

actuary’s advice on the funded status or funding of a pension plan may, consistent with the
circumstances of the work, take into account the value and the terms of a letter of credit of which the
pension plan is the beneficiary.
.07 If

the actuary is providing advice on funding:

• The actuary should determine the next calculation date, and
• The actuary’s advice on funding should cover at least the period between the calculation date and the
next calculation date.....

It is clear from the above CIA guidelines that actuaries are given considerable deference in valuing
defined benefit pension plans’ funding requirements. However, regulators such as the Financial
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The Canadian Institute of Actuaries, The Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of Practice, Section
3210-Advice on the Funded Status or Funding of a Pension Plan-General. (Toronto: 2013 at 3004).
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Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) have checked actuaries’ discretion by mandating
disclosures such as:135

1. A description of how fair value has been determined for all investments that are not
financial instruments.
2.A description of the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which
the plan is exposed at the end of the period, and how the administrator manages those risks;
3. A credit ratings schedule of interest-bearing financial instruments (AAA, BBB etc.).
4. A maturity analysis of interest-bearing financial instruments.
5. A sensitivity analysis of the foreign currency denominated financial instruments, with
regard to a possible change of 5 per cent in the foreign currency exchange rate (one analysis
for each applicable foreign currency subject to the materiality requirement).
6. A sensitivity analysis of interest-bearing financial instruments, with regard to a possible
change of 1 per cent in the overall level of interest rates.
7. A sensitivity analysis of equity financial instruments, with regard to a possible change of 10
per cent in the appropriate equity index benchmark (one analysis for each applicable category
of equity investments permitted by the SIP&P and subject to the materiality requirement).
8. The methods and assumptions used in preparing these sensitivity analyses.
For example, a 2013 actuarial valuation performed by Mercer (Canada Ltd.)136on the City of
Toronto’s defined benefit pension plan includes a sensitivity analysis illustrating the significance of
an actuary’s discretion on funding levels by changing the discount rate by only 10%:

The Pension Fund of The Metropolitan Toronto Pension Plan 137
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Equity price risk
The Plan holds equity financial instruments. The Plan is therefore exposed to equity price risk as
the value of equity financial instruments will fluctuate due to changes in equity prices. The
following sensitivity analysis summarizes the impact on the Plans net assets available for benefits,
following a general 10% change in equity prices. For equity price risk of the Plans pooled fund
investment, the equity price risk is managed by the investment manager of the pooled fund
investment.

135

Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Disclosure Requirements for Financial Statements Filed
Pursuant to Regulation 909 s. 76, 2013 at 6. Online: <
www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/policies/active/.../FSGN-001.pdf >.
136
Mercer is a human resource and related financial services consulting firm.
137
The Pension Fund of the Metropolitan of Toronto Pension Plan, Financial Statements (2013) at 9 Online: <
www1.toronto.ca/City%20Of%20Toronto/Pension...%20Employee%20B >.
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2013

Fair Value
$

Impact (+/- 10%)
$

Directly held Investments
Canadian equities

66,466, 704

6,646,670

Foreign equities

147,475,351

14,747,535

Indirectly held in pooled Funds
Pooled equity funds
63,713,051
_____________________________________
Total
277,655,106

6,371,305
27,765,510

Note that a 10% difference in the actuary’s estimate of equity returns changes the plan’s asset
valuation by almost 28 million dollars.
Section 87(6) of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act states that the Superintendent of FSCO has the
authority to request that a new actuary be retained to perform a plan’s valuation if he or she is
dissatisfied with the previous actuary’s valuation. It states:
Special order re preparation of report
(6) In such circumstances as may be prescribed, the Superintendent may make an order requiring an
administrator, an employer or any other person to prepare and file a new report or another prescribed
type of report in respect of a pension plan if the Superintendent is of the opinion that there are reasonable
and probable grounds to believe,
(a) that there is a substantial risk to the security of the benefits payable under the pension plan to
members, former members, retired members or other persons entitled to payments under the pension
plan; or
(b) that there has been a significant change in the circumstances of the pension plan. 2010, c. 9, s. 75.
Same
(7) An order under subsection (6) may,
(a) specify the assumptions or methods or both to be used in the preparation of the report;
(b) require an employer or other person to give the administrator any information necessary to prepare the
report;
(c) require the administrator, employer or other person to pay all or part of the cost of preparing the report;
and
(d) specify one or more deadlines or periods for complying with the order. 2010, c. 9, s. 75.

However, the pension plan administrator (generally the employer in single employer defined benefit
plans) may apply for an administrative review of the Superintendent’s decision to request a new
valuation. The first review must be performed by FSCO’s Financial Services Tribunal and failing
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that, a judicial review by the court is permitted as per section 88(5) of the Ontario Pension Benefits
Act (PBA):
Effect of judicial review
88 (5) An application for judicial review of an order made under subsection 87 (6) or under subsection (4),
and any appeal from an order of the court on the application for judicial review, does not stay the order
made under subsection 87 (6) or under subsection (4), as the case may be. 2010, c. 9, s. 75.

In other words, the Superintendent’s decisions are reviewable at both the quasi-judicial
(administrative) and judicial levels in Canada. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of
Financial Services) 138 is an example where the Superintendents decision was initially appealed to
the Financial Services Tribunal and ultimately all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The foregoing discussion of debates by academics and judges alike on “professional discretion and
the law” demonstrates their preoccupation with rendering the exercise of professional discretion
effectively accountable across both social and economic life in Canada. This thesis considers a
number of methods of rendering actuaries, specifically, accountable for the exercise of their
professional discretion in estimating the funding requirements of private sector single employer
defined benefit pension plans.

138

Monsanto v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), [2004] 3 SCR 152.
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CHAPTER 2
CURRENT FUNDING AND REGULATORY REGIMES GOVERNING DEFINED
BENEFIT PENSION PLANS IN CANADA
1. Overview
Chapter 1introduced the concept of two tier defined benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada,
highlighting the stark contrast between public sector workers (who are nearly all registered in
defined benefit plans guaranteeing them incomes for life) and private sector workers, the vast
majority of whom either have no employer sponsored pension plan at all, or are registered in
defined contribution plans offering no income guarantees. It then discussed the magnitude of the
funding problem in private sector single employer DB plans, before concluding with a literature
review of “professional discretion and the law”. Chapter 2 discusses the general regulatory regimes
overseeing actuarial discretion and underfunding, revealing that private sector Single Employer
Defined Benefit Pension Plans (SEDPPs), the focus of this thesis, require more extensive analysis,
receive more intensive oversight and are required to meet different funding expectations than other
types of plans.

Even though occupational pension plans originate in voluntary decisions by plan sponsors and
members, they receive significant public support through tax deferrals. Such financial support is
based on the policy objective of ensuring adequate income for retirees by encouraging saving for
retirement. Employment-based pension plans provide a significant proportion of retirement income
to approximately 6 million or 40% of Canadian workers.139 Over 80% of public sector employees

139

A “pension plan” is the document or set of documents that sets out the employer’s pension obligations to
employees, former employees who have a right to a pension benefit, retirees and their beneficiaries. It
typically contains the employer’s contribution obligation, the formula for calculating the pension benefits
earned while working for the employer and the conditions that entitle one to receive a pension fund. A
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were registered in occupational pension plans in 2012 compared to only 25% of private sector
employees.140 These workplace plans have been integrated with other public policy initiatives to
provide guaranteed minimum incomes for older citizens.141 The governance and regulation of
employment-based pension plan funding, therefore, has important public policy implications.
A. Pension Governance
Pension plan governance is about delivering on the pension promise consistent with the pension
plan documents and pension legislation. Pension plan legislation mandates that the pension plan
administrator (normally the employer in single employer defined benefit plans) is the body
ultimately responsible for the governance of the pension plan. 142 Governance may be defined as
“the structure and processes for overseeing, managing and administering a defined benefit pension
plan to ensure that fiduciary and other obligations of the plan are met.”143 Processes and structures
define the division of power and establish mechanisms to ensure the accountability of all funding,
investment, and administration activities. Funding activities include: 144
1. Establishing funding policies for the pension plan (e.g. targeted funding position such as
fully funded, over-funded, under-funded, surplus cushions, immunization etc.).
“pension fund” is the sum of all pension contributions and investment earnings on those contributions that is
the source from which all pension benefits are paid. It must be held by a third party for the benefit of those
entitled under the terms of the pension plan (Ron Davis, Is Your Defined-Benefit Pension Guaranteed?
Funding Rules, Insolvency Law and Pension Insurance: Institute for Research on Public Policy (2011) at 34.
[Davis, Guarantee]
140
Statistics Canada, “Pensions In Canada” (2013) Table 280-0016 (Cansim). Online: <
www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/.../famil120a-eng.htm >.
141
According to a study based on data for 2006-07, private pensions play an important role in retirement
income: “income security benefits [Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement and the Canada
Pension Plan] and private pensions make up the vast majority of individuals’ income starting at age
65…Starting at age 55, [private] pensions represent 50% of income [for retired males]…Retirees with
employment-based pensions or income from a [Registered Retirement Income Fund] have low, almost
negligible, low-income rates while those without a pension have higher rates particularly at ages before 65.
(Baker and Milligan 2009) as cited in Davis, Guarantee at 34.
142
Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA), Guideline No. 4- Pension Plan
Governance Guidelines and Self -Assessment Questionnaire (2004) at 3.
143
Ibid.
144
The Association of Canadian Pension Management, Governance of Pension Plans (1997) at 11.
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2. Selecting the actuarial cost method to apportion annual funding (e.g. projected unit credit,
aggregate method, entry age normal method etc.) and assumptions (e.g., inflation,
investment return, salary growth, etc.). (See Appendix 2 on page 271).
3. Determining the current funded status of the pension plan through actuarial valuations and
deciding when to file with regulatory authorities.
4. Calculating the pension plan’s desired and actual impact on the employer’s financial
statements.
5. Preparation of financial statements for the pension plan.
6. Managing the pension plan’s cash flow.
In the recent past, pension plan governance issues have emerged in three main areas. First, as
suggested by Ambachtsheer,145 there is a concern about the quality of plan governance. This issue
arises in part out of a concern about the day to day management of the schemes per se and in part
out of a concern about how large amounts of capital are being managed. 146 Secondly, the
Association of Canadian Pension Management’s (ACPMs) has highlighted the conflict faced by
sponsors acting in the dual capacity of employers and fiduciaries, noting that at some imprecise
point the employer role gives way to a fiduciary duty to employees. Thirdly, there are governance
issues concerning conflicts of interest on the part of actuaries. Professor Ron Davis addresses the
extent to which the potential and actual conflicts of interest that pervade pension fund
administration and investment have influenced the corporate governance activities of pension funds,
stating:
Certainly Enron and the fallout from the failure of corporate gatekeepers to exercise even a
minimum of corporate oversight of corporate governance provide an opportunity to revisit whether
or not it is wise to leave the corporate governance function in the hands of the experts. 147
145

Keith Ambachtsheer, “Cleaning Up the Pension Mess: Why It Will Take More Money” (Toronto: C. D.
Howe Institute, 2004).
146
Evidence of this concern at the international level is presented in OECD [2005].
147
Enron was a U.S. energy-trading and utilities company that housed one of the biggest accounting frauds
in history. Enron's executives employed accounting practices that falsely inflated the company's revenues,
which, at the height of the scandal, made the firm become the seventh largest corporation in the United
States. Once the fraud came to light, the company quickly unraveled and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
Dec. 2, 2001. Enron shares traded as high as $85 before the fraud was discovered, but plummeted to

$0.30 in the sell-off after the fraud was revealed (Investopedia).
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Each of the above three governance issues is discussed in subsequent chapters.148

B. Classical Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plan Funding Risk
In a classical DB plan, the traditional argument is that almost all of the pension risk is carried by the
plan sponsor, including:149
1. Investment risk
2. Expense risk
3. Inflation risk (if the benefit includes cost of living increases over the payout period)
4. Interest rate risk
5. Longevity risk
However, Professor Keith Ambachtsheer of the Rotman School of Management suggests that the
embedded risks in defined benefit plans (and who bears them) are seldom clearly stated and rarely
understood by the plan fiduciaries, or by the plan participants themselves:
In fixed contribution defined contribution (DC) plans (similar to RRSPs) it is reasonably
clear that plan participants bear the risk that the assets accumulated at retirement may not be
sufficient. In defined benefit (DB) plans however, there is a fiction that all risk-bearing is
done by the employer, and that employees are guaranteed a pre-defined pension on
retirement. In practice, this is not how things usually work. It is true that the employer is on
the hook to make additional contributions when calculated plan liabilities exceed assets.
However, plan participants are risk bearers too. For example, the employer may go broke or
simply terminate the plan. Employee pension contributions may also rise. Even if not
directly, higher employer pension contributions could lead to lower current compensation
Ron Davis, “The Enron Pension Jigsaw: Assembling Accountable Corporate Governance by Fiduciaries”
(2003) 36 UBC L Rev at 571.
148
Bob Baldwin, “Determinants of the Evolution of Workplace Pensions in Canada” (Toronto: Caledon
Institute of Social Policy, 2007) at 38.
149
John Broadbent, Michael Palumbo and Elizabeth Woodman, The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined
Contribution Plans-Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Management, Bank of Canada (2006) at 7.
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for employees. Different plans have different vesting provisions. A significant portion of the
inflation risk embedded in DB plans is typically borne by plan participants, and not the
employer. For example, some plans promise only fixed dollar pensions that may be updated
from time to time, depending on the financial health of the pension plan balance sheet.
Other plans promise pension benefits related to final earnings, but are silent regarding postretirement inflation protection. In short, despite the risk-free fiction, DB plans are virtually
always risk-sharing arrangements.150

Employers will generally argue that the resultant defined benefit costs in private sector plans are
ultimately borne by shareholders of the company or even consumers (if goods produced by the
company go up in price). However, employees will argue that all of these risks are ultimately borne
by the workers through their total compensation package. In other words, if an employer’s pension
costs rise, employees’ wage increases are reduced accordingly.
It is important to note that public sector defined benefit pension plans are generally more viable
than their private sector counterparts because government sponsors can rely on guaranteed tax
revenues to meet their funding commitments.
2. Current Funding Status of DB Plans In Canada
According to Aon Hewitt’s151 annual survey of plan sponsors, most defined benefit pension plan
sponsors in Canada had to make additional contributions toward their pension plan deficits in 2012.
Approximately 97% of defined benefit pension plans in the survey had a solvency deficiency at the
end of 2012. (The solvency funded ratio measures the financial health of a defined benefit pension
plan by comparing the amount of assets to total pension liabilities in the event of plan

150

Keith Ambachtsheer, Cleaning Up the Pension Mess: Why It Will Take More Than Money, C.D. Howe
Institute, 2004 at 2.
151
Aon Canada offers a range of sophisticated advisory and consulting services in risk control and risk
management, reinsurance, and human capital. It designs, structures and implements solutions that may
involve traditional insurance products or risk-transfer programs, alternative financing techniques, or entirely
new products to address a specific problem.
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termination). 152 However, strong equity returns and rising long-term interest rates in 2013 resulted
in a dramatic year of improvement in the funding status of Canadian pension plans. Almost 40% of
pension plans tracked by Mercer153 were fully funded at the end of 2013 compared to 6% a year
earlier. Furthermore, only 6% were less than 80% funded, down sharply from 60% in 2012. 154
Note that long-term interest rates fell in the second quarter of 2014, leaving most pension plans
treading water, with minimal change in their funding status since 2013. (Pension plans use longterm interest (discount) rates to calculate the current value of their pension liabilities; i.e. lower
rates increase a plan’s obligations. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, according
to Aon Hewitt, pension funding is now at its highest level since the 2007 global financial crisis with
37 per cent of plans in a surplus position as of June 2014.155
This resurgence in funding does not mean the trend of declining defined benefit plan membership is
likely to be reversed anytime soon according to Manual Monteiro of Mercer Financial Strategy
Group:156
It’s hard to overstate how good 2013 was for most defined benefit pension plans…but that
doesn’t mean companies and other plan sponsors are likely to reverse the trend away from
defined-benefit pension plans that guarantee specific payments to retiring employees.
Rather, they are being urged by pension consultants to take advantage of the improved
health picture and re-think strategies…. After 12 stomach-churning years of turbulence,
152

Aon Hewitt, News Release, “Canadian Defined Benefit Pension Plans’ Solvency Improves Slightly in
2012” (03 Jan. 2013). Online: < www.newswire.ca/.../canadian-defined-benefit-pension-plans-solvency-i.>.
153
Mercer is one of the largest consulting firms in the world, operating internationally in more than 40
countries with more than 19,000 employees. (Wikipedia). Online: <
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercer_(consulting_firm) >.
154

Barbara Shecter,”Defined Benefit Plans Healthier than Ever But Don’t Expect to See More of Them”
Financial Post, (2 January 2014) FP Street. Online: < www.business.financialpost.com/2014/.../canadianpension-plans-start-2014-at >.
155
Janet MacFarland, “Growth of Canadian Pension Funds Slow in Second Quarter”, Globe and Mail, (30
June 2014). Report on Business. Online :< www.theglobeandmail.com › Report on Business >.
156
Barbara Shecter,”Defined Benefit Plans Healthier than Ever But Don’t Expect to See More of Them”
Financial Post, (2 January 2014) FP Street. Online: < www.business.financialpost.com/2014/.../canadianpension-plans-start-2014-at >.
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many plan sponsors will agree in retrospect that they were too exposed to pension risk.
Exposure to interest rate fluctuations and equities can change the fortunes of a pension plan
rapidly and dramatically, as demonstrated in 2001, 2008 and 2011…. Risk reduction
strategies employed by some pension plan sponsors last year included lower-risk asset
mixes and settling a portion of liabilities through the annuity market…As companies with
defined benefit pension plans struggled to fund their obligations in recent years, many opted
to stop offering the guaranteed retirement benefits to new employees. Others considered
ways to trim their exposure by reducing benefits or paying upfront to hive off obligations.
Such de-risking strategies can be costly, particularly in a low interest rate environment, and
often aren’t designed to pull pension plans out of a current funding deficit position. A
stronger funding position could make de-risking more palatable.
Keith Ambachtsheer, a veteran pension expert and a director of the Rotman International Centre for
Pension Management concurs with Monteiro stating that corporations are done with DB plans and
that he does not anticipate a “resurgence” but rather, more “de-risking” through means such as
liability transfers to insurance companies. 157
A growing number of experts believe that there are underlying causes of the funding problems of
defined benefit plans that must be urgently addressed.158 The obvious solution is for employers with
pension deficits to make additional payments, as required under federal and provincial pension
benefits laws. The problem with this solution is that many companies experiencing financial
difficulties cannot afford to make the additional payments without risking going into bankruptcy.
Even financially sound companies are refusing to fund their pension deficits because of low profits
157

Ibid.
See Ronald B. Davis in Is Your Defined-Benefit Pension Guaranteed? Funding Rules, Insolvency Law
and Pension Insurance, IRRP Study (2011). (Over the past few years…. major Canadian employers have
faced multi-million or multi-billion-dollar shortfalls in the funding of their pension plans at a time when their
cash flow is insufficient to pay the additional special payment contributions required to bring their pension
funds to full funding over a reasonable period of time …. These additional contribution obligations are
triggered by law when an actuarial valuation discloses that the value of the assets in the pension fund has
fallen below the amount needed to pay those benefits earned to the date of the valuation. The global
financial crisis of 2007-09 led to an extreme drop in the value of pension assets just as employers faced
major cash-flow challenges. The substantial pension deficits of such major corporations as Air Canada,
Stelco, Abitibi Bowater, Nortel and General Motors have been a significant factor in their entry into
insolvency proceedings. In some cases, these substantial deficits existed well before the fall in the value of
pension fund assets that occurred as a result of the global financial crisis.)
158
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in these difficult economic times, raising the question, “Why aren’t regulators demanding that
companies meet their pension fund obligations?” The challenge pension regulators face is how to
reduce these solvency deficits without forcing companies into receivership or alternatively,
converting their defined benefit plans into defined contribution plans.
A. Federal and Provincial DB Funding Regulations
There were effectively no controls on defined benefit pension funding in Canada until the 1960s.
An actuary’s advice to clients on funding and other aspects of plan financing was based on the costs
and risks inherent in the plans themselves.

Regulatory laws are applicable to all private sector pension plans. In most jurisdictions, these laws
do not apply to pension plans that the federal and provincial governments have set up for their own
employees. Furthermore, registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) or tax assisted individual
retirement savings accounts are not covered by these occupational pension plan regulations.

Pension benefit laws in Canada have evolved significantly over the past 40 years. In the first stage
of their evolution (in the late 1960s and 1970s), the first pension benefit laws were enacted
provincially and federally, establishing minimum regulatory standards applying to occupational
pension plans. These standards amounted to meeting minimum funding standards without
exceeding federal tax deductible limits. However, since the 1970s the inherent risk plan sponsors
have had to face from their pension plans has changed significantly. Once small fringe benefits,
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retirement plans have grown to become substantial financial commitments with the accompanying
risk.159

In the second stage (in the 1980s and early1990s), the minimum regulatory standards were
improved and strengthened. Emphasis was placed on broadening membership in occupational
pension plans (to include part-time workers), enhancing the rights of members (by shortening the
length of the period of service needed to acquire the right to a pension) and expanding benefits
(instituting survivors’ pensions).160

The third stage in the evolution of DB pension laws in Canada (2000 to present) focused on
governance and funding. Bill 236, the first major pension reform legislation to affect Ontario in
decades, was passed into law on May 18, 2010 as the Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 2010. It
introduced immediate vesting (among other things) for all accrued pension benefits (past and
future). Ontario’s second pension reform bill (Bill 120) was introduced on October 21, 2010. The
federal government also introduced substantial changes to the Pension Benefits Standards Act,
1985161 and to the Income Tax Act 162 by adopting an omnibus bill (Bill C-9) on July 12, 2010.
Immediate vesting and more flexible funding rules, including accepting “letters of credit” as
pension assets, were mandated for federally incorporated companies. 163

159

New Orleans Health/Pension Spring Meeting, “Addressing the Financial Risks of Retirement Systems:
Actuary’s Role in Managing Risk, and How that Fits in Our Standards of Practice” (2005) at 1. Online: <
www.soa.org/library/proceedings/.../rsa05v31n282sem.pdf >.
160

Edward Tamango, The Management and Regulation of Occupational Pension Plans in Canada, Caledon
Institute of Social Policy (2007) at 2.
161
Pension Benefits Standards Act 1985 c.32 (2nd Supp.)
162
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.1 (5th Supp.)
163
Jean-Pierre A. Laporte and Susan G. Seller, Pension Reform: Ontario’s Bill 236 and Canada’s C-9 Are
Now Law-Are You Ready?” Bennett Jones, 2010. Online: <
www.bennettjones.com/.../Pension_Reform__Ontario’s_Bill_236_and_C >.
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There are currently nine distinct provincial pension regulators (P.E.I. is the only province without
pension standards legislation) as well as a federal regulator in Canada. In most cases, pension law
falls within the provincial power to regulate "property and civil rights" set out in the Constitution
Act, 1867.164 Federal legislation governs pensions associated with federal undertakings, such as
banks and railroads and also regulates pensions in the three territories. Two-thirds of the
occupational pension plans in Canada (which include 60% of all occupational plan members) are
registered in three jurisdictions-federal, Ontario and Quebec. 165 The operative statutes are the
Pension Benefits Act166 (the "PBA") in Ontario, the Supplemental Pension Plans Act167 in Quebec
and the Pension Benefits Standards Act168 (the "PBSA") federally.

In order to protect workers who often suffer from a lack of information and inequality in bargaining
power, governments have curtailed certain aspects of an employer's freedom to contract into and
out of pension arrangements by legislating minimum regulatory standards to which every sponsor
must adhere. One of the most important of these statutes regulates pension funding. In an attempt to
defray the risks associated with a sponsor's failure, s.55 of the Ontario PBA addresses pre-funding
of DB pensions:169

(1) A pension plan is not eligible for registration unless it provides for funding sufficient to provide
the pension benefits, ancillary benefits and other benefits under the pension plan in accordance with
this Act and the regulations.
(2) An employer required to make contributions under a pension plan... shall make the contributions
in accordance with the prescribed requirements for funding and shall make the contributions in the
prescribed manner and at the prescribed times.
164

(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3. S. 92(13), reprinted in R.C.S. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
Edward Tamango, The Management and Regulation of Occupational Pension Plans in Canada, Caledon
Institute of Social Policy, 2007.
166
Ontario PBA, R.S.O. 1990.
167
Supplemental Pension Plans Act, RSQ, c R-15.1.
168
nd
Federal PBSA, 1985 (R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2 Supp.)).
169
Ontario PBA, R.S.O. 1990.
165
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Wording to similar effect appears in the federal PBSA. The present value of a plan's assets and
liabilities must be calculated periodically (at least every 3 years) using an actuarial valuation in
order to inform the sponsor of any necessary contributions required to fully fund a plan’s promised
benefits. In preparing these reports, actuaries rely on certain assumptions, including assumptions
about members' life spans and the rate of return on the investment of plan funds. The actuarial
valuation may disclose that there are insufficient assets in the plan fund to meet obligations
(liabilities) promised as of the valuation date, in which case the plan is called insolvent (at least
temporarily). The amount by which the pension fund falls short is called the unfunded liability.
Provincial and federal pension regulators are required to ensure that sponsors make "special
payments" on schedule to re-establish their plans’ solvency. 170 Until recently, the maximum time
limit for these solvency payments was 5 years under federal, Quebec and Ontario laws. However, in
response to the funding problems that many defined benefit plans in Canada have encountered in
recent years, the repayment period has been extended up to ten years. 171
3. Factors Contributing to the Decline of Defined Benefit Pensions
A. Mismatch of Assets and Liabilities

A greater focus on plan liabilities by sponsors, combined with reduced expectations for returns, is
currently affecting pension sector investment and risk management in three ways. First, large
private occupational funds are beginning to modify their policy mix, reducing exposure to publicly
traded equities in favour of more conservative assets that aim to enhance returns, reduce risk and/or
better match the long duration of plan liabilities (i.e. changing the asset mix of a pension plan with
170

Mark Firman, “Protection for Private Pension Plans: What Canada Can Learn from the U.S. Employee
Retirement Income Security” (2009) 67:2 UT Fac L Rev at 208.
171
Edward Tamango, The Management and Regulation of Occupational Pension Plans in Canada, Caledon
Institute of Social Policy, 2006 Online: < www.caledoninst.org/publications >.
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$200 million of assets from an allocation of 60% equities, 40% bonds mix to a lower risk allocation
of 30% equities, 70% bonds could result in an immediate increase in the annual pension cost of
$2.5 million). 172 Second, asset/liability matching is being implemented by investing in fixed-income
portfolios to better manage funding risk (i.e. a company invests in 20 year government bonds to
match liabilities due in 20 years). Finally, the passive management strategies that dominated
pension investment in the 1990s are giving way to renewed focus on active management (i.e.
companies are pursuing more professional investment advice). 173

B. Demographics

Demographic changes are often cited as contributing considerably to the decline in workplace
pensions. Population aging, in particular, generates great pressure on pension systems in all
industrialized welfare states. The proportion of citizens aged 65 or over is expected to double to
approximately 25% of the total population within the next 25 years, as the “first wave” of Canada’s
9 million baby boomers will have turned 65. This will pose 2 major challenges for defined benefit
pension plans:

1) The ratio of active to retired plan members is likely to fall considerably.
2) As the workforce ages and as longevity increases, more retirees will have to be supported
for longer periods of time.
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Gavin Benjamin, Barriers to Pension Plan De-risking, Benefits Canada, 2013. Online:
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While these developments ought to have been foreseeable, studies suggest that many plan sponsors
and their actuaries have been using out-of-date mortality tables, underestimating plans’ liabilities by
as much as 15%.174
In 2013 the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) created the first ever uniquely Canadian mortality
tables (no American data was used) that will in all likelihood lead to higher contributions for
defined benefit pension plans. The CIA study revealed that the life expectancy of a 60 year old male
has increased by 2.9 years (from 24.4 to 27.3 years), while the life expectancy of a 60 year old
female has increased by 2.7 years (from 26.7 years to 29.4 years). Although the effect will vary
from plan to plan, Towers Watson, a consulting firm, says that adoption of the new mortality tables
could immediately increase defined benefit plans’ liabilities by 5% to 10%. 175 Gavin Benjamin of
Towers Watson176 discusses the impact of these new mortality statistics:
Just as sponsors were beginning to see a reduction in their pension deficits due to improvements in
the global equity markets and rising interest rates in 2013, the increase in life expectancy suggested
by the CIA study could reverse much of this again. 177

C. Federal Tax Policy

Pension lawyer Ari Kaplan notes that the Income Tax Act (ITA) regulates virtually every aspect of
pension plan funding in Canada. Income tax regulations set a “ceiling” on employer contributions
to DB plans in order to limit the amount of taxable income a company can defer. Federal (PBSA)
and Ontario (PBA) pension standards legislation provide a “floor” by setting minimum standards
174

Report of the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Queen’s Printer for Ontario,
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Tara Perkins, “Growing Lifespans the Latest Worry for Pension Plans,” The Globe and Mail (2013).
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for benefits and funding. In other words, pension plans must operate within these two sets of
funding limits. Kaplan continues that without registration under the ITA, defined benefit plan
contributions made by both employers and employees are not deductible for income tax calculation
purposes, making them immediately taxable. He concludes that these tax deferral strategies are
fundamentally important to sponsors, pension plan members and the retirement savings system
generally, promoting accelerated funding levels.178
Bill C-9 was passed into law on July 12, 2010, amending the Income Tax Act. The new law
increases the amount of surplus that can accumulate in a defined benefit plan for contributions made
in respect of post-2009 service, from 10 percent to 25 percent of actuarial liabilities, without
triggering adverse tax consequences.
D. Accounting Rules
Registered pension plans must file annual audited financial statements with regulators such as
FSCO and OSFI. However, these statements must first be examined by an external auditor who is
an accountant licensed to sign Audited Financial Statements and is a member of a public
accounting body conducting an auditing practice. Once the financial statements have undergone
the auditor's assessment, they are reviewed by DB plans’ Board of Trustees and filed with the
regulators.
Pension accounting is based on a set of rules and principles established by certified accounting
bodies (e.g. Accounting Standards Board in Canada) to enhance comparability between different
organizations’ financial results. The “off-balance” sheet accounting provisions used by all
Canadian corporations up until 2011 served to distort the financial status of DB plans. In essence,
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“off-balance” sheet accounting allows companies to refrain from reporting the true amount of their
pension plan liabilities on their companies’ balance sheets.179
The shift to a “fair-value” methodology by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accounts’ (CICA) in
2011 required that all publicly traded companies report pension liabilities on their balance sheets as
they are incurred. These new rules are based on the approach taken in the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
Christine Weidman of the Ivey Business Journal notes that the adoption of this “fair value”
methodology is driven by the desire of pension plan members, shareholders and the public markets
to know the true impact of a pension plan’s funding on the sponsor organization’s financial position.
She continues that the upshot of publicly traded corporations being required to report all of their
pension liabilities (as opposed to only reporting a select portion of them) is that their balance sheet
equity (assets/liabilities) is reduced, thereby limiting their access to credit.
Many companies argue that being required to report all of their defined benefit plan’s pension
liabilities on the company’s balance sheet is unfair because it results in their balance sheets being in
a constant state of flux, moving up and down as changes in short and long term interest rates impact
179

Prior to 2011, most Canadian publicly traded companies were required to follow the rules of the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook Section 3461 (CICA 3461) for purposes of reflecting their
pension plans in their corporate financial statements. CICA 3461 encouraged, or at least did not discourage,
assuming DB pension risk for the following reasons:
1. Deferral and amortization of gains and losses: Instead of requiring immediate recognition of pension
experience gains and losses in the employer’s income statement and on the employer’s balance
sheet, CICA 3461 permitted recognition of these gains and losses to be deferred and amortized into
pension cost and onto the balance sheet over time. The ability to defer and amortize gains and
losses resulted in the masking of the true risk that the plan posed to the employer.
2. The deferral and amortization of gains and losses also resulted in some employers having built up
relatively large deferred (i.e., unrecognized) losses in recent years. This resulted in a reluctance to
undertake certain de-risking actions such as purchasing annuities, since these actions required a
portion of those deferred losses to be recognized immediately in the employer’s income statement.
(Gavin Benjamin, Barriers to Pension Plan De-risking, Benefits Canada, 2013).
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the value of their pension liabilities. However, one factor in favour of corporations getting access to
credit is the “unsecured creditor” status of pensioners, giving their creditors “priority” status in
bankruptcy proceedings.180
On January 1, 2013 it became mandatory for pension deficits and surpluses to be fully reflected on
corporate balance sheets of publicly traded companies in Canada, with components of pension
expense reported in different sections of companies’ income statements, including the recognition
of pension gains and losses in comprehensive income. 181 A risk for companies with large defined
benefit pension plan deficits is that such accounting rule changes could negatively impact their
credit worthiness, threatening their very viability. 182
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Gavin Benjamin, Barriers to Pension Plan De-risking, Benefits Canada, 2013. (Revisions to IAS 19 come
into effect on Jan. 1, 2013. These revisions further reduce the barriers to de-risking that have been
embedded in accounting standards:



Revised IAS19 requires the immediate recognition on the balance sheet of all changes to pension
plan surpluses or deficits (i.e., deferral and amortization of experience gains and losses will no
longer be permitted).
The annual pension cost will be calculated assuming that the annual expected rate of return on
pension plan assets is equal to the liability discount rate, which is based on high quality corporate
bond yields (i.e., the pension cost reflected in the employer’s profit and loss statement will no longer
anticipate incremental returns from risky assets). Any incremental investment returns due to the
investment in risky assets that actually emerge over time will be recognized on the corporate
balance sheet (through other comprehensive income) once the incremental returns are actually
earned.)
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While the Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) mandated that all publicly-traded companies would be
required to change their accounting standards to IFRS, there were concerns that such a transition would not
benefit private corporations nor meet the needs of the statement users. After consultation with various
stakeholders, AcSB released a separate set of accounting standards for private, profit-oriented companies:
Accounting Standards for Private Enterprises (ASPE). Private companies in Canada are now permitted to
prepare financial statements using either set of standards, depending on their needs.
Note that In May 2013, the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) issued Section 3462, Employee
Future Benefits, in Part II of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) Handbook to replace
current Section 3461 of the same title. The AcSB has stated that the amendments aim to bring about
significant improvements to the understandability, comparability and transparency of financial information for
all defined benefit plans. This new section forms part of the first significant amendments the AcSB has made
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E. Regulatory Burdens

Private Sector Single Employer Defined Benefit Pension Plans (SEDPPs), the focus of this thesis,
require more extensive analysis, receive more intensive oversight and are required to meet different
funding expectations than other types of plans. The Report of the Ontario Expert Commission on
Pensions discusses plausible reasons that might explain this: few have governance structures that
provide internal checks and balances to the sponsor’s unilateral administration of the plan; some are
quite small and unable to develop, implement or afford sophisticated strategies for investment,
member services and other functions; none can adjust accrued benefits to meet funding shortfalls;
and all (even the largest) are closely tied to the fate of the single sponsor that created and funded
them.183

The Report notes that SEDPPs are almost always governed and administered by the sponsor acting
unilaterally (although in principle nothing prevents a single employer from agreeing to the
participation of active and retiree members in governance procedures) and that if one of the
purposes of funding rules is to ensure that the interests of beneficiaries are properly safeguarded,
that purpose would become easier to achieve if the beneficiaries themselves had a significant voice
in the decision-making that affects them, as they do in the case of Jointly Sponsored (JSPPs)
pension plans.184

to Accounting Standards Applying to Private Enterprises (ASPE). Section 3462 is effective for fiscal years
beginning on or after January 1, 2014.
183
Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario,
2008) at 73.
184
A jointly sponsored pension plan (JSPP) is a special type of pension plan (most are public) in which
decision making and funding of the benefits is shared jointly by both employees and their employer(s)).
(Financial Services Commission of Ontario, A Guide to Understanding Your Pension Plan, 2010. Online: <
www.fsco.gov.on.ca >. )
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Single employer defined benefit pension plan members generally have little or no opportunity for
negotiation with respect to the terms of their plans because of their lack control over the
management of their own pension funds. 185 Therefore, in the interests of efficiency and fairness,
governments have seen fit to intervene by setting minimum pension standards legislation for the
funding, administration and governance of SEDPPs. This regulation necessarily increases the costs
associated with defined benefit plans and may negatively impact them by passing on costs to
workers and inducing businesses to opt out of DB pension plans altogether.
Recommendations recently made by the Expert Commission on Pensions in Ontario to reduce
regulatory burden include:186
1) So far as possible, substantive rules intended to define the rights and responsibilities of
participants in the pension system should be set out in the Pension Benefits Act or rules and
regulations made pursuant to it.
2) As a medium-term project, the PBA and regulations should be re-drafted so as to clearly
articulate both (a) general principles applicable to all pension plans, and (b) comprehensive
codes applicable to specific plan types.
3) Revisions to the Ontario Pension Benefits Act should be drafted to provide both rules- based
and principles-based (general standards allowing some sponsor discretion) approaches, as
appropriate. In particular, minimum standards with respect to benefits should generally be
rules-based; some aspects of investment, plan governance and innovation are more
appropriately regulated by a principles based approach; and funding requirements should
likely involve a mixture of the two.
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4. Actuarial Funding 187
The annual funding cost of a defined benefit pension plan for an upcoming year is projected by
estimating the annual benefits and expenses to be paid in that year, less estimated investment
earnings in that year. This can be expressed mathematically as:
Annual Projected Cost= (Projected Annual Benefits Paid + Projected Annual Plan Expenses)
-

(Projected Annual Investment Earnings)

Actuarial funding of a defined benefit pension plan, while complicated in detail, is conceptually
simple. It consists of three parts. First, a target level of assets required to pay all accrued pension
obligations as of the valuation date is projected based on the actuary’s assumptions regarding
member behaviour (probabilities of retirement, death etc.) and economic behaviour (rates of
interest, investment return, inflation etc.). This annual asset target level is the projected cost of the
plan and is called the actuarial accrued liability. Secondly, the actuary estimates the employer’s
annual contribution of assets or the normal cost (not including annual employee costs/contributions
or investment returns) required to meet the actuarial accrued liability. Thirdly, since all the actuarial
assumptions will normally not be met (because actual asset values of a defined benefit plan realized
at the end of each valuation year will be different from the initial projected actuarial estimates for
that year), an additional payment (which could be negative if actual asset values exceed the target
asset values) must be added to the normal cost. This additional payment, spread (amortized) over
future years, is referred to as the unfunded or over-funded actuarial accrued liability. Actuarial
funding is expressed mathematically as:
Actuarial Funding (Minimum Annual Employer Funding) =Normal (Annual) Costs (Required to Meet
Total Accrued Liability to End of Valuation Year) +Unfunded Actuarial Liabilities.
187
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5. Actuarial Methods

The sole purpose of defined benefit pension plan assets is to pay specified liabilities at a specified
benefit date. 188 Actuaries use tools called actuarial methods to help them determine the level of
assets required to meet defined benefit pension plan obligations. The choice of funding methods is
influenced by several factors, including: 189
A. The plan’s benefit design; in particular, whether the pension benefit is related to salary.
B. The plan sponsor’s objectives.
C. The requirements under the appropriate regulatory environment.
The actuary normally considers the purpose and nature of the measurement of defined benefit plan
assets when selecting an asset valuation method. It may be appropriate for the actuary to select
different methods for different purposes. For example, the actuary may consider spreading a
particularly high funding requirement in a particular year (which may be unaffordable for the
employer)190 over a number of years, using a technique called smoothing. This method allows the
employer to spread his or her annual funding requirement in a given year over a number of years.
Alternatively, in a terminating plan, the actuary normally considers selecting an asset valuation
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Ryan J. Ronald, The Asset/Liability Dilemma in Pension America (1994) 3:2 Journal of Investing at 48.
Online: < www.iijournals.com/doi/abs/10.3905/joi.3.2.48 >.
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Keith P. Sharp, Pension Funding by Normal Costs or Unfunded Liabilities (1996) 4:2 Journal of Actuarial
Practice at 257. Online: < www.jofap.org/documents/vol4/v4_2_sharp.pdf >.
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A defined benefit pension plan’s assets are invested over many years to fund its pension liabilities. An
actuary estimates the current value of these assets by discounting them using a particular interest rate called
the discount rate. In other words, the discount rate is the rate at which current assets must be invested to
equal the estimated total value of assets required to pay future pension liabilities. Note that the discount rate
(i) is in the denominator of the formula and therefore as the discount rate increases, the present value of
pension assets decreases. For example, using an actuarial discount rate of 5% per annum, $1000 worth of
assets at the end of 1 year would require the sponsor to fund at the level of $952. A 1% increase in the
discount rate to 6% would decrease the sponsor’s funding requirements to $942, illustrating the importance
of actuarial discretion in determining a plan’s discount rates. In other words, a low discount rate would
increase the value of current year liabilities, thereby increasing the value of current year assets required to
fund the assets. An asset to liability ratio of 1 or more means the plan is fully funded. Alternatively, a ratio of
less than 1 means the plan has a deficit and that additional employer contributions are required. (Center on
Federal Financial Institutions, PBGC, A Yield Curve Primer, 2004.)
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method that produces an actuarial value of assets net of any significant liquidation or surrender
charges reasonably expected to be incurred.191

Conclusion

Chapter 2 discussed the general regulatory regimes overseeing actuarial discretion and funding,
revealing that private sector Single Employer Defined Benefit Pension Plans (SEDPPs), the focus
of this thesis, require more extensive analysis, receive more intensive oversight and are required to
meet different funding expectations than other types of plans. Plausible reasons might explain this:
few have governance structures that provide internal checks and balances to the sponsor’s unilateral
administration of the plan; some are quite small and unable to develop, implement or afford
sophisticated strategies for investment, member services and other functions; none can adjust
accrued benefits to meet funding shortfalls; and all (even the largest) are closely tied to the fate of
the single sponsor that created and funded them.
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CHAPTER 3
LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, CASE LAW AND PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNING ACTUARIAL METHODS

Introduction
Chapter 2 discussed the general regulatory regimes overseeing the funding of defined benefit
pension plans. Chapter 3 reviews the specific legislation, regulations, case law and professional
bodies governing actuaries’ discretion in Canada, highlighting the disconnect between short-term
funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of DB funding
obligations. 192

It is important to note that the regulation of private sector occupational pension plans in Canada is
not harmonized across the country. Each province (except P.E.I.) has its own pension standards
legislation which regulates the minimum funding requirements in that province. In addition, the
federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (the “PBSA”), 1985 193 regulates pension plans for
employees in the three territories and those employed in any business under the legislative authority
of the federal government, including crown corporations and railroads. This chapter will focus on
three pieces of pension legislation-the Pension Benefits Act (the “PBA”) in Ontario (where most DB
plans are registered), the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (the” PBSA”) and the federal
Income Tax Act (the “ITA”). The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the
basic pension funding concepts and actors governing actuarial methods, Section 2 provides an
overview of the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) and the Ontario Pension Benefits
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Act, while Section 3 reviews specific legislation, regulations, and case law governing actuarial
methods.

Section 1-Overview of Governance of Actuarial Methods
A. Minimum Pension Funding Legislation
Pension funding policy consistently struggles to achieve the appropriate balance between providing
guidance and flexibility. Minimum funding standards serve to ensure that plan sponsors can meet
their promise to plan members and beneficiaries in light of constantly changing market dynamics as
well as changes in the corporate environment, such as workforce reductions and corporate
reorganizations. However, flexibility is also necessary to allow pension assets and surplus to be
used in the best interests of plan members and their beneficiaries.194

All registered pension plans in Canada are required to be funded in accordance with provincial or
federal legislation, depending on the province or the federal jurisdiction in which they are registered.
An actuarial valuation of a plan’s assets and liabilities is required to determine whether a defined
benefit occupational pension plan is sufficiently funded. Under federal and provincial pension
benefit laws, such an evaluation must be conducted at least every three years. However, the federal
regulator (the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)) and Ontario provincial
regulator (the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)) require annual plan valuations if
the solvency (asset to liability) ratio is less than 120%195 and 85%,196 respectively. An actuarial
194
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Subsection 12(2) of the PBSA and section 2 of the Directives of the Superintendent pursuant to the PBSA
(Directives) generally require that an actuarial report be prepared as of the effective date of the plan and
annually thereafter as at the plan year-end (except under certain circumstances, as described below).
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valuation must be done on two bases in Canada: a solvency basis and an ongoing basis. Whiston
and Gottlieb [2006] describe these as follows: 197
An ongoing valuation focuses on the ability of the plan to meet its obligations, assuming
that it continues to operate. For example, in a final average earnings plan, the valuation on
an ongoing basis views the plan as if members will continue to accrue benefits and receive
pay increases, in accordance with the plan terms and assumptions used in the valuation
respectively. The ongoing valuation attempts to show whether the funding of the plan is on
course ….
A solvency valuation is defined as a valuation of the assets and liabilities of a plan using
actuarial assumptions and methods that are in accordance with accepted actuarial practice
for the valuation of a plan, determined on the basis that the plan is terminated at the
valuation date. The actuary is generally required to make assumptions concerning the
proportion of members who would elect a commuted value (and transfer from the plan) and
the remainder who would leave their deferred or immediate pension benefits in the plan.
When calculating commuted values in a solvency valuation, the actuary must follow a
Standard of Practice prescribed by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA). This standard
currently prescribes the UP-94 mortality table projected forward to the year 2015 using
mortality projection scale AA, no pre-retirement mortality or other decrement (adjustment)
and an interest rate of x% per annum for 10 years and y% per annum thereafter. The rate “x”
is equal to the market yield on 7-year Government of Canada benchmark bonds plus 0.5%.
The rate “y” is a more complicated blend of market yields on such 7-year bonds and on long
term Government of Canada benchmark bonds, again plus 0.5%. Lower interest rates apply
when the plan provides indexation of pensions; the formulae are specified in the Canadian
Institute of Actuaries (CIA) Standards of Practice.

A plan administrator will generally be permitted to file an actuarial report every three years if:
1. The solvency ratio disclosed in the most recent actuarial report filed with OSFI was 1.20 or greater.
2. The pension plan meets the definition of a designated pension plan (Designated Plan) under
Regulation 8515 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) (Designated plans are generally executive
compensation DB plans not maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, in which the
total of the pension credits of all specified individuals in the plan is more than 50% of the total of all
pension credits of all individuals the plan for the year.) (Canada Revenue Agency, Registered
Pension Plans Glossary. www.cra-arc.gc.ca).
196
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actuarial valuations as of a date on or after December 31, 2012 for all pension plans (excluding jointly
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Intuitively, it may seem more likely that a plan would be fully funded on a solvency (commuted)
basis than an ongoing valuation basis, simply because members cease to accrue benefits in a
solvency valuation. However, this is not always the case. The terms of the pension plan or the
applicable pension benefit law may result in the commuted plan having additional liabilities upon
termination that it would not have if it continues on an ongoing basis. The solvency of a plan is
calculated as follows:
[(the aggregate of the market value of the plan’s current assets) + (the present value of
future special payments (the plan’s future earnings))] divided by [the liabilities (pension
costs and administration costs) of the plan (where the liabilities are determined on a plan
termination basis)]
B. Maximum Pension Funding Legislation
The federal Income Tax Act (ITA) regulates virtually every aspect of pension plan funding (other
than minimum funding) in Canada. Income tax regulations set a “ceiling” on employer
contributions to DB plans in order to limit the amount of taxable income a company can defer. As
discussed earlier, federal (PBSA) and provincial (PBA) pension standards legislation set a “floor”
by establishing minimum standards for pension benefits and funding.
The ITA and its regulations contain a prescriptive regime of rules that must be adhered to for
pension plans to achieve and maintain registration for income tax purposes. Pension plan
contributions made by both employers and employees are only tax deductible if they are registered
under the ITA; if a plan is not registered, benefits provided to employees are fully taxable up to a
rate of approximately 40%. Clearly, these tax deferral strategies are fundamentally important to
sponsors, pension plan members and the retirement savings system generally.
Bill C-9, amending the Income Tax Act, was passed into law in 2010. This new legislation increased
the amount of surplus that can accumulate in a defined benefit plan for contributions made in
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respect of post-2009 service, from 10 percent to 25 percent of actuarial liabilities, without triggering
adverse tax consequences. However, only an actuary has the legislative authority to determine
whether or not a plan has a surplus. The actuary must calculate and value a plan’s liabilities and
assets using various actuarial methods. It is not known whether a plan has a surplus (or an unfunded
liability) until an actuarial valuation report is prepared. As noted above, a pension surplus is an
actuarial construct, which brings into focus the critical importance of the governance of actuarial
methods.198 The Canadian Institution of Actuaries (CIA) is charged with overseeing the
professional conduct of actuaries in the valuation of DB pension plans.
C. Canadian Institute of Actuaries
The Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA), the national self- regulating organization of the actuarial
profession in Canada, was established by an act of the federal Parliament in 1965.199
It serves the public through the provision of actuarial services and represents the actuarial
profession in the formulation of public policy. It promotes the advancement of actuarial science and
sponsors programs for the education and qualification of CIA members and prospective members.
Both provincial and federal Pension Benefits Standards Acts require that actuarial valuations of DB
plans adhere to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) Standards of Practice.200
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Ibid.
The original organization of actuaries in Canada, the Actuaries Club, was founded in 1907 with 24 charter
members, all actuaries living and working in Toronto. The Canadian Association of Actuaries was
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D. Actuarial Standards Board of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries
The Actuarial Standards Board (ASB) of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) is an
independent body responsible for monitoring and developing actuarial standards of practice. It
constantly strives for clear, accurate and user friendly valuations. 201 The ASB has responded to the
demand for more transparency in actuarial funding estimates by implementing the following
revisions to the professional standards of actuaries: 202

1. In 2007, actuaries were required to provide rationales for the selection of their assumptions in
valuing pension funds.
2. In 2011, actuaries were required to:
a) Disclose the rationales for methods used and method changes.
b) Provide a sensitivity analysis demonstrating the effect of a 1% decrease in the interest rate
assumptions used to discount future pension fund monies.
c) Provide the cost of benefits between the mandatory triennial valuation dates (generally on an
annual basis), not only on a “going-concern” basis, but also on a “solvency” (or hypothetical windup) basis (otherwise known as the “incremental cost”) whenever funding ratios fall below specified
levels. The 2013 Ontario Budget indicated the intention to implement a new “funding concerns”
test to determine when plans will be required to file annual valuations. Currently, plans that are
funded below 85% on a solvency basis are required to file annual valuations. However, no new test
has yet been established.
d) Best-estimate valuations are now allowable, meaning that the actuary need not include a margin
for conservatism in the assumptions, thus potentially increasing the valuation interest rate (and, as a
result, lowering required funding levels).
e) Actuaries are no longer permitted to include an allowance in their interest rate assumptions for
the benefits of an actively managed investment portfolio in excess of the additional fees charged for
active management. (However, an exception is made if the actuary is able to justify that such

201

Canadian Institute of Actuaries, Submission by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries to the Honourable
Dwight Duncan, Minister of Finance-Ontario, 2009. Online: < www.gov.fin.gov.on.ca >.
202
Philip Morse, Actuarial Standards are Changing in 2011, Benefits Canada, 2010. Online: <
www.benefitscanada.com/.../actuarial-standards-are-changing-in-2011-5..

70

additional returns will be consistently and reliably earned over the long term.) This requirement is
expected to result in lower valuation of the pension fund. 203

E. The Role of the Actuary
Each pension plan must have an “administrator” who bears ultimate responsibility for the plan.
This administrator is either the plan sponsor (employer) or a board of trustees. The administrator
has a legal duty to appoint the actuary and any other professionals required for the operation of the
DB plan. The actuary acts as a pension consultant to the administrator and is hired to prepare a
valuation report using assumptions and methods which provide some contribution flexibility for the
employer, while ensuring that the pension fund protects the interests of the plan members. However,
the actuary is not (and does not want to be) a plan fiduciary. 204 In other words, the actuary can
recommend certain actions to the administrator but cannot compel the administrator to act. Jean
Claude Menard of the federal Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions discusses the
purpose of actuarial valuations:
The particular methods of valuation used by an actuary in ongoing pension plans serve one
overall purpose-maintaining capital regulation to ensure adequate contribution levels based
on estimates of current service costs to maintain fund integrity. The actuary normally
strives to compare some measure of the value of the benefits that have been earned in the
plan (the liabilities) against some value for the investments held in the fund (the assets). The
purpose of the valuation will dictate the assumptions and methods used by the actuary. For
example, a going concern valuation performed to indicate the long-term funding position of
the plan may be very different from one used to demonstrate solvency on wind up or to
establish a value for a sale or acquisition of the business.205 Assumptions fall into two main
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categories: economic and demographic. Economic assumptions include factors such as
inflation, real wage increases, and real rates of return on assets while demographic
assumptions include factors such as mortality rates, retirement dates, terminations and
disability rates.206 Actuaries are generally guided by PBA/PBSA regulations and the
governing standards and principles of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries in preparing
valuations. 207 For example, Section 16 of the Ontario PBA states that “the actuary is
required to use “methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent with accepted
actuarial practice.” The content of an actuarial valuation in an ongoing pension plan
generally includes the following information, which must be certified by the actuary: 208
1. The normal cost of the plan in the next year. 209
2. A cost estimate in the following years including the methodology used in the calculations
and a breakdown of employer and employee costs.
3. The present value of future employee costs.
4. An estimate of the total annual employee contributions in each year to which the report
relates.
5. The present value of future special payments (for funding deficits), including adjustments
since the last valuation and the commencement and end dates for amortization.
6. The extent to which “escalated adjustments” in respect of post retirement indexing...are
recognized in the ongoing liabilities and the normal cost.210
7.

Any actuarial gain (surplus) or loss (deficit) experienced during the period of the
valuation.

8. The intended use of any actuarial gain (for example, contribution holiday) or remedial on
any actuarial loss (that is, whether any special payments are required).

employees’ salaries upon retirement. Solvency valuations are only required to use wages earned as of the
valuation date to estimate employees’ accrued pensions.
206
Jean Claude Menard, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Setting Assumptions
for Funding Actuarial Valuations, 2013. Online: <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/ocabac/spds/Pages/jcm20130425.aspx>. 
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9. A statement that there is no solvency deficiency, or alternatively, a list of the special
payments required under the solvency rules, including the amortization period and the
amounts required to be paid into the pension fund.
10. A statement that the valuation complies with generally accepted actuarial principles and
the requirements of provincial pension standards legislation.
11. A statement that the solvency ratio is not less than 1.0, otherwise a statement of the ratio
including the assets and liabilities.
12. An identification of all assumptions and methods used to determine the ongoing and
solvency liabilities.
13. In the event that the plan benefit is based upon an employee’s final average or career
average earnings, any earnings projections that may increase the plan’s liabilities.
F. Transparency Issues
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions discussed the importance of transparency in actuarial
valuations:
Transparency of actuarial valuations, funding decisions and other operational matters is
essential to any system of pension regulation. Transparency aims to provide regulators with
the information they need in order to prevent harm to plans or to the pension system, and to
enforce the law if infractions occur. It also reminds sponsors that funding decisions must be
reasonable and based on sound analysis. 211

Transparency also aims to ensure that actuaries provide analyses capable of standing up to thirdparty scrutiny and that plan administrators understand that their decisions related to valuations may
be subjected to critical oversight by plan members as well as regulators. Active pension members,
retirees and their advisors are all dependent upon transparent valuations, considering pensions plans
are often among a family’s largest investments. The question, therefore, is whether or not pension
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valuations are sufficiently transparent. The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions discussed the
lack of regulatory transparency in Ontario as follows:212
1) Certain benefits may be provided without requiring them to be funded or included in the plan
valuation.
2) Changes in certain variables in the funding formula may be spread over a number of years.
3) Non-disclosure of some pertinent funding information is permitted.
4) There is reliance on actuarial standards and practices which are opaque or imprecise in certain
respects.

1. Exclusions

The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions (OECP) noted that excluded benefits are mainly
related to solvency valuations but have some application to going concern valuations. 213 For
example, while indexation paid to current retirees must be included, the cost of future indexation —
whether on a formulaic basis or ad hoc — need not be included in either solvency or going concern
valuations. While exclusion can be seen as an inducement to sponsors to provide this form of
protection, indexation is generally an expensive benefit, so its exclusion may substantially
undervalue the liabilities of a plan.

Plant closure benefits must normally be funded and included in a valuation. However, they may be
excluded in Ontario if they are provided pursuant to plan-specific arrangements in place prior to
1991. While this exclusion amounts to a form of “grand-parenting” for a limited array of plans, it
too represents a hidden factor contributing to their actual cost.

Benefit improvements, including expensive improvements related to past service may be amortized
over a period of five or 15 years. This means that even though plan members are entitled to the
additional benefits as from their inception, no immediate contribution is necessary to cover the full
212
213
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costs of providing the benefits. Such benefits may be introduced even though a plan is already less
than fully funded, exacerbating the level of underfunding.214

2.

Smoothing

The OECP commented on smoothing:
Ontario regulations allow limited “smoothing” of asset values and discount rates in solvency
valuations — that is, they allow a deferred recognition of gains and losses on investments,
and a discount rate averaged over a period of time. CIA standards, applicable across Canada,
allow smoothing on elements of the going concern valuation. However, the degree of
smoothing allowed for solvency valuations in Ontario is greater than in other provinces. The
15-year amortization period of going concern unfunded liabilities is also arguably a form of
smoothing, as is the five-year amortization period for solvency deficiencies.
There are good reasons for smoothing. It acknowledges the long-term nature of the
obligation and avoids contributions being subjected to sudden and extreme changes.
However, smoothing methodologies for going concern valuations are not carefully defined
by actuarial practice, and the potential exists for changes in smoothing to be used not to
respond to altered circumstances, but opportunistically to hide a funding problem. More
importantly, smoothing can detract from clear understanding of a plan’s funded position if it
is not fully explained in the valuation report.215
The use of smoothing to lower a company’s annual pension funding obligations in times of low
investment returns is certainly preferable to a plan becoming insolvent. However, the misuse of
smoothing to chronically understate plans’ funding deficits in order to increase companies’ profit
margins is unacceptable because it jeopardizes the viability of employees’ pensions. This situation
undoubtedly sparked the introduction of new International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
requiring the immediate recognition of DB plans’ gains and losses on public company’s balance
sheets. The adoption of this “fair value” methodology should greatly improve DB plan funding
transparency in Canada.

214
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3. Funding Information

The OECP argued that valuations should be transparent not only to the sponsor, the plan
administrator and the CIA’s professional standard-setting and discipline bodies, but also to the
regulator and to active plan members and retirees. It noted that one important matter not presently
provided in an actuarial valuation is whether or not a contribution holiday216 (a reduction or
suspension of normal cost payments using a plan’s surplus) is being factored into the contribution
schedule:

The rules currently require a valuation to identify surplus in a plan, which would permit it to
take a contribution holiday; however, the rules do not require disclosure of whether that holiday
has actually been factored into the proposed three-year schedule of contributions. Quite apart
from whether or when contribution holidays are appropriate, the fact that they are going to be
taken should be transparent. Information about contribution holidays is essential for an
understanding of plan funding, both for the regulator and for all plan participants, and should be
provided in a document that is fully accessible to them. 217

4. Actuarial Standards and Practice

As discussed above, many reports and calculations under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA)
and its associated regulations must be prepared by a Fellow of the CIA (a self-regulating,
professional body) in accordance with its standards and accepted actuarial practice. In other words,
the CIA and its members are, in effect, part of the apparatus of pension regulation. The OECP states:
216

Pension legislation in all Canadian jurisdictions requires employers to fund the pension plan in
accordance with prescribed tests and standards for solvency by way of contributions toward current service
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Of course, the extent of their (actuaries) role depends largely on their willingness and ability
to anticipate, respond to and reinforce changing regulatory strategies — greater transparency
not least among them — and on the willingness of the regulator to pre-empt, defer to or
supplement professional norms.
Happily, the CIA has recently changed its standards to improve the transparency of actuarial
valuations. For example, all material assumptions must now be explained in a valuation.
And it is likely that the new CIA standards will also require each assumption to be
“independently reasonable,” rather than collectively producing a reasonable outcome, as at
present. These two developments together would greatly enhance the transparency of
valuations, and it would be helpful if the CIA were to promptly adopt the second as well as
the first. However, if it is unable to do so, the government retains the power to require it by
regulation.218
The Economist magazine discusses aggressive actuarial assumptions: 219
Perhaps the most egregious way in which companies smooth profits is by valuing pension
assets using expected rather than actual returns. They are allowed to do this because the
assets are invested to meet pension promises in the distant future, so they can dismiss shortterm swings. But whether they are inherently optimistic, or because they wish to hide the
true state of their pension plans, companies generally expect unrealistically high returns.
This reduces their obligations to the pension fund and thus inflates their own profits.
By virtue of the vagaries of actuarial science, at the stroke of an actuary’s pen a company
can make heroic assumptions about the returns its pension assets will earn and so the rate at
which its own liabilities will grow in future, allowing it to claim that the pension-deficit
problem is manageable…. the potential for mischief exists because companies have great
flexibility in measuring the size of pension obligations and assets, and hence the pension
deficits or surpluses that feed into profits.

An American study of 3,247 DB plans found that from 1991-2000 many firms boosted their
corporate valuations by over estimating pension-return assumptions, lowering current pension
liability estimates. 220 The issue of transparency was also highlighted by Towers Perrin in its White
Paper on Canada’s retirement system:
Increasingly, funding policy is concentrating on avoiding having to make contributions –
both by directing increasing proportions of a plan’s investment portfolio to mismatched
categories that have historically provided higher long-term returns and by deferring cost
218
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through pre-recognizing the expected higher returns from equity investments in the discount
rate used to determine the plan’s liability. 221
In other words, actuaries reduce plan liabilities to unrealistically low levels by estimating higher
rates of return than actual market rates.
Section 2-Federal (PBSA) and Ontario (PBA) Funding Regulations
A. Pension Benefits Standards Act (the PBSA)
The federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) covered some 1,250 pension plans or close to
10 per cent of the asset value of all registered plans in Canada (350 of the federal plans are defined
benefit pension plans, 800 are defined contribution arrangements, and 100 are combination plans
(hybrids) offering both defined benefit and defined contribution components) in 2012. It sets out
minimum funding standards for federally registered pension plans to ensure that the rights and
interests of pension plan members, retirees, and their beneficiaries are protected. The Government
of Canada’s only role is to ensure that the framework is appropriate and enables all parties to make
informed decisions. The main regulatory body governing actuarial methods for federally regulated
plans is the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).222
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B. Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) was created in 1987 by the
Government of Canada (under the OSFI Act) to contribute to public confidence in the Canadian
financial system. OSFI's mandate with respect to pensions is:
(a) to supervise pension plans in order to determine whether they meet the minimum
funding requirements and are complying with the other requirements of the Pension
Benefits Standards Act, 1985 and its regulations and supervisory requirements under
that legislation;
(b) to promptly advise the administrator of a pension plan in the event that the plan is
not meeting the minimum funding requirements or is not complying with other
requirements of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 or its regulations or
supervisory requirements under that legislation and, in such a case, to take, or require
the administrator to take, the necessary corrective measures or series of measures to deal
with the situation in an expeditious manner; and
(c) to promote administrators of pension plans to adopt policies and procedures designed
to control and manage risk.

The administrator is generally required to file a valuation report with the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) every three years when a plan is in a surplus
position. In the event of a plan deficit, OSFI generally requires a valuation report to be filed
annually. However, the regulator has the power to request valuation reports on a more frequent
basis if necessary. Solvency funding regulations are intended to protect the benefits of members and
retirees in the event that a plan terminates.223

C. Ontario Pension Benefits Act
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act (the “PBA”) prescribes a host of rules that affect the design and
administration of a pension plan. Generally, the legislation is designed to accomplish two
objectives: secure employee pensions from discretionary revocation and preserve the financial
223
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integrity of earned pension entitlements. It does so by guaranteeing minimum vesting rights for
employees, permitting the portability of pensions on termination of employment, and requiring the
locking-in of benefits to preclude access to the funds prior to retirement age. 224

The legislation also entitles similarly situated employees covered by a pension plan to join the plan
once they have satisfied certain eligibility requirements, prescribes minimum spousal and other
beneficiary entitlements, and mandates prescribed levels of disclosure to employees and other
beneficiaries. Finally, as noted above, the legislation and regulations set out minimum contribution,
funding, and solvency rules to ensure the security of current and future pension payments. The main
regulatory body governing actuarial methods for the Ontario PBA is the Financial Services
Commission of Ontario (FSCO).225

D. Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)
The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), like its counterparts in other provinces
administers its statute and regulates the pension sector by maintaining various forms of oversight:
passive (monitoring routine filings), active (providing approvals, issuing advisories and rulings),
proactive (conducting audits and investigations), and reactive (responding to information or
complaints from active and retired members, creditors or service providers).

224
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All persons who establish or administer a pension plan within the meaning of the Pension Benefits
Act and all employees or other persons on their behalf who are required to contribute to any such
pension plan belong to the “pension sector,” one of six regulated sectors governed by Financial
Services Commission of Ontario Act, 1997 (the FSCO Act).226 The FSCO Act establishes the
Financial Services Commission of Ontario 227 (FSCO), the purpose of which is to “provide
regulatory services that protect the public interest and enhance public confidence in the regulated
sectors.” 228 There are 4 bodies associated with FSCO that participate in the regulation of actuarial
methods in Ontario- the FSCO Board, the executive Branch of government, the Superintendent of
Financial Services, and the Financial Services Tribunal. The major pension regulatory functions
under FSCO are carried out by the Superintendent of Financial Services and the Financial Services
Tribunal. Each is discussed in below.

E. Superintendent of Financial Services
Pension lawyer Ari Kaplan discusses the role of the Superintendent of Financial Services: 229
The Superintendent of Financial Services is the person with the most significant and
numerous responsibilities with respect to the regulation of defined benefit pension plans in
Ontario. The Superintendent administers and enforces the FSCO Act, serves as chief
executive officer of the FSCO board, and is responsible for FSCO’s financial and
administrative affairs. The Superintendent is a civil servant appointed under the Public
Service Act. With respect to pension regulation, the Superintendent is vested with the
responsibility to “exercise the powers and duties conferred on or assigned to” him,
“administer and enforce … every Act that confers powers on or assigns duties to” him, and
“supervise generally the regulated sectors.”….
The Superintendent may use FSCO staff, as well as engage other persons, to provide
professional, technical or other assistance. In addition, the Superintendent has the power to
delegate to any person employed by FSCO in respect of the exercise or performance of any
of the Superintendent’s statutory powers or duties. The Superintendent’s functions under the
226
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PBA can be divided into three broad categories: decision-making functions, administrative
and procedural functions, and policy-making functions….
The PBA also confers on the Superintendent broad tools to investigate compliance. The
Superintendent has the power to compel an employer, an administrator or any other person
to supply any such information as he or she may require during an investigation of actuarial
methods; require an appraisal of any or all of the assets of the pension fund by one or more
independent valuators; undertake examinations, investigations and inquiries, and require the
production of any book, paper, document or thing related to a pension plan or pension fund;
The PBA confers on the Superintendent broad tools to investigate compliance…. The
Superintendent has the authority to consider whether an administrator or its agents have
complied with the statutory standard of care expected by administrators in the
administration of a pension plan fund, as codified in the PBA. This is a fiduciary (legal)
standard.230

F. Financial Services Tribunal

Most decisions and proposed orders of the Superintendent that affect pension rights are reviewable
by the Financial Services Tribunal, 231 a multidisciplinary adjudication board established under the
Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) Act. The rules of the Financial Services
Tribunal are made under the authority of both the Financial Services Commission of Ontario and
the Statutory Power Procedures Act (SPPA).232 The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
all questions of fact or law that arise in any proceeding before it and to exercise the powers
conferred on it under the FSCO Act and the PBA. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal has
the authority to uphold the Superintendent’s decision or “substitute its opinion for that of the
Superintendent.” All decisions and orders of the Tribunal are subject to a statutory right of appeal to
the Ontario Superior Court (Divisional Court). In contrast to the Superintendent’s responsibility
230
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under the PBA, the Tribunal’s role is adjudicative only- it has no policy functions as part of its
pension mandate:
The Tribunal’s role is not to establish or manage this system, but to adjudicate individual
disputes as to rights under the Act. It is not engaged in the delicate balancing of the interests
of various constituencies in a legislative or policy making function. It hears disputes and
decides them in accordance with the legislation. 233

G. DB Pension Plan Administrator
The Ontario Pensions Benefits Act (the PBA) requires that every pension plan has an administrator.
A pension plan that does not identify an administrator is not eligible for registration. The identity of
the administrator is a matter of plan design. The PBA sets out the prescribed person, persons or
entity that may be an administrator. Specifically, an administrator may be an employer, an arm’s
length “pension committee” comprised of employer and employee representatives or just employee
representatives such as an insurance company, a board of trustees, a statutory corporation, board,
agency or commission, a person appointed by the Superintendent where the plan is being wound up,
or any other prescribed person or entity. 234

In cases where employees or representatives of the employer or trade union perform tasks for the
administrator, they can be found to be an employee or an agent of the administrator, and held to the
statutory standard of care imposed on the administrator. How far up and down the food chain this
duty extends remains unsettled law. Pension lawyer Ari Kaplan discusses the duty of care of
actuaries as agents of the administrator:235
One very sensitive issue in plan administration concerns the extent to which
actuaries are agents under the PBA or otherwise owe duties of care to employees.
There is little dispute that actuaries play an integral and integrated role in the day to
233
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day operations of a pension plan, especially defined benefit plans, from the inception
of the plan, and at regular and prescribed intervals, with respect to the plan’s
solvency and demographics, to the termination of the plan. Moreover, the
Superintendent may specifically require an actuary to file and certify an actuarial
valuation in certain circumstances and the Superintendent has the authority to refuse
to accept actuarial valuations where the assumptions or methods used in the
preparation of the report are not consistent with “accepted actuarial practice”.
Are actuaries agents under the PBA? Given the broad meaning of “agent” that has
been emerging from the case law, the answer is probably. An actuary preparing a
valuation report is performing an administrative function, and moreover, they are
almost always paid out of the pension fund with respect to their regulatory activities.
One court has described an actuary’s functions as “analogous” to that of an
employee of the administrator where the actuary had developed and implemented a
pension conversation on behalf of the employer. On the other hand, there is an
argument that precisely because of their specified statutory functions actuaries are
not agents, and, if the legislature intended them to be agents, it would have made it
explicit.
Kaplan notes that when not performing regulatory functions actuaries will often characterize
themselves as advisors, similar to lawyers, who merely give “advice” to the administrator or
employer, which may in turn choose whether or not to act upon their advice. Can an actuary
at common law be a fiduciary? To date, courts have been reluctant to find that actuaries owe
fiduciary obligations to the administrator, especially where liability can be determined
through other causes of action, such as negligence or breach of contract.

Kaplan concludes that whether or not actuaries can owe duties directly to employees
depends, of course, on the facts of each case. In the 1999 case McLaughlin v. Falconbridge
Ltd., the Ontario Superior Court certified a class proceeding initiated by a group of
employees against their employer which included a claim against the actuary for breach of
fiduciary duty. The court refused to strike out the claim against the actuary, notwithstanding
evidence that the employees not only had no contractual relationship with the actuary, but
many were unaware of the existence of the actuary prior to the litigation. The court
84

determined that “the presence or absence of a fiduciary relationship cannot be determined on
the basis of categorizing the relationship according to the identity of the persons involved.”
The statement of claim disclosed a cause of action in its allegations that the actuary held and
exercised discretionary power in the manner in which he had the authority to select from a
range of different actuarial assumptions to determine the values of employees’ pension
benefits and, accordingly, it was not plain and obvious the claim would fail. The case
subsequently settled prior to a determination on the merits and scope of the actuary’s duties.
Given the important and integral role that actuaries and consultants play in pension plan
administration, the scope of actuarial liability to plan stakeholders will undoubtedly be
canvassed in future case law. 236

The 2011 case Ault v. Canada held that pension service providers may have fiduciary duties to plan
beneficiaries, emphasizing the importance of accurate and full disclosure all relevant information to
plan members. In this case, the actuary put his own interests ahead of the plaintiffs (members).
Furthermore, unknown to the members, the actuary had a financial interest in the company (Loba)
sponsoring the pension plan into which the members transferred their pension funds. The court held
that there was a relationship of trust and confidence with the actuary that commenced when the
members met with the actuary and provided personal information to him, relying upon his expertise
as an actuary and expert in the field of pensions. In other words, the actuary was in a fiduciary
relationship with the members. However, the Court in Ault v. Canada left unanswered the question
of whether or not a pension actuary has a general fiduciary duty to his or her client or to plan
members, stating that providers such as actuaries may owe fiduciary duties to pension plan
beneficiaries, depending on the nature of the relationship and the circumstances.
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A plan administrator may find itself in a perceived conflict of interest where it is also the employer
sponsoring the pension plan. The employer is perceived (if not de facto) to prefer his or her own
interests over that of his or her employees. At common law, a fiduciary has an absolute duty to
avoid any conflict of interest, regardless of whether the conflict is actual or perceived. Cowan vs.
Scargill237 was a 1985 case where the union trustees appointed to the administration of the pensions
board were deemed to be acting a conflict of interest for not taking off their union “hats” when
evaluating the plan’s investment policy. The Court held:
The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interests
of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding the scales impartially
between different classes of beneficiaries. This duty of the trustees towards their
beneficiaries is paramount. They must, of course, obey the law; but subject to that,
they must put the interests of their beneficiaries first. When the purpose of the trust
is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, as is usually the case, the best
interests of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial interests. In the case of
a power of investment, as in the present case, the power must be exercised so as to
yield the best return for the beneficiaries, judged in relation to the risks of the
investments in question; and the prospects of the yield of income and capital
appreciation both have to be considered in judging the return from the investment.
The Ontario PBA similarly prohibits an administrator, as a general rule, from “knowingly”
permitting its interests to conflict with its duties and powers “in respect of the pension fund” or
receiving any benefit other than pension benefits, a refund of contributions, and reasonable fees and
expenses related to the administration of the plan permitted by common law or provided for in the
pension plan. Other provinces’ pension standards legislation also contain conflict of interest
provisions applicable to the plan administration.
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Section 8(10) of the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) also prohibits conflicts of
interest by administrators. It actually contains an express clause stating that if there is a material
conflict of interest between the role of the employer acting as an administrator and the employer’s
role in any other capacity, the administrator shall act in the best interests of the members of the
pension plan. In the context of this conflict of interest the question that arises is, “Does a singleemployer administrator violate the statutory conflict of interest prohibition solely by reason of the
fact that it is both the employer and the administrator?” It appears not. In the 1995 case Imperial Oil
Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) 238, a group of employees (the “Entitlement 55 Group”)
objected to their employer’s amendment to the pension plan that made the eligibility requirements
to receive an early retirement pension more difficult to obtain. The employees argued the
amendment was void on the basis that the employer was simultaneously acting in its capacity as
employer and its capacity as plan administrator. The employees argued that the employer was
acting with an improper purpose, in that the amendment had the effect of reducing the potential
liabilities of the pension fund, increasing the amount of surplus available in the plan (i.e. the
employer was attempting to reduce its annual service costs at the expense of its employees). The
Pension Commission of Ontario (FSCO’s predecessor) rejected this theory and, in accepting the
amendment for registration, affirmed what has since been referred to as the “two hats” principle of
employer sponsored administration:
The Act recognizes that an employer may wear “two hats” in respect of pension plans.
Indeed, section 8 specifically states that an employer may be an administrator. In that way, it
acknowledges that an employer may play two roles and it is self -evident that the two roles
may come into conflict from time to time. … This leads us to the conclusion that, at least in
the first instance, when the word “administrator” is used in section 22, it is used to mean the
person or body administering the fund and who stands in a special fiduciary relationship
with the plan members courtesy of the fiduciary standard of care set out in subsection 22(1).
We are of the view that an employer plays a role in respect of the pension plan that is
distinct from its role as administrator. Its role as employer permits it to make the decision to
238
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create a pension plan, to amend it and to wind it up. Once the plan and fund are in place, it
becomes an administrator for the purposes of management of the fund and administration of
the plan. If we were to hold that an employer was an administrator for all purposes once a
plan was established, of what use would a power of amendment be? An employer could
never use the power to amend the plan in a way that was to its benefit, as opposed to the
benefit of the employees.
Imperial Oil is an important case because it recognizes that structural conflicts of interest are
explicit in the PBA and must be tolerated. This is especially true given that pension plans are so
often administered by a single employer. Under the “two hats” principle, when an employer acts in
the capacity of “administrator”, the employer is subject to the statutory and common law fiduciary
standards imposed on plan administrators. However, when an employer acts in its “employer”
capacity, it likely does not owe employees a statutory duty of care. The sanctioning of this conflict
of interest precedent in Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) means employers
in Ontario continue to be in a conflict of interest position in hiring actuaries who value their DB
pension funds. This practice gives employers the opportunity to influence the assumptions (discount
rates, mortality tables etc.) used by actuaries in estimating funding contributions.

Although there is little (if any) empirical evidence in Canada that employers are breaching their
fiduciary duties under the “two hats” principle, a 2006 U.K. study (using financial information from
sponsoring firms including total value of assets, profitability, leverage, and taxes)239 investigated
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The study focuses on two alternative hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the presence of insiders is a
source of agency problems, if it allows insider-trustees to favor shareholders of the firm over members of the
pension plan. As described by Treynor (1977), a company with a DB pension plan owns a put option. If
the assets (the firm and DB assets) fall short of the pension fund liabilities, the firm has the option to give
these assets to the DB beneficiaries as payment. Since the value of a put option increases with the risk of
the underlying assets, insider-trustees may have the incentive to increase the risk of the assets (the firm
and DB assets) beyond what is optimal for the members of the pension plan, for example by investing the
pension plan assets into equities. The agency problems may also be reflected in the contributions paid into
the pension plan. Pension plan liabilities are similar to long-term debt, and pension plan members are debtholders of the company (see Webb, 2004). Insider-trustees who favour shareholders of the firm over pension
plan members may have an incentive to reduce firm contributions to the plan. The second hypothesis is that
insider-trustees facilitate a more efficient management of tax liabilities, which may be positive for both
shareholders and pension plan members. More precisely, companies may be able to generate tax savings if
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how the management of defined-benefit pension plans is affected by the presence of trustees who
are also directors of the sponsoring companies, or trustees who are insiders to the company. It
provided statistical evidence that insider-trustees act in the interest of shareholders of the
sponsoring company, and not necessarily in the interest of the pension plan members. In particular,
the study found that pension plans of more leveraged firms with a higher proportion of insidertrustees invest a higher fraction of the pension plan assets in riskier financial assets such as equities.
Thus, the study provided empirical evidence that such risk shifting by more leveraged firms
actually does occurs, an effect previously well understood theoretically but unproven empirically.

Professor Divya Anantharaman of Rutgers Business School in New York notes in her article
Actuarial Independence, Client Importance and Pension Assumptions,240 that actuaries’ pension
assumptions are a conduit for earnings manipulation for many reasons. First, statutory accounting
requirements for pensions and post-retirement benefits are complex, and even sophisticated
investors have trouble understanding them fully (Brown 2004; Franzoni and Marin 2006; Picconi
2006). Second, actuarial assumptions involve very long-term forecasts about the future.
Disentangling deliberate manipulation of these forecasts from honest errors is difficult (Brown

they integrate their financial and pension investment policies: If a company increases leverage, uses the
proceeds to fund the pension plan, and invests these funds in bonds, it may generate tax savings without
affecting financial risk (Black, 1980, Tepper, 1981). This is because the increase in leverage generates a
debt tax shield, while the return on bonds held in the pension plan is tax-exempt.
To test these alternative hypotheses the study collected information on UK companies that have DB pension
plans. It collected information on their pension plan assets (including how they were invested), pension plan
liabilities, contributions paid into the pension plan, and actuarial assumptions. In addition, it collected
information on the identity of the trustees of the pension plan, and whether they were executive directors of
the sponsoring company. Finally, it collected a variety of information for sponsoring companies, including the
total value of their assets, profitability, taxes paid, leverage, dividends paid, and investment. (Joao F. Cocco
and Paolo F. Volpin, The Corporate Governance of Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence from the United
Kingdom, 2006. Online: < www.faculty.london.edu/pvolpin/pensions.pdf >.)
240
Divya Ananatharaman, Actuarial Independence, Client Importance, and Pension Assumptions, Reuters
Business School, 2012. Online: <
www.kelley.iu.edu/feaconference/.../Paper_Upload_Anantharaman_D_76670 >.
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2004). Finally, pension assets, liabilities and expenses are an economically significant part of
corporate balance sheets and earnings. Even a small change in pension assumptions has the
potential to significantly impact financial statements.

Matt Nevisky of the National Bureau of Economic Research summarizes (below) an article titled
Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions: Evidence from Sponsored Pension
Plans (NBER Working Paper No. 10543), co-authored by Daniel Bergstresser, Mihir Desai, and
Joshua Rauh (He notes that the authors identify a simple way in which firms manipulate their
earnings: by manipulating the assumed rates of return on the firm's pension assets. The authors
show that such manipulation is linked to CEOs' incentives and that firms change investment
decisions both to justify and to capitalize on this type of earnings manipulation) 241:

Many firms have pension plans that are large enough to allow them to substantially increase
reported earnings in the short run by changing the assumed long-term rate of return for the
pension assets they manage for their workers. Those managers who determine that
manipulating the rate-of-return assumption can boost their firms' stock price, as was
apparently the case during the 1990s, have strong incentives to set this long-term rate of
return assumption opportunistically, particularly as they undertake mergers and approach
option vesting periods.
Asset allocation within pension plans is another investment decision that may reflect
earnings manipulation. Instrumental-variables analysis suggests that managers increase
equity allocations to justify their higher assumed rates of return on pension assets. Large
equity allocation in most firm pension plans remains a persistent puzzle. The authors note
that their analysis suggests that the interaction of managerial opportunism and pension
accounting may help to explain part of this puzzle, as managers increase equity allocations
to justify a rate-of-return assumption. The study concludes by showing that managers who
are the least constrained by their shareholders appear to be the most aggressive with their
rate-of-return assumptions. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the earnings manipulations
being examined do not benefit shareholders.
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Matt Nevisky, National Bureau of Economic Research, The Neber Digest, Pension Assumptions and
Earnings, 2004. Online: < www.neumann.hec.ca/cref/sem/documents/050506.pdf >.
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Professor Anantharaman continues that in spite of the vital role that actuaries play in pension
reporting, very little is known about the actuarial profession’s effect on financial reporting.

Actuaries belong to a self-regulated profession with an institutional framework very similar to that
of the accounting profession prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. 242 Canada’s Public Accountability Board
(CPAB) was created in 2003 by the Canadian Securities Administrators, the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants as part
of a series of reforms designed to improve investor confidence. CPAB’s duties include:
…conducting inspections of participating audit firms directly or through or in cooperation with
professional regulatory authorities in order to assess the compliance of each participating audit firm
with the rules of the Board, professional standards and the firm’s own quality control policies, in
connection with the issuance of audit reports on the financial statements of reporting issuers.
(Canadian Public Accountability Board, 2012)

The issues surrounding the professional independence of actuaries are not, in principle, unlike those
that faced the auditing profession before regulatory changes were legislated in the early 2000s
(Gunz, McCutcheon and Reynolds 2009)243. Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee,
leaving them susceptible to the conflict between providing advice based on objective analysis on
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The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002), also known as
the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act" (in the Senate) and "Corporate and
Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act" (in the House) and more commonly called Sarbanes–Oxley,
Sarbox or SOX, is a United States federal law that set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public
company boards, management and public accounting firms.
The bill, which contains eleven sections, was enacted as a reaction to a number of major corporate and
accounting scandals, including Enron, and Worldcom. The sections of the bill cover responsibilities of a
public corporation's board of directors, adds criminal penalties for certain misconduct, and required the
Securities and Exchange Commission to create regulations to define how public corporations are to comply
with the law. Canada and the US have both established oversight bodies for the auditors of public
companies in an effort to enhance the quality of audits for those companies: the Canadian
Public Accountability Board (CPAB) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the
United States.
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Gunz, McCutcheon and Reynolds, “Independence, Conflict of Interest and the Actuarial Profession”
(2009) 89 (1): Ethics at 77 - 89.
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the one hand, and serving the needs of their plan sponsor clients on the other hand, whose objective
may be to justify ways of spending as little as possible on the plan (Financial Times 2004). A recent
review of the U.S. actuarial profession stated “as long as a client can threaten to find another
actuary to provide actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an effect on the
actuary’s work product” (CRUSAP Task Force 2006)244.

Anantharanan addressed the issue of whether or not economic bonding created by fee dependence
affects actuarial independence by using a sample of 2,583 firm-year observations spanning 19992007. She found that greater fee dependence (measured as the ratio of fees received from each plan
sponsor client to the sum of fees received from all clients by that actuarial firm in that year) is
associated with a higher (obligation-reducing) discount rate, consistent with economic bonding of
the pension actuary leading to assumptions that understate the pension obligation. Moreover, this
effect is stronger amongst the sub-sample of firms with stronger incentives to understate the
pension obligation (i.e. highly leveraged firms with underfunded plans, and firms with long
duration plans, for which a higher discount rate does not create countervailing effects of increasing
the pension expense on the income statement). Anantharaman found that greater fee dependence is
associated with a lower obligation-increasing discount rate for firms preparing to freeze their
pension plans, which have incentives to overstate the pension obligation to exaggerate the economic
burden of their plans and successfully negotiate the freeze with their workforce. She comments on
her survey’s findings on the conflicted role of the pension actuary:
…on average, economically important clients receive higher (obligation-reducing) discount
rate assumptions. This effect is stronger in highly leveraged firms and firms with longer
244

Divya Anatharaman,The Role of Actuaries In Defined Benefit Plan Reporting, Reuters Business School,
2013. Online :< www8.gsb.columbia.edu/programs.../sites/.../ActuaryFinalSept2013 >.
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duration plans, whose incentives to understate the pension obligation are higher. Moreover,
economically important clients are more likely to receive a lower (obligation-increasing)
discount rate assumption just ahead of a pension freeze, when the firm has incentives to
overstate the pension obligation. Overall, the results suggest that economic bonding of
actuary to client may result in actuarial recommendations that understate or overstate the
reporting funding status of the plan, depending on the incentives of the plan sponsor. 245
Professor Anantharaman concluded that the economic bonding created by fee dependence does
appear to affect the chosen discount rate, a primary driver of the reported pension obligation and the
resulting funding status. Clients from whom actuarial practice offices derive a large fraction of their
revenues receive recommendations for obligation-reducing discount rates when the plan sponsor
has strong incentives to understate the pension obligation, and for obligation-increasing discount
rates when the plan sponsor has incentives to overstate the pension obligation. The results hold after
controlling for the economic determinants of discount rates, and are robust to a variety of
alternative specifications. The results suggest that actuarial incentives to resist client pressure –
litigation risk, for example – are possibly weaker than in the context of accounting firms, consistent
with suggestions by researchers and commentators.

Anantharaman notes that her study took only the first step in examining the incentives facing the
actuarial profession and their impact on the accounting numbers reported for defined benefit
pension plans. She states:

Potential avenues for future research include examining the causes and consequences of
switching of actuaries, examining in further detail the differential incentives, if any, faced
by larger versus smaller actuarial firms, and studying the potential consequences for pension
assumptions of the provision of non-actuarial services such as compensation consulting.
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Divya Ananatharaman, Actuarial Independence, Client Importance, and Pension Assumptions, Reuters
Business School, 2012. Online: <
www.kelley.iu.edu/feaconference/.../Paper_Upload_Anantharaman_D_76670 >.
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The “take away” from Anantharanman’s study is that the conflict of interest between the actuary
and the employer (where the actuary is being paid by the employer) tends to bias actuarial
projections of investment returns toward the high side, resulting in lower employer contributions
and the underfunding of DB plans in these times of low investment returns. 246 Although no such
study has been conducted in Canada, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting similar
actuarial biases exist in valuing private sector single employer DB pension plans

The establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board similar to the one
established in Great Britain would be one possible legal remedy to better control actuarial
underfunding in Canada. After more than a century of self-regulation, the U.K. Faculty and Institute
of Actuaries (comparable to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries) agreed in 2005 that its regulatory
responsibilities would be subject to external oversight (as per the accounting profession) through
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), accountable to the U.K. government. The Council’s core
functions include:







Promoting high standards of corporate governance.
Setting, monitoring and enforcing accounting and auditing standards.
Setting actuarial standards.
Overseeing and regulating auditors.
Operating an independent investigation and discipline scheme for public interest cases.
Overseeing the regulatory activities of the professional accountancy and actuarial bodies.
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A survey of private sector sponsors of Canada’s 100 largest defined benefit pension plans, based on data
at the end of fiscal 2001, found that:
• for 31 sponsors, the fair market value of pension assets was at least 20% of the sponsor’s total corporate
assets,
• for several of the 31, the percentage was in the 30-50% range, and
• for two sponsors, the pension assets were essentially equal to the total corporate assets.
The survey found as well, that 58 of these 100 plans had an aggregate pension asset shortfall (off balance
sheet) of $11.2 billion at the end of fiscal 2001 and 27 of the 58 reported a pension-related asset on their
balance sheets of $2.8 billion. (Wiedman et al, "Whither the Pension Plan? Accounting rules mask increasing
debt," Research into pension sponsors disclosures, Ivey Business Journal, January/February 2003.)
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The FRC delivers these functions through six operating bodies, three of which are involved with
matters directly related to actuaries: the Board for Actuarial Standards (BAS), the Professional
Oversight Board (POB) and the Accountancy & Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB). The FRC
aims to ensure that:



The users of actuarial information can place a high degree of reliance on its relevance,
transparency of assumptions, completeness and comprehensibility.
The clients and employers of professionally qualified actuaries can rely on them to act with
integrity and competence, having regard to the public interest.

It is Important to note that the UK Actuarial Profession fully supports the FRC’s goals, reflected by
a cornerstone of its strategic plan–to build a quality framework which promotes public confidence
in the work of actuaries, resulting in regulators and organizations representing the public respecting
the professional ethics and standards demonstrated by actuaries. 247
Section 3-Specific Legislation and Regulations Governing Actuarial Funding
The future of defined-benefit pension plans is increasingly being questioned. Sponsors are worried
about the impact of fluctuating market returns on funding. Pension regulators are concerned about
the large deficits that many DB plans have been accumulating and consequently, their exposure to
insolvency. As a result, many active and retired employees are worried about the security of their
promised benefits. Jim Armstrong of the Bank of Canada discusses the impact of defined benefit
plans on the financial system:
The potential for continued erosion of the viability of defined-benefit plans raises concerns with
respect to the financial system, particularly in the area of efficiency. Without the option of defined
benefit pensions, risk-averse savers are likely to pursue less-efficient allocations of capital.
Furthermore, without the presence of such plans, the financial system is less likely to experience the
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Caroline Instance, Society of Actuaries, “A New Era in Regulation for the Actuarial Profession”, Online: <
www.soa.org/library/...actuary.../act-2009-vol6-iss4-instance.aspx>.
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efficiency gains provided by active market investors with a long-term perspective. Inefficiencies
from either of these sources could result in significant costs to the Canadian economy. 248

In other words, pension investments are used to finance long term projects such as building roads,
schools and hospitals.

A key impediment to DB plan funding is the issue of asymmetry, whereby pension fund surpluses
are increasingly seen as the property of plan members, while deficits remain the sole responsibility
of the sponsor. The high opportunity cost249 of inaccessible surpluses increases minimum funding
strategies by sponsors, exacerbating underfunding.250 The result is that very few new definedbenefit plans are being created, many existing plans have been closed to new members, and others
are being converted to defined-contribution plans. For example, private sector single employer DB
plan membership in Ontario declined by almost 200,000 members (850,000 to 660,000) from 2005
to 2012.251Appendix 3 on page 275 discusses the various federal PBSA, Income Tax Act and
248

Jim Armstrong and Jack Selody, Bank of Canada, “Strengthening Defined Benefit Pension Plans”,
Financial System Review. Online: < www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/.../fsr-1205-armstrong >.
249
The cost of an alternative that must be forgone in order to pursue a certain action. Put another way, the
benefits you could have received by taking an alternative action. (Investopedia) Online: <
www.investopedia.com/terms/o/opportunitycost.asp >.
250

In other words, if employers cannot access surpluses, they will not want to invest any extra money in their
pension plan to maintain surplus funding; rather they will invest extra money in more accessible investments
outside of the plan (i.e., there is a high opportunity cost of investing extra money in DB plans if it is
inaccessible as surplus pension funds).
251

Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario Annual Report:
(Toronto 2012) at 9 & Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Financial Services Commission of Ontario
Annual Report: (Toronto 2005) at 11.
Private Single Employer Pension Plans (SEPPs) are the focus of this thesis because they have been
steadily declining in recent years. SEPPs are riskier propositions than Multiple Employer Pension Plans
(MEPPs) because they each address the issue of “full funding” rather differently. While surpluses for MEPPs
may be used to fund contribution holidays or benefit improvements (as with SEPPs), unfunded liabilities in
MEPPs are usually dealt with by reducing accrued or future benefits, including pensions already in pay — an
option generally unavailable to SEPPs. In other words, the SEPP employer (sponsor) must make up any
funding deficiencies, as accrued or future benefits cannot be reduced. Of course, if MEPP sponsors and their
unions agree, benefit reduction can be avoided by renegotiating the sponsor contributions that are fixed in
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Ontario PBA amendments which were introduced from 2009 to 2014 in an attempt to address DB
plan underfunding.252 Unfortunately, these amendments generally serve to push funding problems
down the road, rather than fixing them.
Conclusion
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the most recent pension legislation, regulations, case law and
professional bodies governing actuaries’ discretion in Canada, highlighting the disconnect between
short-term funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of
DB funding obligations.
The chapter noted that actuaries are impacted by two major legal factors. Firstly, actuaries are
agents of plan sponsors, meaning that they are prone to being influenced by their employers’ wishes
to make minimum contributions. Secondly, because actuaries are not fiduciaries, they are not liable
for plan deficits. These two factors have been instrumental in allowing employers to pressure
actuaries into estimating lower, more affordable contribution levels (by projecting higher
investment returns on pension assets than actual market rates). In short, actuarial discretion has
(either advertently or inadvertently) become an important factor in the funding policies of both the
Ontario PBA and the federal PBSA, allowing financially challenged plans to remain solvent
through unrealistically low employer funding.253 The problem with this type of funding policy is

their current collective agreement; and in MEPPs that provide for member contributions, those contributions
may be increased as well. But as a practical matter, these alternatives are often difficult to implement.
Consequently, benefit reduction is a real and present danger for most MEPPs and their members. (Report of
the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair Rules (Toronto:
Minister of Finance, 2008) at 68).
252

Murray Campbell and Ken Burns, Lawson Lundell LLP, Pension and Employees Benefits Bulletin:
“Pension Reforms 2009”. Online: < www.lawsonlundell.com/media/news/143_Pension_Reform.pdf >.
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Because actuaries are self-regulating, they make many of the rules that govern their own profession. This
is a recipe for conflict; actuaries competing for lucrative HR consulting work may not have the guts to deliver
hard news to the same employer who is also administering a pension plan. Nothing could be more
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that chronically low returns have resulted in large deficits. Many DB sponsors have responded by
switching to defined contribution (DC) plans, freezing their DB plans (i.e. not allowing new
employees to join), or declaring bankruptcy (note that pensioners are unsecured creditors). Two
potential legal remedies to this underfunding problem include eliminating employer-actuary agency
(by creating an oversight board which hires pension actuaries) and/or making actuaries fiduciaries
(thereby making them legally liable for any funding deficits). However, to date courts have been
reluctant to find that actuaries owe fiduciary obligations to plan members, especially where liability
may be determined through causes of action such as negligence or breach of contract.

dangerous to the industry than this cozy relationship. (Murray Gold, The Law-A World of Concerns, Benefits
Canada, 2005).
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CHAPTER 4
IMPACT OF THE GOVERNANCE OF DISCOUNT RATES ON THE UNDERFUNDING
OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Overview

Chapter 3 provided an overview of the most recent pension legislation, regulations, case law and
professional bodies governing actuaries’ discretion in Canada, highlighting the disconnect between
short-term funding policies based on malleable actuarial assumptions and the long term nature of
DB funding obligations. Chapter 4 discusses the impact of the governance of discount (interest)
rates on funding, concluding that actuaries are permitted to use their discretion to estimate higher
than market rates in order to reduce employers’ funding requirements. It proposes the establishment
of an external oversight board to establish a common framework for estimating discount rates,
promoting a common understanding amongst actuaries of how to improve the consistency of their
estimates.
Despite all the sophisticated tools available in financial markets, projected annual asset and liability
cash flows rarely balance exactly, making the funding status of defined benefit pension plans
unclear. Therefore, actuaries use discount rates, which are at the heart of most actuarial calculations,
as tools to condense complicated cash-flow information into more meaningful present value
numbers for comparison purposes. The discount rate is defined as the rate of return on the present
value of assets which equates them to their estimated values in future years. The higher the discount
rate, the lower the current value of assets/liabilities required to equal their future values.
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Alternatively, the lower the discount rate, the higher the current value of assets/liabilities required
to equal their future values.254
In the 1980s and 1990s most defined benefit pension plans had surpluses due to high investment
returns. However, in 1999 investment returns began to fall dramatically, turning surpluses into
deficits. Persistently low discount rates over the past 15 years have impacted DB plans in the
following ways:
1. Accumulation of surpluses mostly disappeared.
2. Present value calculations of projected annual deficits steadily rose (i.e. the value of
liabilities, which are bond-like in nature, increased with declining interest rates).
3. Present value calculations of projected annual investments required to fund annual deficits
rose (because lower investment returns meant more investment capital was required to meet
increasing funding obligations).

Pension regulation relies on the actuarial profession to control the funding risk in calculating the
contributions required to fund promised pension benefits. The discount (interest) rate is the most
important parameter in the valuation of defined benefit (DB) pension plan liabilities, which equal
the net present value of all expected future pension plan payments. 255 Kendra Kaake notes that
traditional actuaries have long argued that pension liabilities should be discounted at rates that
reflect the expected long-term returns on plan assets, while financial economists have countered
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Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, “Actuaries and Discount Rates”, 2013. Online: <
www8.gsb.columbia.edu/programs.../sites/.../ActuaryFinalSept2013.pdf >.
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In general, the pension liability will change over time as a result of benefit accruals and improvements,
actual versus expected plan experience, plan closure or freezing, changes in plan demographics and
regulations. However, the pension liability will be the most sensitive to changes in the liability discount rate
and inflation. (K. Kaake, Asset Allocation and Risk Management for Defined Benefit Pension Plans: A
Canadian Perspective, 2012).
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that pension liabilities should be discounted at market rates (either risk-free government bond yields
or high-grade corporate bonds).256
Kaake continues that Canadian regulators have prudently adopted a balanced solution, ensuring that
single employer DB plans are funded on a going concern basis (the projected value of future
benefits discounted relative to the expected return on plan assets) and on a solvency basis (the
market value of existing accrued entitlements). As a natural extension, the investment risk assumed
should then evolve, in concert with each particular plan’s governance process, as a balanced tradeoff between the upside return potential and the downside risk of increased contributions. The key
advantage of having both requirements is that the flexibility of the going concern approach is not
allowed to go so far as to leave a consistent shortfall on a solvency basis. In other words, solvency
valuations establish a minimum statutory funding level regardless of the level of the going concern
valuation (i.e. the highest of the two valuations must be funded).

Intuitively, it may seem more likely that a plan would be fully funded on a solvency (commuted)
basis than an ongoing valuation basis, simply because members cease to accrue benefits (based on
wage increases, longevity increases etc.) in a solvency valuation. However, this is not always the
case. The terms of the pension plan or the applicable pension benefit law may result in the
commuted plan having additional liabilities upon termination that it would not have if it continues
on an ongoing basis. 257
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Dmitri Vittas, Discount Rates and the Value of Pension Liabilities, World Bank, 2010.
For example, Grow-In benefits must be included in solvency valuations under the Ontario Pension
Benefits Act. As of July 1, 2012, a pension plan member is entitled to grow-in to certain benefits (referred to
as “grow-in benefits”) if his or her pension plan provides defined benefits, and he or she ceases to be a
member because his or her employment is terminated (subject to some limited exceptions) or the plan is
wound up. This right entitles the eligible plan member to receive the pension beginning on the date on which
257
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Pension funding has experienced much volatility in recent years. In the early 2000s, a sharp decline
in long-term interest rates along with changes in actuarial standards, including increased longevity
assumptions, resulted in increasing plan liabilities. Combined with poor investment returns, these
factors led to many plans being underfunded on a solvency basis. This funding volatility resulted in
governments implementing funding relief regulations and special regulations for specific sponsors
(i.e. Air Canada). The existence of temporary solvency funding relief measures and special
regulations pointed to the need to improve the regulatory framework governing the funding of
private DB pension plans.

As discussed in Chapter 3, solvency funding relief regulations were enacted in the Ontario PBA and
the federal PBSA in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The new regulations attempted to balance the
goals of maintaining benefit security for employees and retirees, and preserving the financial
condition of corporations. This was accomplished by reducing contributions for pension solvency
deficits to allow more resources to be put toward operations. The solvency relief measures included
in both the Ontario and federal regulations provided a number of options to plan sponsors with
respect to solvency deficiencies, in recognition of the fact that each sponsor may have different
priorities and restrictions. Plan sponsors now have a number of options available and need to
consider the disclosure, communication, and filing requirements associated with each of the options.

Under the 2010 federal PBSA amendments, "average" solvency ratios over 3 years replaced
"current" solvency ratios in determining minimum solvency funding requirements in respect of a
defined benefit pension plan. Annual filing of valuation reports were mandated in the
the member would have been entitled to an enhanced or unreduced pension under the pension plan, if his or
her employment or membership had continued to that date.
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implementation of this new funding model. The "current" solvency ratio rule still applies for other
purposes. The 5-year target period for funding solvency deficiencies remained unchanged, requiring
DB plans to remit (on a quarterly basis), 20% of the solvency deficiency each year in which a
solvency deficiency exists.258

The Ontario Pension Benefits Act Regulations were amended in 2012 by Ontario Regulation
329/12 to implement solvency funding relief measures for private sector defined benefit (DB)
pension plans. The new solvency relief measures are similar to the measures introduced in 2009 and
consist of:

1. Up to a 12-month deferral of new amortization schedules.
2. Consolidation and re-amortization of existing solvency deficiencies over a five-year period.
3. Amortization of new solvency deficiencies over a 10-year period, subject to a process which
will allow members to object to this relief option.
Although solvency valuations address the ability of a DB plan to pay commuted benefits in the
event of employer insolvency, only going concern valuations address the ability of a plan to meet
its long term pension commitments.259 Dr. Ron Davis and Dr. Janis Sarra discuss the impact of
discount rates on these valuations:
After a defined benefit pension plan is registered, it must have actuarial reports concerning
its funded status prepared and submitted to the regulator at least every three years or when
changes are made that change the contributions required and/or the plan’s liabilities. Where
the actuarial reports disclose that additional liabilities have been created or existing
liabilities have been increased, then the plan sponsor must make additional special
contributions calculated by an actuary as sufficient to pay-off these liabilities over a five to
fifteen year time frame.
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Eckler Consultants, New Rules for federally Regulated Pension Plans, 2010. Online:
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The Ontario PBA provisions protect against the failure of the plan sponsor to make adequate
contributions by requiring the sponsor to pre-fund the normal cost of a promised benefit in a
defined benefit pension plan. “Normal cost” is defined in the PBA Regulation as “the cost of
pension benefits and ancillary benefits with respect to a fiscal year of a pension plan
determined in accordance with the methods and actuarial assumptions used in a going
concern valuation”. This definition has an impact on the solvency risk for pension plans,
given the provisions that regulate actuarial methods and assumptions and the investment of
the pension fund’s assets. An important factor affecting the adequacy of the funding in a
defined benefit pension plan is the amount of the initial contribution and the investment
income that contribution can earn over a relatively lengthy time period. While the
prefunding obligations discussed above ensure that contributions are made, they do not
specify how an adequate amount is determined except in the most general manner. The
chosen means for specifying the amount is to rely on accepted actuarial practice as
determined by an actuarial practitioner governed by a self-regulatory body rather than any
express regulatory standards.
Davis notes that a “going-concern valuation” in the PBA Regulation “means a valuation of the
assets and liabilities of a pension plan using methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent
with accepted actuarial practice for the valuation of a continuing pension plan.” Thus, the
contributions required to fund each year’s benefits are determined by calculating the normal cost of
those benefits using the actuarial assumptions and methods for a going-concern valuation that are,
in turn, determined by accepted actuarial practice. However, there is a large range of discretion that
actuaries have over the assumptions that will be used to calculate future returns on investment in
pension plans. This variance of assumptions can be compared across jurisdictions, with those used
in large Canadian pension plans being more conservative than those used in the U.S. Weidman and
Weir have reported that the median return on asset assumptions in 2004 of the 100 companies with
the largest pension funds in Canadian Compustat260 was 7.3% while that of the pension funds
sponsored by the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index was 8.5%.
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Davis continues that the statutory requirement in Ontario that the tri-annual actuarial valuation
assess the plan’s funded status on a solvency basis, provides a “check” on the results of going
concern “normal cost” calculations. The solvency funding calculation requires an actuary to value
the plan’s liabilities and assets as if the plan was being wound-up, to determine if sufficient assets
are in the plan to fund the accrued benefits. If there are not, then the plan sponsor must commence
making payments that will extinguish any solvency deficit over the next five years. As a result, any
deterioration in the funded status of the plan over the previous three years as a result of a
divergence between actuarial assumptions and actual experience due to the effect of economic
events on the value of plan’s liabilities or assets, can be remedied by equal monthly instalment
payments over the next 5 post valuation years. The insolvency risk is that during the (up to) eight
year period encompassing the period between actuarial valuations and the five year amortization
period, the plan sponsor may become insolvent resulting in insufficient plan assets to pay accrued
benefits. 261 Similar going concern and solvency requirements exist in the federal PBSA.
Impact of Actuaries on Discount Rates
The discount rate assumptions used in defined-benefit pension funding are often chosen
strategically to make plans appear better funded (i.e. reduce liabilities) than they actually are
(Feldstein and Morck, 1983; Asthana, 1999; Bergstresser et al., 2006, Baloria, 2011). As pension
assets, liabilities and expenses are an economically significant part of corporate financial statements,
even small changes in pension assumptions can impact earnings and balance sheets substantially.
While managers of the firm sponsoring the plan (“plan sponsor”) are ultimately responsible for
choosing pension assumptions, these assumptions are typically chosen on the recommendation of
261
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the pension actuary. Professor Divya Anantharaman of Reuters Business School discusses actuaries’
conflict of interest:
Actuaries are self- regulated…They render opinions for a fee, making them susceptible to
conflicts between providing advice based on objective analysis, and serving the needs of
plan sponsor clients, when the two diverge. This conflict has long been a subject of
discussion within the actuarial profession—for example, “…as long as a client can threaten
to find another actuary to provide actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an
effect on the actuary’s work product” (American Academy of Actuaries Task Force,
2006)—across all areas where actuaries function, such as pensions and insurance (Feldblum,
1993; White and Atkinson, 1993, Carmichael, 1997).262 Vaughan, Cooper, and Frank
(1993), in a survey of insurance actuaries, report that “responding to pressure from clients or
management to change assumptions” was considered the most serious ethical challenge
facing the profession. These issues have received some wider attention, but the generally
low visibility of the profession and lack of public exposure to its work has limited a robust
debate on actuarial independence from developing in the United States.
These concerns about the professional independence of actuaries, when juxtaposed with
academic evidence on firms’ strategic use of pension assumptions, beg the question of
whether the pension assumptions that plan sponsors ultimately use are affected by actuaries’
economic incentives, i.e., whether certain plan sponsors successfully exert pressure on
actuaries to tilt assumptions in a specific direction. If the threat of losing fee revenues from
a client affects the actuary’s work product, this might manifest in actuarial assumptions that
262

In other examples, “An actuary can only really claim independence if the advice given is totally open and
public, and is capable of being relied on by any interested party. The fiduciary relation which a consulting
actuary has with his or her client (not to mention the receipt of a fee) implies that they are beholden to their
client...” in published comments to Bellis (2000)’s speech to the Institute of Actuaries. In the insurance arena,
Feldblum (1993) argues in a discussion paper of the Casualty Actuarial Society that the insurance actuary is
“torn between the two roles” of professional expert (certifying to insurance regulators that loss reserves are
reasonable) and business manager (seeking to optimize company performance), and provides the
interesting example that “almost all major insurers have unqualified actuarial opinions”, but yet “most
actuaries believe that industry reserves are seriously deficient on a statutory basis”.
For example, there is ““subtle pressure on the actuary to come up with numbers that make the pension fund
look good” (Mary Williams Walsh, “Actuaries scrutinized on pensions”, The New York Times, May 21, 2008).
Warren Buffett, in his 2007 letter to shareholders, famously decried pension expected rate-of-return
assumptions for being unrealistic, adding that somehow, “the auditors and actuaries charged with vetting
these return assumptions seem to have no problem with it”. Standard & Poors’ insurance analyst Steven J.
Dreyer asserts, “The accounting profession has come in for a lot of criticism in recent years. Meanwhile, the
insurance industry has done something almost as egregious by, in effect, overstating prior-year earnings by
billions of dollars. Somehow, actuaries have avoided the spotlight for abetting this.” (Dreyer, Steven J.,
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better fit the client’s reporting objectives. Actuaries do, however, face countervailing
incentives to resist client pressure - from the threat of litigation, the need to maintain
reputation, and perhaps more fundamentally from personal integrity and professional codes
of conduct. Whether these incentives dominate economic considerations, is an empirical
question. 263
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions voiced similar concerns about the professional
independence of Canadian actuaries:
An actuary considers a number of discretionary factors (including the discount rate) in
valuing the funding requirements of a defined benefit pension. Ideally, the breadth of the
options offered should be influenced by the actuarial firm’s desire to serve both the sponsor
and the plan members. The employer, (responsible for hiring the actuary) is the party with
the most influence. This situation exposes actuaries to subtle — even overt — pressures to
exercise their discretion in a way that produces outcomes agreeable to the sponsor. In the
end, of course, the sponsor makes the choice — but it is actuarial discretion that confers
legitimacy on that choice.264
Professor Anatharaman conducted a survey of 4,149 American actuarial firms to determine whether
discount rate estimates varied systematically across large and small actuarial firms, and also,
whether or not the discount rate varied within actuarial firms based on the economic importance of
the plan sponsor to its actuary. She observed:
In a sample of 4,169 firm-years from 2000-2008, there is evidence that clients of the largest
actuarial firms use systematically lower, or more conservative (i.e., obligation- increasing)
discount rate assumptions, consistent with larger actuarial firms having incentives to enforce
conservative pension valuations. Within actuarial firms, there is strong evidence that
economically important clients (i.e., that account for a greater proportion of their actuary’s
client portfolio) use higher, or more aggressive (obligation-reducing) discount rates,
compared to less important clients. Examining client importance at three levels – the
actuarial firm level, the actuarial practice-office level, and the level of the individual actuary
signing the actuarial report, client importance at both practice-office and individual levels is
incrementally associated with higher discount rates (i.e. lower funding requirements).
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Partition tests265 show that the effects of client importance are driven, as expected, by client
firms with strong incentives to overstate discount rates - highly leveraged plan sponsors
with poorly-funded pension plans (“financially weak” plans). This effect exists both within
actuarial firms (across their client portfolio), and within client firms (over time). In these
plans, there is some evidence that client importance effects at the practice-office level are
stronger when auditor oversight of actuarial valuations is weak.
Finally, the effect of client importance manifests in both large and small actuarial firms.
Interestingly, however, sorting plans by absolute size shows that the effect of client
importance is driven by relatively small plans in combination with smaller practice-offices.
In other words, the plan sponsors that appear to successfully exert pressure for aggressive
assumptions are not the very largest plans by absolute size (these plans may face significant
external scrutiny that constrains manipulation) but rather, smaller plans that happen to be
relatively important to their actuarial practice-office.266
This chapter examines the impact of the governance of discount rates on actuarial discretion and the
underfunding of defined benefit pension plans in Canada. It is divided into three sections examining
the theory, legal framework, and policy options, respectively, applicable to the governance of
discount rates.
Section 1-Theory of Discount Rates
1. The Concept of Discount Rates
A discount rate is a financial concept that accounts for the time value of money. It recognizes that a
dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received tomorrow. In essence, a discount rate is
an interest rate which reflects the amount of risk one is willing to take in receiving a value of
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Several existing test methods (e.g. Equivalence Partitioning [32], Category Partition [2], and Domain
Testing [33]) are based on the model that the input space of the test object may be divided into subsets
based on the assumption that all points in the same subset result in a similar behavior from the test object.
This is called partition testing. Even if the partition test assumption is an idealization it has two important
properties. First, it lets the tester identify test suites of manageable size by selecting one or a few test cases
from each subset. Second, it allows test effectiveness to be measured in terms of coverage with respect to
the partition model used. Online:<www.csrc.nist.gov/acts/grindal-offutt-andler.pdf >.
266

Supra, see note 263.

108

money at a future date rather than today. Professor Ron Davis discusses how actuaries calculate
discount rates:
For example, in order to pay a benefit of $100 per month for life starting in ten years,
suppose the actuary projects that it will take a total of $60,000, based on average life
expectancy. The actuary must estimate how much money must be contributed today to earn
a total of $60,000 in ten years, based on the anticipated rate of return (the discount rate). In
making this calculation, the actuary takes into account the type of investments the plan
makes. The returns on equity investments generally outpace the returns generated by “riskfree” fixed-income investments such as bonds. Therefore, the greater the proportion of
equities in a pension fund’s assets, the lower the initial pension contribution required in an
actuary’s estimated cost calculation. 267
One study suggests that most of today’s DB retirement plans try to make DB pensions affordable by
investing 50-70% of funds in equities. The objective is to increase the annual rate of return on the
pension fund by about 2%, while delivering an acceptable compromise between affordability and
stability. Increasing the expected rate of return by 2% reduces the steady state pension contribution
rate by about 40%.268
In summary, actuaries calculate “present values” in order to compare assets and liabilities. Cash
flows of assets and liabilities in future years are discounted to an equivalent present value using (1)
a factor based on the number of years before the money is scheduled to be received and (2) an
interest rate called a “discount rate.” An example of a present value calculation is presented below:
A payment of $1,000 in 2 years, discounted at 5% per year, is worth approximately $907 in
today’s dollars. It tends to be easier to understand this calculation by reversing the process.
If today we put $907 into a savings account earning 5% per year, it will grow to a value of
$1,000 in 2 years. That is, the $907 would earn $45 (at 5% interest) and total $952 at the end
of year 1. This $952 would earn $48 (at 5% interest) and total $1,000 at the end of year 2.
267

Ron Davis, IRRP Study, “Is Your Defined Benefit Plan Guaranteed?” (2011) at 9. Online:<
irpp.org/research-studies/is-your-defined-benefit-pension-guarante >.
268
Malcolm Hamilton, “Investment and Longevity Risks”, Retirement Savings Research Program. Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 2009. Online: < www.fin.gc.ca/activty/pubs/pension/refbib/hamilton-eng.asp >. as
cited in Ron Davis, IRRP, Is Your Defined Benefit Plan Guaranteed?

109

The mathematics can become complicated, but the logic always remains the same; a present
value growing at an interest (discount) rate for some number of periods equals the ultimate
target amount that was originally discounted to today’s dollars. 269

2. Types of Discount Rates
Discount rates are essential in determining a DB plan’s current funding status because its assets and
liabilities are spread over many years. Discount rates can generally be classified in one of three
categories:

(i)

Expected rates of return:

Actuarial rules specify that the discount rate should be based on the expected long-term return on
investment in the pension trust. Therefore, a plan would be viewed as fully funded if it has
sufficient investments to make its obligated pension payments at the estimated interest (discount)
rate. For many years actuaries estimated the return for the average plan at about 6%, although
estimates for individual plans always varied up or down by one or two percentage points. Fred
Vitesse, Chief Actuary at Morneau Shepell, explains how actuaries arrived at a 6% rate of return:270

1. Estimate future inflation: The average inflation rate since 1924 has been 2.94% though
actuaries generally assume lower future inflation because (a) inflation has been low for quite
a while, (b) economic growth in the developed world looks like it will remain sluggish for a
long time to come and (c) the Bank of Canada is targeting inflation at 2% per annum.
Taking all this into account, the typical estimate of future inflation is about 2.25%.

2. Forecast the real return: Calculate the return on each asset class over and above the inflation
rate. Assuming three asset classes with 40% in long-term government bonds, 30% in
Canadian equities and 30% in international equities.
269
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3. Expect bond yields to rise: Bonds are currently at the bottom of a 60-year interest cycle so
yields are expected to rise over the next 25 to 30 years. As yields rise, long-term bonds will
produce capital losses that will reduce total return. This has already started as bond funds
have registered a net loss in the first eight months of 2013. Indeed, there have been 25-year
periods when bonds lost money in real terms. Nevertheless. …the consensus that real returns
on long-term bonds will average about 1.25% over the next 25 years.

4. Expect equities to rise less: Actuaries generally expect that Canadian equities will generate
real returns of 5.25% over the next quarter century; this is less than the 6.7% or so that they
have generated historically but an aging population implies a slower economy. Real returns
on international equities are expected to be a little higher, about 5.75%.

5. Factor in rebalancing: Put this all together and a nominal return of 6.05% is derived.
(Nominal means the inflation component is added back in ) This can be bumped up by the
closest thing to a free lunch that you are apt to find in the investment world: Assuming the
portfolio is going to be rebalanced regularly (to maintain the 40-30-30 mix), the actual
return will be a little higher than if the asset mix is allowed to drift. The estimated return can
therefore be rounded up to about 6.4% to reflect regular re-balancing.
6. Assume 6% gains: Finally, we knock off about 0.5% for management fees to come up with
our final estimate of 5.9%, which we will round up to 6%.271

(ii)

Risk-free rates: 272

Central to the establishment of discount rates is the concept of a risk-free rate. If pension assets are
invested in government bonds which have been guaranteed to be paid, then we would expect them
271
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to be valued on a discount basis which assumes certainty or in other words, is risk free. The
boilerplate definition of risk-free is a zero-coupon government bond curve.

Financial economists generally advocate the use of a “risk-free” rate, such as the return on a
government treasury bond of equivalent duration to the pension obligation. Currently, this would
produce a discount rate of 2% to 3%. Financial economists argue that a plan’s assets should be
invested at a risk free rate to guarantee that increases in pension liabilities (usually 2-3% per year)
are matched by similar increases in pension assets. This “risk free” concept conflicts with the wellestablished actuarial principle of investing pension assets in more volatile equities to achieve higher
expected rates of return:
Professor Ron Davis notes that critics of this practice (focussing on the bias toward equity
investment created by the “equity premium)” argue that there is no justification rooted in financial
economics principles or research for using differing costs for a fixed obligation based on what form
of investment one makes (see, for example, Bader and Gold 2003; Exley, Mehta, and Smith 2004;
and Sutcliffe 2005). In their review, the practice of incorporating the equity premium into the cost
calculations ignores the fact that the premium is the market price for the extra risk assumed by
choosing equities over risk free investments. The result is that the potential for a pension asset
shortfall is increased by the proportion of equity assets in the pension fund. Despite this, in Ontario,
the proportion of pension assets invested in equities has grown steadily, and at the end of 2008
stood at 60 percent (Financial Services Commission of Ontario 2009, 12-13), although the
proportion declined slightly to 55 percent in 2009 (Financial Services Commission of Ontario 2010,
25-6).
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Davis continues that another critique of funding pension obligations through equity investments is
that the volatility of such investments is a mismatch for the predictably increasing liability of a
pension benefit. Because equity investment prices do not follow a predictable path, there is a real,
albeit low, probability that they will generate a very large price decline just at the time when they
must be sold to pay benefits (Bodie 1996, 90-1). A task force of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries
to review the standards for pension funding in actuarial practice similarly concluded
that 10 percent should be added to the contribution amount if the pension fund contained 50 percent
equities, in order to account for the potential of an “unacceptable deterioration in the
plan’s funded status” because of the high degree of asset-liability mismatch (Canadian Institute of
Actuaries 2003, 9-10).273

(iii)

Rates On High-Quality Bonds:274

There are at least three justifications for using high-quality bond rates. First, it represents a
compromise between traditional actuarial practice and the “risk free” arguments of the financial
economists. High-quality bonds are not truly risk-free, but they do tend to have a low probability of
default. Second, the implied interest rates that insurers build into their pricing when they offer to
take on pension obligations are generally close to high-quality bond rates. Third, it is a convenient
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political compromise between the arguments of different groups that favor risk-free rates or rates
closer to long-term investment returns.275
3. Nature of Discount Rates used in Actuarial Valuations of DB Plans in 2012276
The Standards of Practice of the actuarial profession in Canada stipulates that the discount rate to be
used in actuarial valuations (for funding purposes) should be the best estimate of future portfolio
returns.277 As a result, the discount rates used in the actuarial valuations of DB plans include an
estimate of the future equity premiums expected to be earned on any equity assets included in the
pension fund portfolio. This focus on estimating future equity premiums exposes plans to a high
probability that the resulting measure of the accrued liability and current service costs may prove
inadequate, as there is a 50% probability that actual emerging investment returns will be less than
the actuary’s discount rate assumption.
A. Current Best Estimate of Future Investment Returns
Estimates of future investment returns are typically developed by using a building block approach
or calculated using a stochastic model. The Canadian Institute of Actuaries published an
Educational Note in December 2010 (Determination of Best Estimate Discount Rates for Going
Concern Valuations). 278 This Educational Note guides the actuary to one approach for developing
the estimated future return on a pension plan’s asset portfolio as follows:
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1. Develop estimates of the long term risk premium applicable to each asset class.
2. Determine the weighted average of the risk premiums based on the expected long term asset
allocation policy.
3. Add the weighted average risk premium to the prevailing yield on long-term Government of
Canada bonds.
4. Add an increment for the diversification and rebalancing effect, and
5. Deduct estimated investment expenses, reflecting only passive investment management costs.
The result is an estimate of the expected long term return on the pension plan assets.

Equity risk premiums are typically estimated from a long term history of equity returns measured
relative to bills or bonds. The most comprehensive database of historical returns has been
developed by three academics from the London Business School. 279 The most recent version of the
database is published in the Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2013. This database
includes 113 years of annual returns on bills, bonds and equities across 25 countries. To develop a
current best estimate of expected future returns on a conventional asset portfolio, an asset allocation
policy (40% fixed income and 60% equities) may be postulated consisting of:
1. Long Government of Canada bonds 40%
2. Canadian equities 20%
3. US equities 20%
4. Global equities 20%
Dimson (2013) reports geometric average280 equity risk premiums (relative to bonds) over the
period 1900 to 2012:
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1. Canadian equities 3.4%
2. US equities 4.2%
3. Global equities (ex US) 3.0%
4. Average 3.5%
The yield to maturity on long term Government of Canada bonds at December 31, 2013 was 3.24%.
Hence, the expected return on the postulated portfolio is 40% of 3.24% (bonds) plus 60% of 6.74%
(3.24% (return on bonds) + 3.5% (average equity risk premium over bonds)) =5.3%. Adding a
diversification additive of 0.4% and deducting 0.25% for investment expenses gives a best estimate
of future investment returns of 5.45%.281
B. Academic Forecasts of Future Investment Returns 282
Two recent academic studies by Elroy Dimson and Alain Guay respectively, focus on estimates of
future investment returns on diversified investment portfolios. Both studies argue that the discount
rates used in the actuarial valuations of defined benefit pension plans are too optimistic. Dimson
projects real global equity returns in the range of 3% to 3.5%. In the Canadian context with a best
estimate inflation rate of about 2%, Dimson’s projection is for a nominal annual return on global
equities of 5.5%, at best. His equity projection implies an estimated 4.75% return on a pension
invested 60% in global equities and 40% in long Government of Canada bonds invested at 3.24%.
Dimson observes that the high equity returns of the last half of the 20th Century were not normal,
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nor were the high bond returns of the last 30 years. The long run averages documented by Dimson
over 113 years “provide a more realistic guide to the future”.
Guay, a professor at the University of Montreal and Lawrence Allaire Jean, a senior operations
specialist at Deutsche Bank, also conducted a study of expected long term investment returns in the
Canadian context. They used prevailing dividend yields and economic growth assumptions to
predict future equity returns. Back testing of this prospective forecasting approach revealed a 55
percent correlation with realized returns (as compared to a negative 63 percent correlation for
extrapolation from historical data).283 They predicted long-term returns (over 30 years) of 2.5% on
long term bonds and 6.9% for Canadian stocks. A stochastic asset model was then used to project
the total portfolio returns for a pension fund invested 50% in Canadian equities and 50% in
Canadian long bonds. The geometric return over 30 years on this portfolio was 4.77%. The
stochastic modelling permitted analysis of the distribution of possible future returns around the
mean forecast. There was a 25% probability that the 30 year geometric returns would be less than
3.67% and a 10% probability that the return would be less than 2.75%.
C. Academic Views on Conventional Actuarial Valuations Based on Best Estimates of
Future Returns 284
As discussed above, both Dimson and Guay observed that the discount rates used in conventional
defined benefit valuations are too optimistic. Dimson noted that “For Canada and the UK, the real
implied real equity return is greatly above the level we deem plausible.” Guay concurred, stating
“Compared to our forecasts, current Canadian actuarial assumptions tend to be too optimistic to
achieve sustainability for DB pension plans; it is imperative as a first step to be transparent about
283
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some of the very high costs. Once these costs are revealed, employers (and employees) can then
proceed to perform the adequate adjustments on the cost side as well as on the accumulated deficit
side to ensure sustainability.” Guay estimated that public sector pension liabilities would be
increased by about 25% if the benefits were discounted at the 4.77% indicated by his study.
Malcolm Hamilton noted that while contribution rate stability is a worthwhile objective for a
funding strategy, it is not an achievable one for mature pension plans with significant equity
holdings because any viable funding strategy will force contribution rates to move in a wide range
(i.e. contributions will vary significantly with changes in equity returns). Furthermore he stated that
DB equity investments introduce intergenerational inequity, transferring current funding risks
(through underfunding) to future generations:
By building the equity risk premium into the valuation assumptions, albeit reduced by some poorly
defined margin for adverse deviation, 285 actuaries allow the first generation of plan participants to
enjoy the equity risk premia that are expected to be earned in the future as compensation for risks
borne by future generations. 286
In other words, if the first generation’s pension contributions (based on artificially high estimates of
future equity returns) are insufficient to pay their pensions upon retirement, the second generation’s
contributions will necessarily increase to fund the resulting future deficits.

4. Formulae for Discounting Assets and Liabilities
The mathematical formula for this present value calculation is as follows:
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Present Value Calculation
The DB present value formula is the core formula which accounts for the time value of money.
The present value (PV) formula of assets in any given year has four variables, each of which can be
solved for:

1.
2.
3.
4.

PV is the value at year= 0
FV is the value at year = year n
i is the discount rate, or the interest rate at which the assets will be compounded each year
n is the number of years after year 0

The cumulative present value of future cash flows in all years can be calculated by summing
the contributions of FVt, the value of cash flows in each year.

A. Assets
Note that the discount rate (i) is in the denominator of the formula and therefore as the discount rate
increases, the present capital value of pension assets decreases. For example, using a discount rate
of 5% per annum, $1000 worth of assets at the end of 1 year would require the sponsor to fund at
the level of $952. A 1% increase in the discount rate to 6% would decrease the sponsor’s funding
requirements to $942, illustrating the importance of actuarial discretion in determining a plan’s
discount rates.287
B. Liabilities
A defined benefit pension plan’s liabilities are the cost of current and future promises to its
members. The actuary makes assumptions with regard to economic (salaries, inflation etc.) and
287
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demographic (age, mortality etc.) factors in order to project a plan’s liabilities in future years. The
actuary then estimates the discount rate to determine the current value of the plan`s liabilities.
Similar to assets, the higher the discount rate, the lower the current value of a plan’s liabilities (i.e.
the mathematical formula used for the present value calculation is the same as the one used for the
present value asset calculation).
The discount rate for liabilities is often lower than discount rate used for assets because actuaries’
projections of investment returns are often based on high risk equities (to try to generate higher
returns than “risk free “ investments such as bonds), whereas liabilities are dependent upon more
predictable, steadily increasing economic (i.e. salary increases) and demographic (i.e. longevity)
factors. The current value of the liabilities is compared to the current value of the assets to
determine whether or not a plan has a deficit or a surplus. An asset to liability ratio of 1 or more
means the plan is fully funded. Alternatively, a ratio of less than 1 means the plan has a deficit and
that additional employer contributions are required. 288
C. Introduction of 3 Year Average Solvency Funding Ratios
In 2009 the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) formally adopted a new methodology
for the determination of minimum funding requirements for defined benefit plans in order to
mitigate the pro-cyclicality of the prior funding regime. Amendments to the funding rules adopted a
new standard for establishing minimum funding requirements on a solvency basis that used average
(rather than current) solvency ratios to determine minimum funding requirements. The average
solvency position of the plan for funding purposes is now defined as the average of the solvency
ratios over three years, i.e. the current and previous two years. The three solvency ratios used in the
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determination of the average must be based on the market value of plan assets as of the dates they
were initially calculated. Past deficiencies must be consolidated annually for the purpose of
establishing solvency special payments. 289
This new approach reduces the effects of short-term fluctuations in the value of plan assets and
liabilities on solvency funding requirements, spreading them over three years instead of one.
Although initial increases in special payments are less than under the old solvency funding rules,
payments tend to be higher in later periods. Similarly, when a pension plan’s funding position
improves as a result of strong investment returns, solvency special payments tend to decline more
gradually as a result of averaging. This new approach also mitigates the “pro-cyclicality” of the old
funding rules, reducing the level of required contributions in any given year. The amortization
periods for solvency deficiencies remain at five years. 290
In 2009 the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) introduced the following temporary solvency relief
measures for single employer defined benefit pension plans:291

The administrator of an eligible plan may elect any or all of the following solvency funding
relief options:
1.

Defer new special payments (going concern and solvency) determined in the solvency relief
report for up to one year;
2. Consolidate pre-existing solvency special payments into a new five-year schedule; and
3. With the consent of the members and former members, extend funding of any new solvency
deficiency in the solvency relief report for up to five additional years….
289

Federal Department of Finance: “Regulatory Impact Statement”, 2010. Online: < www.fin.gc.ca >.
In periods of substantial market downturns, such as was experienced in 2008, the use of the average
solvency ratio method with a five year amortization period would serve to dampen the effect of a market
downturn on funding requirements without the potential adverse impact on benefit security of a significantly
longer amortization period.
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While the average solvency ratio would be used for minimum funding purposes, the current solvency ratio
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Note that although average solvency funding ratios are not prescribed (as in the federal PBSA),
solvency payments may be amortized over an additional five to ten more years, thereby reducing
the immediate impact of a substantial market downturn on a sponsor’s funding requirements. These
temporary solvency relief measures were extended in 2012. 292 Both the federal PBSA and Ontario
PBA solvency valuation amendments were obviously designed to help sustain the single employer
DB plans in times of large funding deficits.
5. Proposed New Valuation Methods
Barry Gros of the C.D. Howe Institute discusses the need for better balance in the funding of single
employer DB plans (SEPPs):293
Ontario’s two-part funding system consists of going-concern and solvency-funding
rules. Conceived with good intentions in the 1980s, the solvency-funding
requirements are an ongoing frustration for plan sponsors. Ontario has issued
temporary easements to these requirements twice in the past 10 years, a sign that
292

The opportunity introduced in June 2009 for certain DB pension plans to elect temporary solvency funding
relief measures has ended. Three funding relief options were available for only the first filed valuation report
with a valuation date on or after September 30, 2008 and before September 30, 2011:




Deferral of the start of special payments required to liquidate a new going concern unfunded liability
or new solvency deficiency for up to twelve months;
Consolidation of existing solvency special payments into a new five years payment schedule
commencing on the valuation date of the solvency relief report; and
Extension of the period for liquidating a new solvency deficiency from five years to a maximum of ten
years (with member consent).

The 2012 measures provided certain DB pension plans with similar options for temporary solvency relief as
those introduced in 2009 by the Ontario government. The 2012 temporary solvency funding relief measures
applied to the first filed valuation report with a valuation date on or after September 30, 2011 and before
September 30, 2014. The relief measures included consolidation of existing solvency special payments into
a new five-year payment schedule, and allowed new solvency deficiencies to be amortized over a period of
up to 10 years instead of five years, with member consent. In addition, the Regulation has since been
amended to generally allow for all plans to defer, for up to one year, the start of special payments required to
liquidate new going concern unfunded liability or new solvency deficiency. (FSCO, 2013 Report on the
Funding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Ontario-Tenth Annual Report, 2013. Online: <
www.fsco.gov.on.ca >.
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these rules are insufficient to secure pension plan promises during difficult economic
times. As well, contractual inflation indexing need not be included in the pension
liability calculations for solvency purposes, further weakening the credibility of
Ontario’s solvency requirements.
Furthermore, current solvency funding rules require large additional contributions
when economic times are bad, creating the potential for trapped surpluses when
times improve because of the onerous rules for removing surplus funds. Solvency
valuations have a valid purpose in assessing the financial well-being of a plan, but
they need not drive funding. An important observation in the Alberta/BC JEPP
Report (2008) is that the test for determining plan deficits and potential remedies are
two separate issues.

In short, Gros points out that the vast majority of DB plans are not terminating and
consequently, there is no need to require deficit funding on an onerous short term solvency
(wind-up) basis. Alternatives to this two-part system of funding have recently been
proposed through New Brunswick’s new shared-risk plan and Quebec’s D’Amours Report
(2013), which proposed an “enhanced funding method. 294 Current funding issues are, to
some extent, a result of trying to support benefits that were implemented in an era when
costs were substantially lower than they are today, raising the question of whether the
funding problems that pension plans have recently encountered are truly a funding
requirement issue or a benefit issue. Gros notes that there are still fundamental issues with
current funding rules that need to be addressed and proposes the following remedial
measures:295
1. Replace both the going-concern and solvency-valuation requirements with a
new single valuation methodology, based on going-concern principles but
made stronger with the addition of key components – key components would
be a valuation discount rate that excludes full pre-recognition of any equity
premium that may or may not arise along with shorter deficit amortization
294

Quebec proposed that enhanced funding not be based on the hypothetical termination of a DB plan. In
other words, funding of solvency deficiencies would be eliminated.
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periods (e.g., eight years rather than the existing 15). This is similar to the
enhanced funding method suggested in the Quebec Expert pension study
(D’Amours 2013). Solvency-based testing should still be maintained for
contribution holidays, though.
2. Introduce a margin reserve account for special payments and “excess”
service cost payments – Better symmetry could be established in the funding
equation by segregating contributions meant to shore up short-term deficits
and margins built into the service cost. Recent BC legislation goes in the
right direction by establishing a reserve account for solvency amortization
payments that could be returned to the employer regardless of the wording in
the plan document. A further step would include both going-concern special
payments (where there is no solvency funding) and margins in the service
cost in order to reduce the possibility of future trapped surpluses.
3. For defined benefit single employer pension plans, 296 funding and surplus
utilization are the primary areas of concern. Current funding models could
benefit from replacing the combined going-concern and solvency valuation
model with a stronger going concern valuation model and creating a new
margin reserve account to prevent special payments made during poor
financial times (as well as margins incorporated in service cost payments)
turning into trapped surplus when times improve.

6. Financial Economics Re: Discount Rates
Financial economics is a subset of microeconomics and is primarily devoted to studies of capital
markets. One particular subject of interest to financial economists is how markets determine current
values (prices) of future cash flows. Two familiar examples are shares of stock, which generate
future dividends and /or earnings growth, and bonds, which generate future interest and principal
payments. Stocks and bonds trade on open markets, making it easy to determine their current
market value. However, pension liabilities do not trade on open markets, making it more difficult to
determine their values. Therefore, financial economists use openly traded items which are close in
nature to the untraded pension liabilities in order to assess their value. For example, a $100 five-
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year zero coupon bond currently trading at $90 can be used to determine the discount rate of
pension liabilities that are due five years hence.297
As discussed earlier, pension actuaries determine current values of future cash flows using various
methods and assumptions about discount rates which are often different from the way in which
capital markets value similar cash flows. These actuarial discounting methods have always been
contested by financial economists, who argue that when pension assets are determined on a basis
other than fair market value, prices are distorted, creating a misallocation of resources. In other
words, contrary to the teachings of financial economics, the actuarial pension model anticipates
expected outcomes without reflecting the price of risk (i.e. the risk of a decline in the value of
pension investments such as stocks). It then camouflages the risky distribution of outcomes through
various smoothing and amortization applications. The challenge posed by financial economists to
pension actuaries is summarized in the following questions:
1. Why do actuaries use different interest rates to discount future cash flows than capital market
values?
2. Is it appropriate for the actuarial profession to have different actuaries in different practices
producing different rates to discount similar cash flows?
3. Is it possible to create a common language and transparent framework for describing and
determining discount rates and possibly reduce the diversity of current actuarial practice?
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In finance, a bond is an instrument of indebtedness of the bond issuer to the holders. It is a debt security,
under which the issuer owes the holders a debt and, depending on the terms of the bond, is obliged to pay
them interest (at specified dates on the coupons) and/or to repay the principal at a later date, termed the
maturity date. Similarly, pension obligations are debts held by employers which are owed to employees. The
cost of these obligations generally increase steadily over time (similar to bonds) correlating with real and
inflationary wage increases. (Society of Actuaries and American Academy of Actuaries, Pension Actuaries
Guide to Financial Economics, 2006. Online: < www.soa.org/Files/Sections/actuary-journal-final.pdf >.)
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Section 2-Legal Framework Governing Discount Rates
1. Overview

Strong equity returns and rising long-term interest rates in the final quarter of 2013 capped a
dramatic year of improvement in the funding status of Canadian pension plans. Canadian equities
returned 7.3 per cent in the fourth quarter which brought the average 2013 return to 13.0 per cent.
Long-term Government of Canada bond yields, a key factor in calculating the liabilities of pension
plans, ended the year at 3.2 per cent, up almost 1% (from 2.3 per cent at the beginning of the year),
thereby reducing the current value of DB liabilities. Mercer298 estimates that a one percentage point
increase in long-term interest (discount) rates reduces liabilities by 10 to 15 per cent.299Moreover,
Mercer’s pension “health” index reached its highest level in 12 years at the end of 2013.300 It
revealed that almost 40% of pension plans were fully funded at the end of 2013 compared to 6% at
the beginning of the year. What’s more, only 6% were less than 80% funded, down sharply from 60%
at the beginning of 2013. AON Hewitt301 also reported that the median solvency funded ratio in its
pension universe of 275 public, semi-public and private plans rose to 93.4% at the end of 2013, up
nearly 25 percentage points from the beginning of the year. 302

Despite these dramatic improvements in discount rates, it is highly unlikely there will be any
resurgence in DB plans in Canada. Sponsors have decided that DB plans have exposed them to too
298

Mercer is a pension consulting company which helps with every aspect of defined benefit investing, from
strategy and structure to unwavering oversight of governance and implementation. Working dynamically with
your pension plan, we harness your investment strategy to the goals of your business.
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Mercer, Press Release: “Funded Status of Canadian Pension Plans at Highest Level in 12 years”,
2014.Online: < m.mercer.ca/press-releases/ >.
300
The Mercer Pension Health Index, which tracks the funded status of a hypothetical defined benefit
pension plan, stood at 106% on Dec. 31, up from 82% at the start of the year and at its highest level since
June 2001.
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Barbara Shecter, Financial Post: “Defined Benefit Plans Healthier Than Ever but Don’t Expect to See
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much funding risk over the past 15 “stomach-churning” years of market turbulence.303 Professor
Keith Ambachtsheer, a veteran pension expert and director emeritus of the Rotman International
Centre for Pension Management (ICPM) does not anticipate any resurgence of defined benefit
pensions; rather, he expects more “de-risking” through means such as liability transfers to insurance
companies. He believes that corporations are “done with defined benefit plans.”304Barbara Shecter
of the Financial Post weighed in on the status of DB plans:

As companies with defined benefit pension plans struggled to fund their obligations in
recent years, many opted to stop offering the guaranteed retirement benefits to new
employees. Others considered ways to trim their exposure by reducing benefits or paying
upfront to hive off obligations. Such de-risking strategies can be costly, particularly in a low
interest rate environment, and often aren’t designed to pull pension plans out of a current
funding deficit position. A stronger funding position could make de-risking more
palatable. 305
The fixed discount rates on high-quality long term government or corporate bonds are generally
used by actuaries to determine a plan’s expected risk-free (guaranteed) returns in the future.306
Today’s low discount rates have placed additional funding burdens on DB plans by requiring
sponsors to increase levels of investment capital in order to generate the same revenue that higher
rates would have yielded in the 1990s. 307 However, Michel Kelly Gagnon, president and director
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The theoretical rate of return of an investment with zero risk. The risk-free rate represents the interest an
investor would expect from an absolutely risk-free investment over a specified period of time. In practice,
however, the risk-free rate does not exist because even the safest investments carry a very small amount of
risk. (Investopedia. Online: < www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risk-freerate >.)
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Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) estimates if the discount rate rose by 2 per cent, the DB pension
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Canadian Lawyer Magazine: “Bracing for the Pension Time Bomb”, 2013. Online: <
www.canadianlawyermag.com >.
Canadian defined benefit (DB) pension plans' solvency continued to improve significantly in the fourth
quarter of 2013 and ended the year in a much stronger position than at the same point in 2012, according to
the latest survey by Aon Hewitt, the global human resource solutions business of Aon plc (NYSE:AON). The
major contributors to increased solvency were improved equity market returns, with help from higher long304
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general of the Economic Institute of Montreal argues that low rates in 2012 did not truly reflect
expected risk-free returns, but rather, reflected the monetary policy measures taken by the Bank of
Canada to counter slow economic conditions: 308

The main cause of these solvency deficits is that long-term interest rates are exceptionally
low. For example, since 2000, rates have decreased from 6% to 2.5% on long-term federal
government bonds and from 4% to 0.3% on real return bonds used in indexed pension plans.
This reduces investment returns, but the benefits are not accordingly adjusted…This is
another unfortunate consequence of our current monetary policy. It creates a major problem
for many Canadian companies that have those types of pension plans. Air Canada, Resolute
Forest Products, Canadian Pacific, Bell Canada, Canada Post, Canadian National, are but a
few of the companies impacted. The practical consequence of all of this is that Canadian
companies suffer a substantial drain on their cash flows since they have to make important
"deficit payments" that sometimes represent up to 30% of their total payroll. This is money
that is not available to make investments, give pay raises or hire new employees.
Let's take for example the case of Resolute Forest Products (the former AbitibiBowater).
Their Canadian pension plans have performed well, in relative terms, generating a 5.4%
investment return in 2011. However, the company's solvency deficit has steadily increased
to $1.9 billion simply as a result of the precipitous decline in the yield on government bonds
in Canada. Its retirees could lose 30% of their revenues if the company were to cease its
operations. Air Canada is another example, with a $4.4-billion pension solvency deficit. 309

term interest rates, which rose by 91 basis points over the year, and sponsor contributions toward solvency
funding requirements. Interest rates on long-term bonds remained low, compared to earlier years, but the
benchmark Government of Canada yield increased from 2.37% to 3.28% during 2013.
(Online: < www.newswire.ca/.../aon-hewitt-survey-reports >.)
308
Michel Kelly-Gagnon, Toronto Sun, “Canada’s Pension Plan Strait Jacket”, 2012. Online: <
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Note that as discussed above, the average DB plan in Canada was 99.9 per cent funded (on a solvency
basis) at the end of 2013, meaning it had nearly all the assets needed to provide pensions to plan members
if it were wrapped up immediately. Only 6 per cent of plans were below 80 per cent funded. Those figures
are based on data from 607 public and private sector funds that are Mercer clients. Calculations of funding
levels are volatile because they depend on long-term interest rates, which are used to calculate the size of a
fund’s liabilities. But the numbers do indicate a dramatic turnaround. A year ago, 60 per cent of pension
plans were less than 80 per cent funded and companies were facing huge cash hits to improve their plan
funding. (The Globe and Mail, Report on Business, Shift from defined benefit pensions reinforces need for
retirement planning (20 Feb. 2014). Online: < www.theglobeandmail.com > Report on Business >.)
There have been several factors that have contributed to the elimination of Air Canada’s solvency deficit in
2013, which sat at $3.7-billion at the start of the year, not the least of these has been a rise in the discount
rate. Air Canada’s discount rate rose from 3.0% to 3.9% in 2013. Each 1% rise in the discount rate results in
a $1.5 billion change in the solvency liability, translating into $1.35-billion in savings. This comes in addition
to the $970-milllion in saving it saw from the implementation of previously disclosed changes to its pension
benefits, including moving new hires into a hybrid defined benefit/contribution pension plan that was part of
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When faced with this issue, Canadian authorities say that they apply those funding rules in
order to protect retirees. This is indeed a laudable goal. However, putting important
Canadian companies at a major competitive disadvantage with their American counterparts,
harming their cash flow and, in some case, pushing them closer to bankruptcy, won't protect
anyone in the end.
Many other countries have eased the funding burden of DB plans by legislating higher discount
rates. In June 2012 Denmark and Sweden took direct approaches, setting floors or specific
minimum values for discount rates applicable to certain pension obligations. A less contrived
approach would be to use actual market rates, averaged over several years, as the discount rate. The
U.S. recently took this step as Congress passed legislation in July 2012 allowing corporations to use
a discount rate based on high-quality bond yields averaged over the past 25 years, instead of over
the past two years.310 It is estimated that this change will increase discount rates by up to 200 basis
points (2%), significantly reducing the amount U.S. corporations need to contribute to their pension
funds. For instance, David Zion of Credit Suisse estimated that only a 100 basis point increase in
the discount rate would cause UPS’s required contribution to drop from $1.6 billion to $470 million
in 2013. 311

UK regulators have yet to follow the lead of their American counterparts, but British companies
have made their case. The Confederation of British Industry, a group representing over 200,000
businesses, has called for a smoothing (averaging) of interest rates “over a number of years.”
However, an averaging period of 5 to 10 years might better reflect more “normal” conditions. The
25-year averaging period enacted by the U.S. Congress is undoubtedly excessive considering that
its contract negotiations in 2012. The carrier said it also contributed $225-million to the plan over the last
year. Online: < www.business.financialpost.com/2014/.../air-canada-pension-deficit->.
310
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interest rates in 1988 are unlikely to have any predictive value for discount rates from 2015 to
2025.312 Allowing actuaries to use these artificially high discount rates will undoubtedly result in
excessive underfunding and insolvencies down the road, as assets will be insufficient to pay plan
liabilities.

In projecting pension obligations in Canada, discount rates reflecting future market conditions
would obviously be more representative than using past interest rates as per American legislation.
For example, short term obligations payable in the next 2 or 3 years could be represented by risk
free bond rates which reflect the current low interest rates conditions, while discount rates further
down the road could possibly be determined by calculating the forward interest rate on risk-free
assets, such as 10 or 20 year government Treasuries. According to Robert Pozen of Harvard
Business School, this forward rate, adjusted for the historic spread between Treasuries and the
relevant long term bond yields might be a reasonable reflection of expected risk-free returns in the
future. He states:

In short, low interest rates make the obligations of pension plans more daunting because
plan trustees cannot rely on expectations of strong investment returns. But policymakers
must be careful when considering what the “correct” discount rate should be. What if
today’s historically low interest rates are not some aberration that will quickly disappear? If
so, reducing employer contributions by increasing the estimated discount rate will only
delay, rather than prevent, underfunded defined benefit pension plans. 313

312

Ibid.
Robert Pozen and Theresa Hamacher. Financial Times, A Real Discount Rate for Pensions, 2012. Online:
< www.ft.com > Markets > Ftfm > Opinion >.
313

130

Section 3-Public Policy Options for Discount Rates
1. Overview
The fact that DB pensions have been in a slow and persistent decline for two decades in Canada is
evidence that the current regulatory structure is not working. 314 William Robson, President of the
C.D. Howe Institute, comments on the dysfunctional nature of the regulatory structure governing
private sector single employer DB plans: 315
The problems of employer-sponsored defined-benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada raise
two issues: the need for short-run measures to limit the damage; and the need for new
pension models to prevent their recurring. The DB sector’s immediate preoccupations are
the result of changes in the economic environment — in particular, a decline in long-term
interest rates — that caused their balance sheets to deteriorate, and of changes in accounting
standards to more market-based methods that revealed the underfunded state of these plans
in stark form. The immediate policy challenge is to ensure the recovery and/or restructuring
of sick plans, and the continued health of sound ones. Extra time and financial scope to
work off deficits are good, but current limits on contributions to plans should rise or
disappear, while legislation to establish clear title to surpluses for sponsors who must cover
deficits is badly needed. In the longer run, policy should sustain and encourage a thriving
occupational pension sector that helps individuals save for old age and helps finance the
investment that underpins economic growth. But DB plans were in decline long before the
recent crisis, and evidence is mounting that the classic single-employer DB plan has fatal
agency problems — evident particularly in the tendency for these plans to mismatch assets
and liabilities in ways that exposed them to risks far larger than sponsors or participants
understood.
314

This decline can be measured in the following ways:
1. Private sector workers covered by DB plans fell from 31% to 12% from 1977 to 2013.
2. Between 1986 and 2010 the proportion of the Canadian labour force covered by DB pension plans
shrank from 39 percent to 29 percent, while over the same period the number of employees covered
by defined contribution (DC) pension plans nearly tripled.
3. The share of registered pension plan members covered by DB plans fell from 92 to 75 percent,
while the proportion in a DC plan doubled from 7 to 16 percent (with the remaining 9 percent were
covered by hybrid and combined plans) from 1986 to 2010 (Statistics Canada 2010b,c).
(Robert R. Brown and Tyler Merideth, Pooled Target Benefit Pension Plans: Building on PRRPs, IRRP
Study at 3, 2012. Online: < www. irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/research/.../IRPP-Study-
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Robson argues that rather than seeking to prop up the classic DB system, Canadians would do
better to seek alternatives. Existing RRSPs and money-purchase (DC) plans tend to impose high
decision-making and administrative costs on individuals. A better route would be to promote the
development of plans with good features from both models. They could:
1. Be predominantly money purchase, but with a small and affordable minimum benefit;
2. Pool investment risk across a large number of individuals at reasonable administrative
cost;
3. Gear contribution rates to a target payout; and
4. Steer individuals’ portfolios toward an asset mix that would insulate them from
fluctuating annuity prices as they approach retirement.
Robson concludes that “even as Canadians seek to deal with the short-run problems of traditional DB
plans.... they need to develop new models that offer attractive ways to pool resources and save for
retirement, while mitigating not only financial risk and longevity risk, but agency risk as well. 316
The relationship between risk and pension promises is measured using discount rates. Professor Ron
Davis notes that at the heart of this issue is whether or not the cost of a defined-benefit pension plan
that has little or no risk, is one that plan members are willing to fund. He discusses Love, Smith, and
Wilcox’s (2007) proposed theoretical model of employment bargaining that suggests employees
demand sponsors to avoid risk by investing solely in fixed-income assets. However, such “risk-free”
investments would undoubtedly mean employees would face higher plan contributions. Alternatively,
employees could demand more in cash compensation for bearing the risk of a pension plan funded
solely by equities, considering that sponsors would face lower contributions as a result of the higher
discount rates generated solely through equity investments. Financial economists refer to this
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compensation concept as “pricing the risk.” 317 [The model assumes that employees have complete
information concerning the risks and cannot diversify their risks]. Davis discusses this type of risk:
Ambachtsheer calculates that the cost of funding pension benefits with default-free, fixedincome assets would be about 25 percent of employees’ compensation (2007, 66); Hamilton
(2009) puts the cost at almost 24 percent. Using some equity to fund the benefits,
Ambachtsheer estimates it would cost between 10 and 15 percent of employees’ cash
compensation (2007, 66-7), while Hamilton calculates the range as between 7.5 percent and
15 percent (2009). Either way, using fixed income discount rates would cause a steep
decline in employees’ take-home pay. Would employees be prepared to forgo that much of
their cash compensation to reduce the risk in their pension fund? Alternatively, if current
contribution levels were maintained, would plan members wish to dramatically reduce the
default risk in the pension plan by accepting reduced benefits in return for risk reduction or
increase the portion of their compensation allocated to the pension fund as contributions?
What kind of mechanism would be needed to communicate the existing risk and ascertain
the wishes of employees, and how would potential conflicts over benefit reduction versus
increased contributions be managed between active employees and retirees? 318
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions (OECP) was given one of the broadest mandates: to
“examine the legislation that governs the funding of defined-benefit plans in Ontario, the rules
relating to pension deficits and surpluses, and other issues relating to the security, viability and
sustainability of the pension system in Ontario.” 319Among the OECP’s recommendations was to
consider the creation of “target-benefit” plans, in which the contributions would be fixed, based on
best estimates of the amounts necessary to fund the target benefits. In the event that market discount
rates are lower than those forecasted (resulting in contribution shortfalls), present and future target
benefits could be adjusted downward in lieu of increased employer contributions. 320 The sponsoring
employer’s obligation would be restricted to fixed contributions, thereby transferring the full
investment risk onto plan members and retirees (unless, of course the sponsoring employer
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voluntarily agreed to increase contributions in response to a funding shortfall). 321 Professor Ron
Davis discusses target benefit plans in Canada:
Target plans differ from the current defined-benefit regimes in that employer insolvency is
not required before pension benefits are reduced to reflect shortfalls in assets. This type of
pension arrangement has existed for decades in Canada as multi-employer pension plans
(MEPPs), which, as of 2006, provided pension benefits for more than one-fourth of all
pension plan members in Canada (Shilton, 2007). In these plans, more than one employer
contributes (usually under a collective bargaining agreement with a trade union) fixed
contributions to a defined-benefit or defined-contribution plan. Legislation in many
jurisdictions in Canada permit the reduction of defined benefits (as a last option) when the
pension fund’s assets are less than the cost of its promised benefits. Another feature of
MEPPs that distinguishes them from single-employer DB pension plans is their governance
structure. MEPPs are governed by a body in which plan members have significant
representation, in many instances, making up one-half of the governing body (Shilton, 2007).
Similar to single employer DB plans, actuarial estimates of discount rates are required to
determine target plan funding levels.
Private sector single employer target benefit plans are currently not permitted under the Ontario
PBA or the federal PBSA. However, in 2014 the federal government proposed a target benefit plan
(TBP) framework be incorporated into the PBSA, allowing single employer DB plans to convert to
TBPs.322 Ontario announced in its 2014 budget that it will also develop a framework for singleemployer, target-benefit pension plans to provide employers and employees with an additional,
more flexible retirement savings option. Clare Pitcher discusses the significance of employee
participation in target benefit plans: 323

Governance for these new TBPs will be critically important. Given that the risk is borne by
the members, at a minimum, the employees must have a 50%—possibly even 100%—share
of the governance. Jointly governed TBPs will likely become the norm, with basic current
service cost (i.e., not including any deficit funding requirement) sharing anywhere from 100%
employer/0% employee to 50/50. In this new world of operating a MEPP/TBP in a non321
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union situation, the traditional role of the union representatives acting as trustees will be met
by member association or employee-elected representatives to a pension committee or board
of trustees.
Finally, assuming that the necessary legislative and regulatory changes are made, we will
have a plan design—the TBP design—which effectively works for both employers and
employees in the private sector. This sets the stage for increasing the pie of registered
pension plan coverage. With an effective vehicle that meets the two major stakeholders’
requirements, pension plan coverage could be further enhanced by making a registered
pension plan a mandatory requirement for all employers (or at least those meeting a certain
size threshold, such as a minimum of 15 employees).
Opening up access to private pension plans via the TBP for the remaining 60% of Canadian
workers will cost nothing to the government or taxpayers, as there is no Pension Benefits
Guarantee Fund safety net. In fact, the ultimate beneficiary —along with the newly covered
employees themselves—will be future taxpayers, as the potential need for government
social assistance down the road will be reduced significantly.
What’s needed now is to take this “new” plan design from the point of conception to the
actual birth of the new TBP for use in the single- as well as multi-employer environment—
and in the non-union as well as union environment—thereby increasing the pie and
broadening pension plan coverage across the province and the country.
2. Public Policy on Discount Rates in the U.K., the Netherlands and the U.S.
U.K
The UK Pensions Regulator adopted the opposite approach of most actuaries by invoking a low
discount rate (i.e. higher contributions) when employers face financial difficulties and a high
discount rate (i.e. lower contributions) when they are financially strong. This conservative
regulatory regime should, in theory, promote full funding of financially troubled plans. However, it
begs the question of whether or not a sponsoring employer experiencing financial difficulties will
be able to make the higher contributions necessary using a lower discount rate.324

324

U.K. Government, Defined Benefit Pension Schemes-Questions and Answers, 2013. Online: <
www.gov.uk/.../Defined_benefit_pension_sche >.

135

Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the old rules mandated pension funds to discount liabilities at a constant rate of
4 percent rate and to report assets at actuarially adjusted values. The new rules require pension
funds to use fair market values 325for both assets and liabilities. Use of the euro swap yield curve is
compulsory. 326
U.S.
Corporate pension plans in the U.S. historically determined the current value of their liabilities by
using the rate of return on corporate bonds; otherwise known as the discount rate. However, as
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historically low bond rates over the past several years forced higher funding contributions, U.S.
corporations lobbied Congress to change the discount rate. Pension discount rates were recently
amended in the U.S. Highway Bill 327which was signed into law by President Obama in 2012. As
stated above, under this new legislation pension plans are able to use a rate based on the average of
the past 25 years instead of discounting long-term liabilities using a rate based on the average of the
past two years. This is expected to increase the discount rate used to determine DB liabilities by
more than two percentage points, increasing the current discount rate from the 4 percent range to
roughly 6 percent, resulting in further underfunding. This policy will place the burden of the
funding shortfall on both current and future generations, as many of these plans will undoubtedly
face insolvency down the road. As Jason Fitchner states “That's not good funding policy, no matter
what the short-term fiscal gains are for companies and government coffers.”328Appendix 4 on page
286 further discusses discount rates in the U.K., the Netherlands and the United States.
3. Establishment of an Independent External Actuarial Oversight Board
I argue that the best remedy to the systemic underfunding of private sector single employer defined
benefit plans is the establishment of an actuarial oversight board comparable to the Canadian Public
Accountability Board (CPAB) established in 2003 to regulate auditors. The issues surrounding the
professional independence of actuaries are not, in principle, unlike those that faced the auditing
profession before regulatory changes were legislated in the early 2000s (Gunz, McCutcheon and
Reynolds 2009)329. Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, leaving them susceptible to the
conflict between providing advice based on objective analysis on the one hand, and serving the
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needs of their plan sponsor clients on the other hand, whose objective may be to justify ways of
spending as little as possible on the plan (Financial Times 2004). A recent review of the U.S.
actuarial profession stated “as long as a client can threaten to find another actuary to provide
actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an effect on the actuary’s work product”
(CRUSAP Task Force 2006)330.

I propose that the Canadian Board’s mandate would be similar to the U.K. Actuarial Public
Oversight Board (POB) established in 2005 “to promote more effective scrutiny and monitoring, to
ensure that actuarial information is produced in accordance with the relevant technical and ethical
standards, and to examine the current framework of self-regulation by the actuarial profession” with
respect to potential issues such as:331




Professional standards that have been weak, ambiguous or too limited in range, and perceived as
influenced by commercial interests.
An absence of proactive monitoring of members' compliance with professional standards.
A profession that has been too introspective, not forward-looking enough and slow to modernize.

An independent actuarial oversight board could conduct detailed studies on how to best to govern
actuaries’ discretion, addressing issues such as the current conflict of interest that surrounds
actuaries as agents of employers. Such a board could conduct research on how to establish a
common framework for estimating discount rates, promoting a common understanding amongst
actuaries of how to improve the consistency of their estimates. In cases where there may be very
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good reasons for actuaries using different discount rates in similar circumstances, a common
framework for communicating such anomalies could be provided.

Conclusion
Chapter 4 examined the impact of the governance of discount rates on actuaries’ discretion,
revealing that public policy in Canada has made actuaries an important factor in the sustainability
of DB plans by permitting them to estimate higher than market discount rates. For example, a 2%
increase in the discount rate reduces an employer’s steady state pension contribution rate by a
whopping 30-40%. Unfortunately, this policy has resulted in DB plan underfunding and
insolvencies. The chapter concluded that mandating fixed rates (effectively eliminating actuaries’
discretion) would greatly increase the cost of funding DB plans, making them unaffordable for
many employers. (Note that the argument being made in this thesis is that actuaries’ discretion is
too broad; not that it should be curtailed completely). It proposed the establishment of an external
oversight board to develop a common framework to improve the consistency of actuaries’ estimates
of discount rates.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPACT OF THE GOVERNANCE OF ACTUARIAL METHODS ON THE
UNDERFUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Overview
Chapter 4 examined the impact of the governance of discount rates on actuaries’ discretion. It
revealed that public policy in Canada has made actuaries an important factor in the sustainability of
DB plans by permitting them to estimate higher than market discount rates to reduce employer
funding requirements (For example, a 2% increase in the discount rate reduces an employer’s
steady state pension contribution rate by a whopping 30-40%). The chapter concluded that
mandating actuaries to use fixed discount rates would not be a viable legal remedy to DB plan
underfunding, instead proposing the establishment of an independent external oversight board to
develop a common framework to improve the consistency of discount rate estimates.
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the governance of actuarial methods on the funding of defined
benefit pension plans. It examines asset/ liability valuations, asset allocation policy, and the role of
the actuary, revealing that actuaries are using actuarial methods to push under funding problems
down the road in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concludes by proposing the establishment an
independent external oversight board to monitor the reliability and usefulness of actuarial methods.
1. Actuarial Assumptions
In order to project the cost of a DB plan’s retirement benefits (liabilities), assumptions must be
made regarding the timing of retirement and the probability of an individual remaining in the plan.
Assumptions must also be made regarding the probabilities of the triggering events (e.g.,
disablement, death) in order to project utilization of ancillary benefits and other benefits payable
140

upon termination of employment. In addition, benefits payable to surviving spouses and domestic
partners upon death of the participant in active service require assumptions regarding marital /
domestic partner status during employment and spouse / domestic partner ages. Examples of other
actuarial assumptions are:332
1. Assumptions regarding future salary increases must be made to determine the cost of
benefits based on pay.
2. Assumptions regarding post-retirement mortality rates must be made if benefits are
payable in annuity form.
3. In order to take into account a plan’s provisions regarding calculation of lump sum
payments (if any), it may be necessary to make special interest rate and mortality
assumptions as well as assumptions of what proportion of participants take lump sums and
under what circumstances.
4. Assumptions must be made regarding the discount rates used to convert a pension plan’s
future income (returns on assets) and expenses (liabilities) into current year dollars for the
actuarial valuation date.
In other words, actuaries must project when and how pension benefits will be paid in the future.
Specific examples of questions actuaries must answer are:333
1. Considering today’s 70-year old retirees are promised payments for the rest of their (and
perhaps their spouse’s) lifetime, “How long will they live?” and “How many years might
their spouse survive them by?”
2. Considering today’s 30 year-old active participants will earn benefits, terminate
employment at a certain age, and receive payments for the rest of their lifetimes, “How long
will 30-year olds work for their employer before their employment is terminated?”
3. “How might a 30 year olds pay increase over time?” “When will he/she start to receive their
retirement benefits?” “How long will he/she live after retirement?”
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The actuary is required to use “methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent with accepted
actuarial practice.”334 Actuarial assumptions, plan participant data and the benefit formula described
in the pension plan text are all used to project future plan benefits. These assumptions can be
categorized into two main categories: economic and demographic.
A. Economic Assumptions335
Economic assumptions are required to project the amount of benefits that will be payable to
pensioners. They address the issue of how market forces will affect the cost of a plan. Some of the
economic assumptions made by actuaries in valuing retirement benefits include:
1. Interest rate for discounting future cash flows
2. Rate of price inflation
3. Rate of increase in salaries
4. Rate of increase in pension payments
5. Rate of increase in pension benefits for deferred pensioners
6. Rate of increase in dividends/interest income from assets.

Economic assumptions are a necessity in DB plan funding in order to predict the amount and timing
of future cash flows. Their impact on asset and liability estimates is discussed in Appendix 5 on
page 294.
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B. Demographic Assumptions
Demographic assumptions are about the participant group make-up and expected behaviour and life
expectancy. They address the issue of how participant behavior will affect the cost of the plan and
are required to project when benefits will be payable. Actuaries use rates (probabilities) to model
the uncertainty of participant behavior. For example, because some participants will retire early,
some will retire at age 65, and others will work to age 70, an actuary could make the assumption
that each individual has some probability of retiring early, at 65, and also working to 70. Sometimes
assumptions are the same for many plans (e.g., mortality rates) and sometimes assumptions are very
specific to a given employer’s workforce (e.g., rates of terminating employment before
retirement).336 Some typical demographic assumptions are:
A. Withdrawal or termination assumptions address how long participants will continue to
work for a specific employer.
B. Mortality assumptions obviously address how long people will live.
C. Retirement assumptions obviously address when participants retire and begin receiving
benefits.
D. Disability assumptions obviously address when participants become disabled and are no
longer able to work.
2. Pension Funding
A. Pre-Funding
Ari Kaplan notes that a pension plan must be “pre-funded” to ensure that funds are invested to
meet plan obligations decades down the road. He states:
This feature is “central to the regulatory scheme” established by the federal Pension
Benefits Standards Act (the PBSA) and the Ontario Pension Benefits Act (the PBA.) This
pre-funding arrangement is what qualitatively distinguishes pension plans from other
336
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forms of retirement compensation arrangements. The objective of “going-concern” and
“solvency” funding is to ensure that contributions associated with defined benefit pension
benefits are paid regularly and throughout the working life of the employee. These funds
must be invested prudently to ensure the necessary funds will exist upon retirement to pay
the pension and ancillary benefits promised in the plan text. The purpose of funding
standards is to enhance the security of DB pension benefits by mandating minimum
funding levels and regulating the timing of payments into pension funds. 337
The federal PBSA and the Ontario PBA funding rules exist to protect employees’ pension interests
which are contingent on the liquidity of the employer at the time the pension is payable. The Court
in Collins v. Pension Commission of Ontario (1986) 338 asked, rhetorically:
Who is more interested in the solvency of a pension plan than its members, who are either
depending upon it as a source of income in their retirement years, or looking forward to the
day when they will, or must?
Statutory funding requirements apply almost exclusively to defined benefit pension plans, since a
defined contribution (DC) pension plan is, in essence, fully funded once the employer’s normal
contributions to the pension fund are remitted. In a defined benefit plan, the amount of an
employer’s normal contribution is largely determined according to assumptions made by the plan
actuary. These assumptions, as previously discussed, account for the demographics of the plan as
well as economic and personnel factors, such as salary increases and expected investment returns.
In 2013 there were an estimated 10,000 and 6,000 private sector single employer DB and DC plans
in Canada with an estimated 1.5 million and 900,000 members, respectively. 339 DB assets were
worth approximately $500 billion while DC assets represented an estimated $50 billion.340 The
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overall funding position of DB plans deteriorated significantly between 2004 and 2008, with the
vast majority (92%) of private pension plans being in a deficit position as at December 31, 2008.
The average funding ratio decreased from 112% to 77% over the same period on a ‘without
indexation’ basis and from 71% to 57% on a ‘with indexation’ basis. 341 The aggregate funding
shortfall exceeded $350 billion.342
During the six month period from September 2008 to February 2009 343 (after the North American
stock market collapse), the typical DB pension plan lost approximately 20% of its assets’ value,
measured on a market value basis. According to estimates performed by the consulting firm Mercer,
71% and 92% of Canadian private occupational defined benefit pension plans were in a solvency
deficit position at end of 2007 and 2008 respectively. Furthermore, almost 40% of defined benefit
plans had solvency ratios under 70%, while over 70% of them had solvency ratios under 80% by
2008 year end. 344
A typical pension fund in 2010 was funded at a level of approximately 80% (i.e. plan assets covered
only 80% of plan liabilities), meaning that a plan needed to generate an investment return of about
10% per annum over the next 5 years to eliminate such a liability. A plan funded at 70% required

0002- Trusteed Pension Funds, Market and Book Value of Assets. Online: < www.5.statcan.gc.ca/subjectsujet/result-resultat?pid...id >.
341

Note that the Ontario Pension Benefits Act permits employers to exclude the liability for cost-of-living
protection (indexing) from actuarial valuations for funding purposes, even where those arrangements
constitute an ongoing, formal commitment written into the terms of the plan. While such an arrangement may
appear to be practical where the continuity of the plan is secure, they open the door to exposing all members,
both active and retired, to greater losses in the event of plan wind-up.
342

Supra, see note 339.
On September 16, 2008, failures of massive financial institutions in the United States, due primarily to
exposure of securities of packaged subprime loans and credit default swaps issued to insure these loans
and their issuers, rapidly devolved into a global crisis resulting in a number of bank failures in Europe and
sharp reductions in the value of equities (stock) and commodities worldwide. (Wikipedia, Stock Market Crash
of 2008, Online: < www. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stock_market_crash>.)
344
General Accountants Association of Canada, Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada, 2010.
343

145

eight years of double digit investment to remedy the deficit. Considering that the long-term best
estimate of future returns for a balanced fund was reasonably estimated at around 6.5 % per annum
(net of investment and administrative expenses), it seemed highly unlikely that improved
investment returns could be relied on to correct the DB deficit situation in Canada.345

Almost half of DB pensions were less than 80% funded in 2012. However, as discussed previously,
2013 turned out to be a banner year for defined benefit pension plan sponsors as stock markets
soared, long-term interest rates rose sharply, and the Canadian dollar weakened (increasing exports),
resulting in the best level of improvement in the health of Canadian pension plans in more than a
decade. Long-term Government of Canada bond yields, a key factor in calculating the liabilities of
pension plans, ended the year at 3.2 per cent, up from 2.3 per cent at the beginning of the year.
Mercer estimated that a one percentage point increase in long-term interest rates would reduce the
liabilities of most pension plans by 10 per cent to 15 per cent. Only 6% of DB plans were less than
80% funded in 2013.

The Mercer pension health index, which tracks the funded status of a hypothetical defined benefit
pension plan, started 2013 at 82 per cent, stood at 98 per cent on Sept. 30 and 106% on December
31, the highest level since June 2001. Mercer estimated that almost 40 per cent of pension plans
were fully funded at the end of 2013, compared with six per cent at the beginning of the year.346
However, despite their improved funding status, DB plans are unlikely to reverse their declining
membership numbers under the current funding model. Dave Ovsey of the Financial Post comments
on the status of defined benefit plans in 2013:
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But the damage has been done. After more than a decade of attempting to manage massive
pension deficits, many DB plan sponsors are on a one-way track toward ridding themselves
of pension risk. For most, this will mean executing a variety of de-risking tactics with the
eventual goal of shifting toward pure defined contributions plans. For others — namely
those who are up against the collective-bargaining power of trade unions — the alternative
might be a DB-DC hybrid that will create a two-tiered system within the ranks of one
organization. Still others will do away with a pension option altogether, preferring to offer
(if anything at all) a group RRSP or something comparable. 347
B. Minimum Funding
An employer establishing a pension plan for Canadian employees must fund the plan at a pace
which, at a minimum, meets the requirements of the pension standard legislation applicable to its
pension plan. The minimum funding requirements are determined from an actuarial valuation which
must be carried out at least every three years. Annual actuarial valuations are generally required if
triennial solvency (asset/liability) ratios are less than specific levels (i.e. around 90% in most
jurisdictions).348
The actuarial valuation involves comparing the value of plan assets with the value of the benefits
(liabilities) that the plan is expected to pay in the future. The ratio of the value of plan assets to the
value of plan liabilities is often referred to as the funding ratio or funding level. For example, a plan
with assets worth $80 million and liabilities valued at $100 million will be said to have a funding
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ratio or level of 80%. The minimum federal PBSA and Ontario PBA funding levels are calculated
as follows:
Minimum Funding =Normal costs +Unfunded Actuarial Liabilities (Actuarial Losses)
The “normal cost” is the current cost of servicing or funding the pension benefits in a particular
year, as determined by the plan actuary.
The “unfunded actuarial liability” (or “special payment”) is a required contribution by an employer
to liquidate any going-concern unfunded liability or any solvency deficiency. It consists of 2 main
parts:
1. Actuarial gains or losses-A pension plan has actuarial gains or losses each year because
the actual events during the year (“experience”) do not exactly match the long-term actuarial
projections made on the previous valuation date. Gains or losses on plan assets occur
because the actual investment returns were higher or lower than anticipated by the actuary.
Gains or losses on actuarial liabilities can occur because long-term assumptions (e.g.,
mortality, salary increases, termination, retirement, etc.) were not met.
2. Prior service liability – Prior service liability arises if the plan improves benefits for
service already earned. It can arise when the plan is established (if participants are given
credit for time served with the employer before the establishment of the plan) or when the
plan is amended.
Unfunded liabilities may be amortized by the employer over prescribed periods of time set by
legislation. 349
C. The Role of the Pension Actuary
Each pension plan must have an “administrator” who bears ultimate responsibility for the plan. This
administrator (either the plan sponsor or a board of trustees) appoints the actuary and other
professionals who are required for the smooth operation of the plan. Basically, the actuary acts as a
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pension consultant to the administrator. The actuary is expected to prepare a valuation report using
assumptions and methods which provide some contribution flexibility for the employer, but which
also ensures that the pension fund will protect the future interests of the plan members. It is
important to note that although the actuary can recommend certain actions to the administrator, he
or she cannot compel the administrator to act.350
The DB plan actuary conducts going concern and solvency tests as prescribed by the Canadian
Institute of Actuaries and pension regulators (federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions (OSFI) and Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)) to ensure that the
contribution rate is not less than that required by the Minimum Funding Ratio (MFR). Professor
Ron Davis discusses actuarial funding:
The difficulties inherent in pension funding can be illuminated by calculating the amount of
money necessary to fund a benefit of $100 per month for the rest of a worker’s life after age
65. It would be necessary to estimate the worker’s longevity after age 65 to determine the
returns on any amount invested. The return on investment would vary with the type of
investment or asset held and with the investment fees incurred. The calculation would be
further complicated by pension benefit formulae which are based on a percentage of the
worker’s final salary or career average earnings. These earnings must be projected by the
actuary using hypotheses about future earnings. 351
Although the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and provincial
Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO)) regulate pension funding risk, there is always
an element of discretion in actuarial valuations. Ron Davis describes the impact of actuarial
discretion on funding estimates:
Clearly, an actuary is in the business of forecasting. Even more clearly, given the number of
variables involved, that forecast is primarily a product of the exercise of professional
350
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judgment and discretion. Therefore, there is almost invariably a difference between the
actual rates of earnings, retirement, and life expectancy experienced by the pension plan and
the estimates of those rates provided by the plan’s actuary when calculating the cost or the
funded status of the plan. This exercise of professional discretion is the first source of
insolvency risk for the pension plan’s members. Unless the actuary uses relatively
conservative assumptions, the plan’s members face the risk that minute variations in actual
experience will require large unexpected contributions from the plan sponsor and either the
plan sponsor will not be able to make them due to its insolvent status or the size of the
payments will drive the plan sponsor into insolvency proceedings. 352
D. The Role of Asset Allocation Policy In Funding Risks
A small increase or decrease in investment returns can play with havoc with actuarial estimates over
time. Professor Ron Davis discusses the impact of equity investments on pension funding:
For example, to pay a benefit of $100 per month for life starting in ten years, suppose the
actuary estimates that it will take a total of $60,000, based on average life expectancy. The
actuary then estimates how much must be contributed today to earn a total of $60,000 in ten
years, based on the anticipated rate of return, and including the effect of compound interest
from investing the pension contributions over that period. In making the calculation, the
actuary takes into account the type of investments the plan makes by using a rate of earnings
that includes an “equity premium” intended to reflect the common understanding that, over
the long run, the return on equity investments will be greater than that generated by “riskfree”353 fixed-income investments such as bonds. Thus, the greater the proportion of equities
in the pension fund’s assets, the lower will be the initial pension contribution needed in the
normal cost calculation the actuary performs. 354
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Davis continues that a report prepared by actuary Malcolm Hamilton estimates that a pension plan
that seeks to replace 50 percent of preretirement income by investing in fixed-income government
bonds requires a contribution rate of 23.8 percent of salary (Hamilton 2009). Hamilton notes:
Most of today’s retirement plans, defined benefit and defined contribution alike, try to make
good pensions affordable by investing 50% to 70% of the fund in risky assets thought to
offer higher rates of return in the long term, albeit with commensurately higher risks. The
objective is typically to increase the rate of return on the pension fund by about 2% net of
fees and to use some combination of risk management, patience, fluctuating contribution
rates (defined contribution plans), fluctuating benefits (defined benefit plans) or both
(hybrid pension plans) to deliver an acceptable compromise between affordability and
stability. Increasing the expected rate of return by 2% reduces the steady state contribution
rate by about 40%. (Hamilton 2009)

In other words, by investing pension assets in high risk equities, the actuarial estimate of investment
returns will be higher than if the assets were invested in lower fixed rate bonds, thereby increasing
projected pension income and reducing the level of employer contributions required to fund pension
liabilities. Davis continues:
Critics of this practice focus on the bias toward equity investment created by the “equity
premium,” arguing that there is no justification rooted in financial economics principles or
research for using differing costs for a fixed obligation based on what form of investment
one makes (see, for example, Bader and Gold 2003; Exley, Mehta, and Smith 2004; and
Sutcliffe 2005). In their view, the practice of incorporating the equity investment premium
into a pension’s cost calculations ignores the fact that the premium is the market price for
the extra risk assumed by choosing equities over risk free investments. The result is that the
potential for a pension asset shortfall is also increased by the proportion of equity assets in
the pension fund. Despite this, in Ontario, the proportion of pension assets invested in
equities has grown steadily, and at the end of 2008 stood at 60 percent (Financial Services
Commission of Ontario 2009, 12-13), although the proportion declined slightly to 55
percent in 2009 (Financial Services Commission of Ontario 2010, 25-6).355
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The funding of pension obligations through equity investments is also problematic because the
volatility of such investments means their value moves up and down in an unpredictable manner,
making it difficult for actuaries to project their value in any given funding period. In contrast,
liabilities are generally steadily increasing in pension plans as employees’ years of service increase.
This often results in underfunding due to a mismatch between a plan’s annual asset and liability
values.356 Doug Andrews of Aon consulting discusses the merits of using equity risk premiums: 357
Within the last five years, there has been increasing attention directed to the choice of the
investment return assumption. Proponents of the financial economics approach to
assumption-setting have argued that defined benefit pension promises are similar to the
issuance of a bond from the plan to the members. To ensure security of the promised
benefits, the plan should value the liabilities with expected bond-like returns. Let us accept
this logic, assume that liability values have been estimated using a bond-like interest rate,
and turn to the asset component of the funded ratio. If there were assets equal in value to the
liability estimate, and if those assets were invested to earn the assumed bond-like return,
today’s liabilities would remain fully funded (ignoring any deviations from other
assumptions). As a starting point in understanding future potential contribution requirements,
sponsors and administrators should ask, ‘what are contributions expected to be if a 100 per
cent bond investment philosophy is used?’
From this starting point, it is logical to ask, “Can the assets be invested to earn more than the
expected bond-like returns?” Traditional wisdom is yes. Because there is additional risk
assumed by an equity investor relative to a bond investor, (because the equity investor has a
lower order entitlement to a company’s revenue), there must be an equity risk premium
(ERP). In other words, if an investor could choose to invest in the equity or the debt of a
company, the investor would only choose to invest in the equity if the investor expected to
receive a higher return for receiving less security. If we accept this argument (and there are
some who would object), what is the expected ERP? This is an important question for the
sponsor and administrator to consider if they pursue an investment policy including equities
(which is by far the most common investment approach).
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So what is an appropriate ERP? There is a range of answers. Aon Consulting gathers
information from more than 25 of Canada’s major institutional investment management
firms, twice yearly, regarding their forecasts of returns on the major financial market indices
for various time horizons, ranging from one to 10 years. The managers do not explicitly
forecast the ERP. However, by comparing their forecasts of expected returns on the equity
indices compared to the bond index, one observes a positive ERP which is implicit in their
forecasts….Over a 10-year horizon, the implicit ERP is 2.2 per cent to four per cent.
Conversations with investment managers suggest that a range for the long-term ERP of two
per cent to four per cent is commonly quoted.
Andrew notes that an examination of Canadian economic statistics compiled by the Canadian
Institute of Actuaries indicates that the implied ERP for the 50-year period ending December 31,
2003, is approximately 3.2 per cent, comfortably in the range suggested above. However, as we
examine these statistics for shorter periods, such as 10 years, we note a much lower ERP in the
more recent 10 year periods. For the 10-year period ending 2003, the ERP was approximately 0.1
per cent. Robert D. Arnott and Peter L. Bernstein have carried out research and written several
papers regarding ERP. Although their research focuses on the U.S. financial markets, Arnott has
suggested that similar results could be expected in Canada. The U.S. longer term history (50 years)
shows an ERP of approximately five per cent. Their analysis suggests that expected real stock
returns over the 10 year period ending 2012 will be 2.5 per cent. Bernstein writes, “the primary
reason that the actualized equity risk premium has been so enormous in the years since 1954 is that
the bond market went through repeated inflationary episodes that took bond investors by surprise.”
A similar explanation may apply to the CIA data cited previously. Few investors expect inflationary
episodes in the next 10 years. Where one believes the ERP will fall (in the range from four per cent
to negative 0.8 per cent), it will significantly affect asset mix decisions. Bernstein suggests portfolio
policies of “50/50 [equities and bonds] or no policy numbers at all, purely an opportunistic strategy
based on no fixed opinions – at least until equity valuations change enough to reveal which asset
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(stocks or bonds) will be the better performer in the long run”. In conclusion, Andrews suggests the
following approach for sponsors and administrators considering an asset allocation policy: 358

1. Understand the value of liabilities using bond-like rates.
2. In making asset-liability projections, use as a starting point a 100 per cent bond allocation.
The characteristics of the bond portfolio should ideally match the characteristics of the
liabilities as closely as possible, particularly in areas such as duration, inflation sensitivity,
and cash flows.
3. When considering other asset allocations, understand the implicit ERP.
4. Test a variety of ERP assumptions to understand the potential variability of results and the
impact on financial position.
5. If you are not satisfied with the results, do further analyses considering alternative asset
classes.
In 2003 a task force of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries was established to review the standards
for pension funding in actuarial practice. It concluded that 10 percent should be added to the
employee/employer contribution amount if a pension fund invested 50 percent or more in equities,
in order to account for the potential of an “unacceptable deterioration in the plan’s funded status”
because of the high degree of risk of an asset-liability mismatch. (Canadian Institute of Actuaries
2003, 9-10). However, this recommendation has not been legislated to date.359
The potential for equity investments to contribute to the rapid deterioration of plan funding has
been recognized in at least one jurisdiction in Canada. In the province of Quebec a pension plan
must provide for adverse returns on equity investments by holding additional funds in reserve, over
and above the amount required to pay for the plan’s outstanding liabilities. Section 128 of the
Supplemental Pension Plans Act 360 states:
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At the date of the actuarial valuation to which the pension plan is subject, a reserve must be
established equal to the lesser of the following amounts:
(1) The amount of the actuarial gains determined in the valuation.
(2) The amount of the provision for adverse deviation calculated in accordance with the
regulations.

The amount of the actuarial gains corresponds to the amount by which the plan’s assets exceed the
plan’s liabilities. 361This reserve fund is based on the ratio of fixed-income assets to the total assets
of the pension fund (Regulation Respecting Supplemental Pension Plans, s. 60.04). 362 Since the
implementation of the reserve requirement, the number of private DB pension plans declined from
2010 to 2012, while the number of members rose from 2011 to 2012.363 The verdict is still out on
the effectiveness of these plans based on such limited data.
The Quebec government proposed a new strategy in 2013 to begin resolving the 26 billion dollar
deficit of the province’s private sector DB pension plans, covering approximately one million
members (half of them already retired). Quebec Labour Minister Agnes Maltais stated:
Defined-benefit pension plans are in danger. … These are the best pension plans available to
workers, and we need to protect them. We have no choice. We have to settle this problem.
The status quo is no longer possible.
361
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Ms. Maltais said she will table two bills in 2014, one to set the conditions for workers and
employers to negotiate how to resolve their companies’ pension deficits, and another to define the
financial terms to ensure the solvency of defined-benefit plans. The Quebec government’s proposal
to ease the financial troubles of private DB pension plans gave workers and employers until
December, 2014, to negotiate a solution for their company. If talks fail, they will have another six
months with the help of a conciliator. If they reject the conciliator’s report, the province’s labour
relations board will determine a final agreement.

The government will also make it mandatory for workers and employers each to bear half of the
costs of pensions in the future. Rules will also be changed to provide more flexible and less costly
ways for companies to replenish the capital in their pension plans to prevent insolvency and protect
benefits in closings or bankruptcies. The province is hoping these changes will encourage
companies to stay with defined benefit plans rather than adopting pensions with fewer benefits.

The government plans to hold consultations in 2014 with labour organizations, employer
associations, retirees and a coalition of student and young unionized workers on the proposed
private pension plan changes. Labour groups also applauded the initiative but criticized the 50/50
cost-sharing and the plan to give more powers to the labour relations board. 364

The legislative measures introduced to achieve full funding in Quebec have caught the attention of
actuaries and lawyers in other Canadian jurisdictions advising provinces on pension reform. Dan
Ovsey of the Financial Post comments:
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Outside of New Brunswick,365 Alberta and B.C. appear to be the most progressive on this
front and are seen as the mostly likely to be first to enact the needed legislation. Ontario is
on a similar track but has been in a holding pattern for the past year. Meanwhile, Quebec
has seen the implementation of target-benefit plans but these have been limited to the pulp
and paper sector. Curiously, Ontario’s prospective pension-legislation reform would restrict
target-benefit plans to unionized workplaces… 366
Professor Keith Ambachtsheer argues that investing in equities directly challenges the risk bearing
model that underlies Canada’s pension funding regulation:
The greater the asset shortfall, and/or the greater the liability/asset mismatch, the riskier the
pension contract becomes. It follows directly from this conclusion that funding policy and
investment policy in [defined-benefit] plans are intimately linked. Both have a direct
impact on the riskiness of pension contracts. Further, more risk exposure from
one source can be offset by less risk exposure from the other, and vice-versa” (2007,
208).
In short, the risk that is currently carried on pension fund balance sheets in Canada has not
been clearly articulated in defined-benefit pension plans. As a result, most plan members
naively believe that the current regulatory arrangements are designed to guarantee full
funding under the current formula for contribution rates (Ambachtsheer 2007, 11). This
belief is simply false. 367
Ambachtsheer notes that accepting that this guarantee, in fact, does not exist is thus the starting
point for a discussion about what changes should be implemented. Options could include improving
pension regulation, addressing the risks through the insolvency law regime, and implementing some
form of pension benefit insurance. However, there will be no incentive to start a dialogue about
reform unless all involved agree that the current system does not offer a guarantee to those
involved.368
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E. Impact of Adopting Mark to Market Valuation Principles
Scot Blythe of Benefits Canada discusses why actuarial pension valuations for publicly traded
companies are now being reported on a mark to market basis in Canada: 369

In the pension fund world, accounting rules sometimes attract more attention than actuarial
valuations. That’s because, at least among DB pension plans in the private sector, funding
results are applied to the bottom line—but only in an approximate fashion.
Let’s say the plan’s valuation assumes an 8% return on assets. Markets go down? No matter:
amortize that loss over a reasonable number of years. A company looks healthy and can
even include pension gains on its income statement—even if the pension fund has
performed dismally when it comes to meeting its long-term actuarial liabilities.
We saw this scenario play out in the auto sector during the Great Recession, when some
companies—weighed down, in part, by future pension and benefits obligations—went
through a forced-march bankruptcy as optimistic assumptions on asset returns disguised
how dreadful the balance sheet really was. The balance sheet (a company’s assets and
liabilities) is often less visible than its income statement [a company’s annual profit and loss
(P&L) summary]. And that annual P&L summary can gloss over long-term liabilities, since
only a portion is recognized (or amortized) each year.
The change in accounting rules, which came into effect for Canada on Jan. 1, 2011, will not affect
how pension plans are funded, as the current pension funding regulations remain in effect. Hvroje
Lakota of Mercer Canada noted that “At the end of the day, the objective of funding is benefit
security. Accounting has nothing to do with that. Pension accounting is figuring out how an
organization should recognize the cost of its benefits plan in its financial statements. But it may
have an impact on how pension funds invest, since what was always there in the footnotes to
earnings statements will become more transparent.”370
The move to mark to market means two things under International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). First, it eliminates the “smoothing” of investment gains and losses; essentially, waiting for
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markets to pick up and trend toward their expected value. Second, it transfers gains and losses from
the income statement to the balance sheet, where they are recognized as an impact on retained
earnings and, ultimately, on shareholder equity. 371
Prior to 2011, most Canadian publicly traded companies were required to follow the rules of the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook Section 3461 (CICA 3461) for purposes of
reflecting their pension plans in their corporate financial statements. CICA 3461 encouraged, or at
least did not discourage, assuming DB pension risk. Canadian pension accounting standards were
viewed as one of the barriers to employers reducing their pension risk. These barriers included the
ability to defer and amortize experience gains and losses, the inclusion of expected additional
returns from risky assets in the expected return on assets (EROA) calculation, and the ability to use
a smoothed value of assets to calculate the EROA. The adoption of International Accounting
Standards Section 19 (IAS 19), which “mark pension plans to market” in the employer’s financial
statements, means that these barriers to de-risking should eventually be removed. 372 IAS 19
eliminates the following barriers to de-risking:

1.

371
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At its November 2011 meeting, the AcSB considered factors for and against the development of a standalone fair value measurement standard for private enterprises and decided not to proceed with the project at
that time. The AcSB concluded that the need for such a standard is less acute for Part II of the Handbook
than it was for IFRSs, given the different focus of financial statement users in this sector and the current view
that the existing guidance in Part II for determining the fair value of an item is satisfactory. The AcSB further
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2.

IAS19 requires employers to recognize gains and losses immediately on their corporate
balance sheet (through other comprehensive income), better reflecting financial risk as plans
are “marked to market” on the balance sheet. (However, as of 2011employers adopting IAS
19 still had the option of continuing to defer and amortize experience gains and losses). 373

On Jan. 1, 2013 the following revisions to IAS 19 further reduced barriers to de-risking which have
been historically embedded in public companies’ pension accounting standards:

1. Revised IAS19 required the immediate recognition on the balance sheet of all
changes to pension plan surpluses or deficits (i.e., deferral and amortization of
experience gains and losses will no longer be permitted).
2. The annual pension cost must be calculated assuming that the annual expected rate
of return on pension plan assets is equal to the liability discount rate, which is based
on high quality corporate bond yields (i.e., the pension cost reflected in the
employer’s profit and loss statement will no longer anticipate incremental returns
from risky assets). Any incremental investment returns due to the investment in risky
assets that actually emerge over time will be recognized on the corporate balance
sheet (through other comprehensive income) once the incremental returns are
actually earned.374
F. Actuarial Standards of Practice
The federal PBSA states:
(3) The employer shall file with the Superintendent any information required by or under the
regulations at any intervals or times that the Superintendent directs.
(3.1) Except as otherwise specified by the Superintendent,
(a) the actuarial reports must be prepared in accordance with the standards of practice
adopted by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries;

The Ontario PBA states:
16. (1) An actuary preparing a report under section 70 of the Act or under section 3, 13 or 14
shall use methods and actuarial assumptions that are consistent with accepted actuarial practice and
with the requirements of the Act and this Regulation. O. Reg. 144/00, s. 11; O. Reg. 178/12, s. 16
(1).
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(4.1) A person preparing a report under subsection (1) or (2) shall use actuarial cost methods
and assumptions,
(a) that include a benefit allocation method or a cost allocation method; and
(b) that are consistent with section 3000 of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of
Practice, available to the public from the Canadian Institute of Actuaries at Suite 800,
150 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa, Ontario K2P 1P1 or electronically on its website. O. Reg.
116/09, s. 2.

In other words, both the PBSA and the PBA defer to the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) for
their actuarial funding standards. All DB pension reports and calculations must be prepared by a
Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (a self-regulating, professional body) in accordance
with its standards of accepted actuarial practice. On January 1, 2011 the CIA changed its standards
to improve the transparency of actuarial valuations. These updates affect how actuaries determine
assumptions, apply actuarial methods and prepare their reports for all funding actuarial valuations.
Phillip Morse of Benefits Canada discusses the details of the new standards:
The new CIA standards require that the actuary’s work should take account of the
circumstances of the work, including whether the work pertains to advice on the funded
status of the plan, advice on the funding of the plan, any applicable laws, the policies of any
regulators with jurisdiction on the work of the actuary, and the terms of the engagement
between the actuary and the plan administrator. In its most simplified form, the actuary
needs to know how the work will be used. This new standards create a greater need for the
plan administrator and actuary to make the terms of the actuary’s engagement more
transparent.375

Solvency and hypothetical windup valuation reports are impacted as follows: 376
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1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

The report must now contain a reconciliation of the gains and losses for the plan on a
solvency or hypothetical windup basis for the period since the prior valuation, unless such
reconciliation was reported on a going concern basis.
The report must disclose the hypothetical windup position under the scenario following plan
windup which maximizes the RPP’s benefits/liabilities on windup;
The actuary must determine an “incremental cost,” a prescribed calculation showing the
estimated change in solvency or hypothetical windup liability between the valuation date
and the expected ensuing valuation date; and
Required disclosure of the sensitivity of solvency or hypothetical windup valuation results,
through determination of the impact that a 1% decrease in the discount rates would have.
Going concern valuation assumptions are to be best-estimate assumptions, no longer
requiring margins for conservatism, except as required by law or by the engagement.
The actuary may no longer assume additional potential returns from active investment
management unless the actuary can support, based on relevant data, that such incremental
returns will be “consistently and reliably earned over the long term”
Required disclosure of the sensitivity of going concern valuation results, through
determination of the impact that a 1% decrease in the discount rate would have.
Changes in the actuarial cost method or asset smoothing method must now be accompanied
by an explanation of the rationale for and the impact of the change.

G. Actuarial Discretion
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions focused on the issue of actuarial discretion and its
impact on the transparency of valuations, especially in connection with going concern valuations
(solvency parameters are mostly legislated) discussed in Chapter 3. The following
recommendations were made by the Commission to improve funding transparency: 377
1. The Superintendent should work with the Canadian Institute of Actuaries to ensure that
actuarial standards and practices continue to evolve in the direction of greater transparency
and more structured discretion. For example, actuarial valuations should reveal whether the
sponsor intends to take a contribution holiday. [Note that whether or not a sponsor takes a
contribution holiday (a reduction or suspension of normal cost payments) is currently
undetectable in an actuarial valuation, as it is not factored into the contribution schedule.
The rules currently require a valuation to identify surplus in a plan, which would permit it to
take a contribution holiday; however, the rules do not require disclosure of whether that
holiday has actually been factored into the proposed three-year schedule of contributions.]
2. The Superintendent should have the power to require that plans cease using assumptions
that are unreasonable or that depart materially from accepted actuarial practice, and to order
an independent valuation or peer review of a report, at the expense of the plan, if there are
377
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grounds to believe that the actuarial valuation misrepresents a material factor in its funding.
[This recommendation has been adopted by both the PBSA and the PBA].
3. Smoothing Calculations

Overview

Professor Ron Davis notes that a technique called smoothing has been incorporated into actuarial
practice in Canada to insulate employers from sharp fluctuations in the values of DB pension assets
and liabilities, and the resulting plan contributions required to meet funding obligations. However,
smoothing methodologies for going concern valuations are not carefully defined by actuarial
practice. Consequently, the potential exists for smoothing to be used to opportunistically hide
funding problems. More importantly, smoothing can detract from a clear understanding of a plan’s
funded position if it is not fully explained in a valuation report so pension members are capable of
understanding the true risk inherent in their pension contract.378

Smoothing is essential to DB plans because it helps stabilize member and employer contribution
rates. It is one of the reasons that DB plans were not compelled to drastically increase contributions
after the huge investment losses on the stock market in 2008. Smoothing enables sponsors to make
payments over a number of years rather than in the current year (which would be required under
normal funding circumstances). An example of smoothing is outlined below:
Suppose in a given set of years DB plan investments earned an annual return in of 30% in
Year 1, then lost 10 percent in Year 2, then repeated this pattern for several more years. It
would be tempting to increase or decrease…. plan contributions in reaction to a single-year
performance. However, actuaries employ smoothing methods so that the gains and losses in
a single year are evened out over a number of years. This steadies the contribution rates
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required by the fund, allowing better planning by both employers and employees. It also
allows investment managers to create better long-term funding plans.379

A. PBSA
The federal government recently implemented an extension of smoothing techniques to apply to the
calculation of solvency deficiencies (funding shortfalls) in defined benefit pension plans. 380
Professor Ron Davis discusses the PBSA’s new smoothing techniques: 381
Prior to July 1, 2010, actuaries calculated the solvency status of a plan every three years by
comparing the value of the assets in the pension fund to that of its liabilities on the date of
valuation. A ratio of .8, for example, means that the value of assets is 80% of the liabilities
and, if a plan is terminated with that ratio, members and retirees could expect a 20%
reduction in their benefits. Employers were formerly required to make special payments
sufficient to raise the solvency ratio to 1 over the following 5 years, based on the funded
status of the plan determined via a triennial actuarial valuation.
Amendments have recently been legislated under the federal PBSA allowing actuaries to
“average” solvency deficiency ratios over the previous three years in the calculation of a
plan’s minimum funding requirements (Pension Benefits Standards Act Regulations, 1985,
9(8)). Furthermore, solvency valuations must now be conducted every year in plans under
federal jurisdiction. In other words, the special payments required if there is solvency
deficiency (funding shortfall) is determined by the average of the current solvency ratio and
that of the previous two years. This change could lead to a plan never being fully funded, as
the average-of-ratios calculation might generate special payments that never quite
extinguish the existing liability. For example, if the ratios for three years are 1, .9 and .8, the
average ratio would be .9 and special payments would be calculated to raise the ratio to 1
over the next five years. The following year, the ratios for three years could be .9, .8 and .82,
while the average ratio would be .84, and, again, special payments would be calculated to
raise the ratio to 1 over the next five years, and so on.
Davis notes that this reform of pension funding rules is based on the implicit assumption that the
volatility of equity values is not a random event; rather, equity values will revert to some ever
increasing average value over time. The federal Department of Finance stated in a news release that
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this new solvency funding standard “will mitigate the effects of short-term fluctuations in the value
of plan assets and liabilities on solvency funding requirements.” 382 In other words, a reduction in
the level of payments required to extinguish a pension fund shortfall is permitted because it is only
an “aberration,” or temporary departure from the “true” or “normal” value of the equity investment,
which will correct itself with the passage of time. However, critics claim that there is no empirical
or theoretical evidence to justify such an assumption (see, Bader and Gold 2003, 9; Sutcliffe 2005,
64-7). University of Texas Law School Professor Henry Hu recently stated:
… whether equity returns follow an ever-increasing trajectory with only temporary
aberrations or are truly random and whether investing over longer time horizons allows an
investor to capture the “average” returns are hotly contested in both financial economics and
the investment industry (2000, 823-36).The problem occurs not when individuals or
investment managers defer to these beliefs in their investment decisions, but when
governments and regulators promote a particular belief, either expressly or implicitly.383
There continues to be much debate over whether these new federal solvency rules (which
effectively reduce current employer DB contributions) are based on fact or fiction. Only time will
tell.
Strengthening Federal Funding Rules
A number of other provisions were also enacted in 2010 to strengthen federal pension funding rules.
Sponsors can no longer amend their pension plan to increase benefits if the funded ratio of the plan
is, or would fall, below a prescribed ratio (Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, 10.1).
Furthermore, the amount of surplus that a pension fund may hold without facing penalties under
income tax regulation was increased from 10 percent to 25 percent in order to address the volatility
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of asset values and increase the security of members’ pension benefits (Income Tax Act, 147.2(2)
(d)). Finally, employers are no longer permitted to suspend making normal cost contributions (i.e.
taking contribution holidays) until the funding ratio of the plan reaches 105 percent (Pension
Benefits Standards Act Regulations, 1985, 9(5)).384
B. OSFI
Pursuant to subsections 9(2) and 12(3.1) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 (“PBSA”) the
federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions has specified that the following
regulations will apply to the valuation of assets used in respect of solvency valuations for actuarial
reports with effective dates from November 1, 2008:385
Paragraph (a) of the definition of “solvency deficiency” contained in section 9 of the
Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985 (“PBSR”) refers to the valuation of assets for
actuarial valuations of federally-registered pension plans. The PBSR permits the use of a
value of plan assets determined on the basis of a value related to the market value by means
of a method using market values over a period of not more than five years to stabilize shortterm fluctuations, often referred to as an asset smoothing method. An asset valuation
method, defined as either the market value or an asset smoothing method, must be used
consistently for a period of at least three years in actuarial reports covering this period.
If an asset smoothing method is used, the resulting asset value must not exceed 110% of the
market value of plan assets at the same date. (Specification with respect to the Solvency
Funding Relief Regulations, 2009) With respect to actuarial reports with effective dates
from November 1, 2008 to October 31, 2009 that were prepared in accordance with and for
the purposes of the Solvency Funding Relief Regulation, 2009 (2009 Regulations), the
following may be used in lieu of the valuation of assets specified under the PBSR General
Specification, provided that the conditions and restrictions set out herein are met. For this
purpose, the asset value resulting from the use of an asset smoothing method must not
exceed 115% of the market value of plan assets at the same date. However, the actuarial
report must disclose the special payments that would be required for the period covered by
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the report if the asset value was limited under the PBSR General Specification, as well as
the special payments required on the basis of the 2009 Regulations Specification.
In essence, these new regulations restrict an actuary’s’ ability to smooth asset values in any given
valuation year by limiting both the number of years over which smoothing can occur (5) and the
percentage increase in the plan’s asset value due to smoothing (10).
Strengthening Provincial Funding Rules
The provinces have also legislated solvency funding relief for sponsors of provincially regulated
defined benefit pension plans. The most common relief was the amortization of funding deficits
over a 10 year period, instead of the usual 5 years. This will significantly reduce the required
employer contributions in the short term.
FSCO
The Financial Services Commission of Ontario enforces the following principles in regulating
asset smoothing methods used in solvency valuations in Ontario 386.
1. The method should be consistent with the current actuarial practice in Canada, i.e., the
guidelines on asset smoothing methods as set out in the Educational Note issued by the
Canadian Institute of Actuaries.
2. The method should have the effect of stabilizing the short-term fluctuations in the market
value of the plan assets.
3. The method should be appropriate for the circumstances of the plan;
4. Once an asset smoothing method is adopted for a valuation, it must be applied consistently
in future valuations unless otherwise justified by the circumstances of the plan (e.g. where
the plan is merged with another plan); and
5. The report should describe the method in sufficient detail so as to enable another actuary to
follow the development of the smoothed asset value.
6. FSCO’s current policy is that it does not intend to impose a limit on the deviation between
the smoothed asset value and the actual market value. However, it states
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“The actuary who prepares a report should apply his or her professional judgment as to
whether it is appropriate to impose a limit in light of the circumstances of the plan.” (In
other words, the limits on smoothing are left to the discretion of the actuary.)
Is Smoothing a Legitimate Funding Tool?
Smoothing assets and liabilities clearly has no impact on the total value of a DB plan’s liabilities,
which are a function of economic (i.e. inflation) and demographic (i.e. longevity) factors (i.e.
inflation). However, smoothing may impact the value of assets required to fund liabilities,
depending on the rate of return on deferred contributions compared to the rate of return on assets in
the year the liability was originally incurred. In other words, a sponsor will ultimately have to meet
his or her plan’s total liabilities, regardless of whether or not deferred contributions are higher or
lower than if the liability was totally funded in the year it was incurred (i.e. no smoothing). 387 The
key argument in favour of smoothing is that it provides greater certainty to the sponsor in terms of
planning contributions because large funding swings in any given year are spread over a number of
years.
In a situation where funding deteriorates over time due to economic and demographic factors (e.g.
structurally lower asset returns, lower bond yields, improved longevity, aging workforce),
smoothing simply delays the recognition of this trend. In other words, a smoothed discount rate
reduces the transparency of the pure “marked-to-market” funded position at a particular point in
time and may slow down the recovery of funding levels. This is not problematic where the sponsor
is healthy and can eventually catch up with higher contributions. However, in the case of a weak
sponsor, delaying bad news will inevitably cause members to run elevated sponsor credit risk and
by the time the deterioration is fully recognized, it may be too late for trustees to take preventative
steps. In the event the sponsor does eventually fail, the final deficit may be much higher than it
387
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would have been, had an unsmoothed approach been used with more proactive risk management
along the way. Equally, smoothing will delay recognition of a steadily improving funded position
due to secular factors (i.e. much stronger than expected equity returns, unexpectedly high bond
yields etc.).
Proponents of smoothing argue that short term fluctuations in markets are just noise which adds no
value and at worst distorts pension fund decision making which should be long- term. The reality is
that it is impossible to know, other than with the benefit of hindsight, whether an improvement or
deterioration in funding is short term noise or part of a long-term trend. It would obviously be
preferable to have all DB plans fully funded based on market derived assets and liability valuations.
However, if the smoothing of funding requirements ultimately gives sponsors more time to meet
their liabilities in difficult economic times, it is certainly an option that merits consideration in lieu
of certain insolvency. 388 Cardano Inc., a U.K. risk management consulting company, comments on
smoothing:
One of the arguments commonly used to support smoothing is that financial markets are
volatile and potentially prone to ‘over shooting’ on both the up and down sides. A smoothed
approach, it is argued, gives a more realistic reflection of the pension fund’s long-term
health, which surely does not fluctuate on a day to day basis? We believe that the weight of
academic and empirical evidence firmly supports the ‘market value’ approach over the
‘smoothed value’ approach. There are many good reviews of the academic literature and we
do not intend to cover these arguments in this document.
However, we do want to point out that probably the single most important differentiator
between well and poorly funded DB schemes in the UK today is the speed and enthusiasm
with which they understood mark to market valuation of the liabilities and adjusted their
investment strategies accordingly. Those pension funds that embraced mark to market
liability valuation understood that they were running interest rate and inflation risks and
generally took steps to manage these risks. On the other hand, those trustees who objected to
388
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mark to market valuations were also slow to accept that they are running interest rate and
inflation risk and generally did very little about it. The slow adopters suffered far greater
deterioration in their funding position over the last decade than their more technically
advanced peers.
We believe that it makes sense for pension funds to hedge the vast majority of their interest
rate and inflation risk under most circumstances. An unhedged interest rate (or inflation)
position only makes sense if one believes that interest rates (or breakeven inflation) will rise
(fall) by more than what is already priced in by markets. We believe that it is difficult for
anyone, let alone pension fund trustees, to form a consistently superior view on these
complicated macro-economic variables than the market. By taking less interest rate and
inflation risk, pension funds potentially have the ability to take more risk elsewhere in their
portfolio, in areas where there is a stronger economic rationale for being rewarded.
Cardano concludes that the reality is that market volatility does not have to result in volatile funding
ratios and deficits. By using tried and tested risk management techniques, pension funds can
navigate their way through volatile financial markets and control the impact that market volatility
has on their funding ratio and deficits. However, because risk management uses market tools, it
requires mark to market valuation to operate effectively. Risk management is made much more
difficult and is, in fact, disincentivised if assets and liabilities are smoothed…. 389 In short, the more
smoothing, the less risk management.
4. Establishment of an Independent External Oversight Board
An independent external actuarial oversight board could be established “to promote more effective
scrutiny and monitoring to ensure that actuarial information is produced in accordance with the
relevant technical and ethical standards, and also to examine the current framework of selfregulation by the actuarial profession” with respect to potential issues such as: 390
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Professional standards that have been weak, ambiguous or too limited in range, and perceived as
influenced by commercial interests.
An absence of proactive monitoring of members' compliance with professional standards.
A profession that has been too introspective, not forward-looking enough and slow to modernize

In particular, an oversight board could monitor the reliability and usefulness of actuarial methods
by mandating that:391
1. actuaries make effective use of models to complement the use of spreadsheets, the application of
which can vary widely from one actuary to another, with due recognition of the power and
limitations of the models used.
2. actuaries are directed to the needs of users and measures are taken to ensure that the reliability
and usefulness of estimates are proportionate to the benefit they provide. (i.e. actuaries are not
unduly constrained by financial and other restrictions).
3. actuaries incorporate checks on the reliability and usefulness of data with full and clear
documentation, ensuring that the results are capable of being checked and reproduced by
other actuaries.
4. actuaries incorporate robust criteria for:
- selecting assumptions which incorporate findings from theoretical and empirical
research based on past experience and current market information;
- ensuring consistent treatment in the model of different measures such as assets
and liabilities;
- recognizing and exploring risk and uncertainty; and
- analysing model outputs against expectations.
5. there is effective and continuing review within and outside the profession of the
methods used, so as to encourage innovative, transparent and consistent approaches.
6. actuaries meet technical standards which are principles-based and outcomes-focused and
which promote the reliability and usefulness of actuarial methods
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Conclusion
Chapter 5 discussed the impact of the governance of actuarial methods on the underfunding of
defined benefit pension plans. It examined asset/ liability valuations, asset allocation policy, and the
role of the actuary, revealing that actuaries are using actuarial methods to push DB funding
problems down the road in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concluded by proposing that an
independent external oversight board be established to monitor the reliability and usefulness of
actuarial methods in Canada.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE OF ACTUARIAL SURPLUS ON DEFINED BENEFIT
PENSION PLAN FUNDING

Overview
Chapter 5 discussed the impact of the governance (by legislators, regulators (Ontario PBA and
federal PBSA), and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries) of actuarial methods on the underfunding
of defined benefit pension plans, revealing that governance of these methods has only served to
push DB funding problems the road, in lieu of addressing them. The chapter concluded by
proposing that an independent oversight board be established to monitor the reliability and
usefulness of actuarial methods in Canada.
Chapter 6 examines the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding
that Canadian courts’ surplus policy (from the “Dominion Stores” case in 1986 to Manitoba
Telecom in 2014) has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting
underfunding and insolvencies.

Pension Lawyer Ari Kaplan notes that no issue in recent history has been more divisive and
polarized in the governance of defined benefit pension plan funding than actuarial surplus,
continuing that surplus ownership, use and distribution have dominated the pension landscape both
judicially and politically. 392 As discussed in Chapter 5, asymmetry (i.e. employers are responsible
for funding deficits but have limited access to surplus) has been a major barrier to the funding of
DB plans. 393
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The funded status of a defined benefit pension plan is in a constant state of flux due to its
dependence on a number of variables. For example, rising investment returns increase a plan’s
funded status while falling returns lower it.394 During the 1980s and 1990s (in times of high
investment returns) much of the pension funding debate centered around which parties had legal
rights to pension surpluses (also coined “actuarial errors”). The 1994 Supreme Court of Canada
landmark decision Schmidt v. Air Products ([1994] 2 S.C.R. 611) referred to the distinction
between “actual” surplus and “actuarial” surplus, stating that during the ongoing operation of a
pension plan, a surplus is simply an actuarial number, only becoming actual or certain upon the
wind-up of a plan. Since the 2000 stock market collapse, the pension debate has shifted to pension
deficits. The court in Schmidt characterized deficits as follows:

An on-going pension plan may have an actuarial deficit that will go up and down as
actuarial assumptions, economic conditions, and the experience of the pension plan change
whereas an actuarial deficit becomes “actual” or certain only upon wind-up of the pension
plan. In other words, it is only upon wind-up that the extent of the underfunding and the
impact on plan members is determined. 395
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Courts have been applying classic trust principles to actuarial surplus ownership issues since
Schmidt (1994),396 making it extremely difficult for both employers and employees to freely access
surplus in an ongoing plan. In Schmidt, the Court decided that pension trusts are classic trusts, and
not trusts for purpose.397 (Classic trusts hold funds for the benefit of specified persons and not for a
general purpose like building a hospital in which the trust expires once the hospital is built). The
1994 Schmidt decision was to have profound implications for actuarial surplus cases, some of
which were not likely foreseen by the court. In deciding that pension trusts were analogous to
classic trusts, the Court mandated that the law of trusts, which developed over hundreds of years in
Britain, would apply to all pension trusts in Canada. 398

The plan documents that legally create both the plan and its pension fund should establish the
authority for ownership of any surpluses that may occur in defined benefit plans. However, research
by Normand Gendron of Benefits Canada revealed that many originating documents drafted in the
1940s, ’50s and ’60s did not anticipate the litigious environment that has developed in Canada over
the past several decades and as such, did not preserve the employer’s right to surplus ownership
indefinitely, while other documents contain language indicating that surplus assets are for the
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exclusive benefit of the plan members. 399 These historical documents giving members rights to
surpluses have discouraged sponsors from maintaining surpluses, promoting minimum funding.
Sponsors and members, respectively, make the following arguments regarding surplus
ownership:400
Plan sponsor’s argument – We support the risk of funding shortfalls through deficiency
amortization payments. We should therefore benefit from any surplus (the positive side of that risk).
Plan member’s argument – Employer contributions are really deferred wages. All funds in the
pension plan, therefore, belong to us.
In 2008 Gendron proposed the following legislative and regulatory amendments to address these
surplus ownership issues: 401

1) The government should introduce legislation to ensure that pension plans are interpreted
under contract law as opposed to trust law. Under contract law, a general power of
amendment would allow an employer to amend the plan in respect of surplus ownership.
Since surplus ownership would not be governed by classic trust law principles, surplus
ownership would not be established at the time that the trust was originally established. 402
2) Pension plan regulation should be clear on surplus ownership and how it will be
determined. Some new potential provisions include:
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A. Allowing the use of a side fund for deficiency contributions. Money in the side fund

could be used for contribution holidays if no longer needed to cover liabilities.
B. Establishing a “banker’s rule” arrangement whereby a sponsor could recuperate

deficiency payments made to the fund when the fund returns to a surplus position (with
or without a safety margin being required).
C. In the absence of clear rules, providing for an arbitration mechanism that would allow
each party to present its arguments. (IMPLEMENTED IN ONTARIO’S PBA)
3) A safety margin should be held in the fund before any contribution holidays are taken or
benefit improvements adopted. This would benefit both sponsors and members, as the plan
could sustain greater fluctuations in asset values without incurring deficiency payments
while the members would benefit from greater benefit security. (IMPLEMENTED
FEDERALLY (PBSA) AND IN ONTARIO (PBA))
4) The maximum surplus allowed by the Canada Revenue Agency should be increased to
allow for the buildup of greater margins. (IMPLEMENTED-INCREASED FROM 10% TO
25%)
In short, plan sponsors want the greatest possible predictability and flexibility to manage their costs
while members want benefit security. It is obvious that greater security can be achieved through
higher contributions; in other words, funding with a margin. However, court decisions restricting
use and ownership of surplus have made plan sponsors wary about funding above the minimum
actuarial requirements, increasing the volatility of pension costs and reducing benefits security. 403
This chapter will focus on the impact of the governance of “actual” and “actuarial” surplus on
defined benefit pension plan funding. It is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the major
legal concepts associated with actuarial surplus. Section 2 reviews the major court rulings on actual
and actuarial surplus, while Section 3 discusses the policy issues relevant to actuarial surplus.
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Section 1-Major Surplus Issues
1. Introduction
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act (PBA) defines surplus as:
The excess of value of assets of a pension fund related to a pension plan over the value of
the liabilities under the pension plan, both calculated in the prescribed manner. 404
A pension plan is not able to disclose a surplus without the assistance of an actuary. This is because
it is the actuary who calculates and values the plan’s liabilities and assets and, until the actuary
prepares a plan valuation report, it will not be known whether the plan has a surplus or, for that
matter, an unfunded liability or a solvency deficiency. In this respect, a surplus cannot exist until it
is disclosed in a valuation report. Such a report must be prepared at least triennially and may, at the
request of the administrator, employer or regulator, be prepared on a more frequent basis.
Pension Lawyer Ari Kaplan notes that a surplus can only exist, if at all, in a pension fund related to
a defined benefit pension plan:
A defined contribution plan can never have a surplus; all monies, after deduction of taxes and
expenses, must be paid out to the pensioners. In a defined benefit plan, pensions are calculated
by reference to a specific formula set out in the plan text. An actuarial valuation report discloses
the total value of the aggregate defined benefit liabilities; that is, the present value of the
pensions promised to be paid in the future. Surplus assets arise at any given point in time when
the value of the assets in the pension fund exceed what is necessary to discharge all present and
future defined benefit liabilities. Surplus is sometimes characterized as those assets in the
pension fund over and above the assets required fund required to discharge the so-called
pension promise. The promise refers to the pension benefits calculated under the plan’s defined
benefit formula. 405
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2. Actual and Actuarial Surplus in Canada
In 1919 an amendment to the Income Tax Act allowed employee contributions to employer
sponsored pension plans to be claimed as a tax deduction. 406 During the 1950s and 1960s, the
Department of National Revenue maintained its “Blue Book” (later Information Bulletin No. 14)
which set out conditions for pension plan registration. One of the requirements was that employer
contributions had to be irrevocable.407 Kaplan notes that there were a number of different ways that
employers were able to structure their pension plans to comply with this rule:
The most common and popular funding models proved to be by way of either investment
annuity contracts with insurance companies or trust agreements with institutional custodial
trustees. These models were perceived to provide the requisite degree of “irrevocability” of
contribution to entitle the employer to obtain tax relief on its pension contributions. Between
these two models the pension trust proved to be a preferred and efficient choice by
employers, not least of all because of the commercial realities in the custodial marketplace
at the time.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the irrevocability requirements were relaxed until finally, in 1981,
the Canadian Revenue Agency expressly changed its registration requirements to provide that
future defined benefit pension plans must contain a provision permitting all surplus to be refunded
to the employer on termination of the plan. 408 Therefore, the debate over surplus ownership upon
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plan termination is only relevant in DB pension plans registered prior to 1981. The Ontario Pension
Benefits Act (PBA) and the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA) provided little, if any
direction on surplus ownership until the late 1980s, focusing mainly on procedure, specifically on
the employer’s procedure for applying to the pension regulator to withdraw surplus. Due process
and notice to employees are prominent in these regulatory schemes. 409
As mentioned above, high profile litigation over surplus ownership, withdrawal, and usage in
Canada commenced in the mid-1980s and climaxed in the 2000s. High interest rates in the early
1980s lowered plan liabilities (which are bond-like in nature) and increased asset values, triggering
large surpluses. The surplus ownership issue gained significant media coverage through legal
disputes involving high-profile institutions including Dominion Stores, Bank of British Columbia
and the National Hockey League, among others.
Poor economic conditions in the early 1990s triggered mass lay-offs, plant shutdowns, and
corporate restructuring, resulting in the premature termination of many company pension plans.
Consequently, groups of terminated employees and employers (or their creditors) engaged in legal
disputes over the ownership of plan surplus. 410
As discussed above, it wasn’t until 1994 in the landmark ruling Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada
Ltd.411 that the Supreme Court of Canada prescribed a principled framework of analysis for
determining, on a case by case basis, the ownership of surplus on the wind-up of pre-1981 plans.
The Court also set out the applicable interpretive principles for determining when an employer has
the right to use the actuarial surplus to take a so-called “contribution holiday” in an ongoing
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pension plan. However, Schmidt did not resolve the scope of an employer’s right to use actuarial
surplus in an ongoing plan for purposes other than contribution holidays (for example, to pay
administrative expenses out of the pension fund, merge two or more pension funds that are in a state
of surplus or deficit, or convert a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan). Judicial
consideration of these issues took place in the post-Schmidt Supreme Court of Canada cases
Monsanto Canada Inc. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), Buschau v. Rogers
Cablesystems Inc. (2006), Canada (Kerry Inc.) v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)
(2009), Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Company (2010), and Manitoba Telecom (2014).
3. Surplus Use and Allocation
Professor Ron Davis distinguishes between two different concepts of surplus pension assets, those
in an ongoing plan and those in a terminated plan:
In the case of an ongoing plan, the surplus assets are an estimate that, if all of the variables
concerning future economic trends used by a pension plan actuary in forecasting the future
costs of future benefits behave as predicted, not all of the assets in the plan will be needed to
pay those future benefits. Of course, a change in any variable will affect this forecast, and a
subsequent forecast may find that there is no surplus, or that the plan is actually in a deficit
position.
The second concept of surplus refers to the calculation made when the pension plan is
terminated. Since there will be no future accrual of benefits, there is no need to forecast
future pension costs or investment performance, the calculation of the surplus is not an
estimate and the existence of the surplus is not contingent on future economic performance.
The distinction between these two concepts of surplus is important in assessing the
circumstances in which there is a dispute over the use or ownership of surplus assets.
Except in circumstances in which a plan is terminated, partially terminated or proposed to
be terminated, the disputes concerning the use of actuarial surplus involve the first concept;
that is, surplus assets in an ongoing plan. These include extraction of surplus by an
employer from an ongoing plan; funding contribution holidays, funding benefit
improvements, funding deficits in other pension funds sponsored by the employer and
funding new types of pension benefits. In the event a plan is terminated, the issue is who is
entitled to share in the actuarial surplus available for distribution and whether or not the plan
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members and pensioners can terminate a pension plan in order to obtain a distribution of the
surplus in the plan.412
Davis notes that the problems of competing claims concerning the legitimate use of excess assets in
a pension fund are complex and multi-layered, involving conflicting views of the implications of
the defined benefit pension “bargain,” the allocation of the burdens of the significant risks in such a
bargain, and the proper distribution of the increases in income that can result from an increase in
certain risks. Competing claims in an ongoing plan include:
1. The plan sponsor’s interests in the continuation of a valuable human resource
management benefit plan on a cost effective basis.
2. The plan members interests in receiving the full benefit of past employer contributions as
part of their compensation for past services rendered.
3. The need to provide reasonable assurance that accrued benefits will continue to be fully
funded, and the concerns of tax authorities about excessive contributions to tax-exempt
funds.
Davis continues that both regulation and judicial pronouncements have played a role in balancing
employer and employee claims, with the emphasis varying by jurisdiction. The use of the trust as a
funding medium has not played a significant role in questions about surplus use in ongoing plans
except for the use of surplus in one plan to fund benefits accrued in another. Rather, regulatory
requirements are central to resolving these issues. For example, in Ontario, any extraction of
surplus by an employer from an ongoing plan must meet minimum standards with respect to the
funding left in the plan following the withdrawal, and receive the unanimous consent of the plan
members, pensioners and beneficiaries. 413
Professor Davis concludes that the use of actuarial surplus in ongoing plans to fund employer
contribution holidays, either in respect of the original members of the plan or for new employees,
412
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whether hired directly or acquired by the employer through mergers with other entities, is permitted
in all jurisdictions. Also permitted is the use of actuarial surplus from a defined benefit plan to fund
employer contribution holidays in a defined contribution pension plans, provided the DB and DC
benefits are being delivered as part of the same plan (i.e. hybrid benefits). Davis discusses the
policy implications of these permissive surplus regulations:
Courts have interpreted broad amending powers in a trust instrument and pension plan as
including the power to make amendments to accomplish these goals. This interpretation is
based primarily on the courts’ views about the private pension system as a voluntary system
in which an employer may terminate participation at any time and in which the choice of the
benefits to be provided is left to the employer. Although recognizing the interests of
employees in receiving the full benefit of past contributions, the courts have held that the
retention of control by the employer over prospective benefit design and the utilization of
surplus assets to fund benefits does not involve a trespass on the reasonable expectations of
plan members in a defined benefit pension plan and recognizes legitimate employer interests
in controlling its costs and utilizing the plan as a human resource asset for all of its
employees.414
Different considerations apply when the issue concerns the allocation of surplus assets on plan
termination, as an employer’s interests in the continuation of the plan for its benefit are no longer an
issue, nor are the interests in controlling its costs and benefit design. These issues are addressed in
the next section of this chapter.415
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4. Actuarial vs. Actual Surplus-Legal and Policy Issues
Kaplan notes that actuarial and actual surplus, more than anything else, frame the competing legal
and policy viewpoints expressed by employers and employees regarding the use and ownership of
surplus in defined benefit pension plans. 416 He discusses employers’ viewpoint on actuarial surplus:
An actuarial surplus in an ongoing DB plan is sometimes said to exist “only on paper”
because it is a notional sum that results from actuarial assumptions and calculations.
Employer advocates point to this attribute of surplus to support the proposition that
employees have no legal entitlement to actuarial surplus in an ongoing plan. In other words,
any employee rights to surplus arise only when the actuarial surplus becomes an actual
surplus, which crystallizes upon termination of the plan. In support of this proposition,
employers point to the legal principle that affirms that an employer’s right to take
contribution holidays from an actuarial surplus does not, in and of itself, represent an
“encroachment upon the [pension] trust nor a reduction of accrued benefits” under the
plan. 417 Under this predominantly employer-sponsored view of actuarial surplus, there is a
crucial qualitative and legal distinction between actuarial and actual surplus. An actuarial
surplus does not truly exist because it is not definite and, therefore, employees can have no
legal interest or expectation in an employer’s use of that surplus while the plan is ongoing. It
is only when a pension plan is wound up, if ever, that any existing surplus must be
distributed. Only at this time (from the employers’ viewpoint), do employees have a vested
right to challenge the ownership or use of that surplus and claim a share of the proceeds. 418
Employee advocates acknowledge that while actuarial surplus is of necessity an estimate,
employers frequently place a real financial value on it in ongoing plans by:
1.

Disclosing its existence in solvency and going-concern valuations.

2. Taking contribution holidays.
3. Agreeing to transfer pension assets including surplus during purchase and sale transactions.
4. Withdrawing surplus from the ongoing plan itself. 419
In 2003 Markle v. Toronto (City) held:
416
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…the actuarial surplus in this case constitutes part of the trust fund held for the employees.
The fact that the employees entitlement to those funds may not crystallize until the Plan is
terminated, at which point an actuarial surplus (if one exists) becomes an actual surplus,
does not change the fact that the actuarial surplus is part of the trust fund and that as such it
may only be dealt with during the life of the trust and in a manner that is consistent with the
principles of trust law or relevant statutory provisions. 420
In other words, under this predominantly employee supported view of surplus, the court held that
there was no qualitative difference between an actuarial and actual surplus. Any surplus, whether
characterized as actuarial or actual, is part of the total assets of the pension fund and under trust law,
the surplus exists solely for the benefit of the employees who are equitable and ultimate
beneficiaries of that surplus. Under this theory, the only material legal distinction between an
actuarial surplus and actual surplus is that, subject to the plan terms, employees do not have an
immediate right to compel a cash distribution of that surplus while it is an actuarial surplus, as they
do when it crystallizes into an actual surplus. 421

Section 2-Major Court Cases and Legislative Amendments on Surplus
A. Court Cases
1. Collins (1986)-Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA)
In the 1986 case Collins and Pension Commissioner of Ontario,422otherwise known as the
“Dominion Stores Case,” the issue at hand was whether or not an employer could access actuarial
surplus for its own benefit without a surplus sharing agreement. The court’s decision was “no.”

The employer (i.e. Conrad Black) withdrew $56 million from the pension fund without consulting
plan members. Conrad Black considered the actuarial surplus his own rightful property. The
420
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Ontario Court of Appeal ruled against Black and ordered him to return half of the surplus to the
pension fund. According to the court, while the most recent language in the plan documents
suggested that the employer had ownership of the actuarial surplus, the original intention was to
keep the surplus in the plan in order to increase members’ benefits. The decision resulted in
employers being unable to access actuarial surplus in Ontario without entering into a surplus
sharing agreement with their employees.423

2. Schmidt (1994)-S.C.C.
The 1994 case Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd.424 is a landmark case in Canadian pension
law. The main issue was whether or not surplus belonged to employers or employees upon plan
wind-up. The court held that pension trusts are classic trusts and therefore employees own the
surplus upon wind-up unless the pension text says otherwise.
In Schmidt, the employer merged two defined benefit pension plans and used actuarial surplus that
had accumulated in the two prior plans to take contribution holidays. The employer claimed that it
was entitled to the surplus when the merged plan was terminated. The plan members commenced an
action, arguing that they were entitled to the surplus and that the employer had to pay back the
surplus it had used to fund its contribution holidays. 425

After a series of appeals, the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, which established the
legal framework for analyzing pension plans that continues to be applied today. More significantly,
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the Court held that a pension plan funded pursuant to a trust is a classic trust and, as such, is subject
to all common law trust principles. 426

Based on these principles, the Court found that surplus is always included in the trust unless the
original trust agreement says it is not. The employer will only be entitled to it in the following
circumstances:

(i) The employer was made a beneficiary of the trust from the outset;
(ii) The employer reserved a power to revoke the trust when it was established; or
(iii) The doctrine of the resulting trust is applicable.427

426

Classic trust principles, however, do not translate neatly into the pension context. They were developed in
the context of testamentary estates (wills) where the trust product was left by a settlor who was deceased.
The trust was “fixed” and, except for gains or losses realized through investment, it did not change over time.
All of the beneficiaries were entitled to a specific benefit – whether that be a specific portion or part of the
trust or the residue of the trust after all of the specific benefits had been provided. The beneficiaries were
typically set at the time the trust was created, and could not be changed by the settlor from time to time.
Pension trusts are fundamentally different from classic trusts in a number of ways. A classic trust is a form of
gift involving the transfer of property to a trustee for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries. A pension trust,
on the other hand, is primarily a funding vehicle to provide security for future pension obligations. A pension
trust is fluid in nature – new beneficiaries join the pension plan and current beneficiaries leave on a regular
basis – and are closely intertwined with employment. Unlike a classic trust situation, the trustee of a pension
fund typically has very little discretion in the investment or administration of the trust fund; rather,
investments and payment of benefits are performed at the direction of the plan administrator and/or
investment managers.
The result of applying traditional trust law principles to pension plans has been, in a word, unsatisfactory.
Allowing a series of archaic rules not designed with pension plans in mind to take precedence over
contractual arrangements between employers and employees adds an unnecessary complexity and
uncertainty into what is intended to be a contractual (employment) relationship, capable of being changed
from time to time. It also means that the DB pension promise is being overridden by extraneous factors. (The
Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM), Back from the Brink: Securing the Future of
Canadian Defined Benefit Pension Plans at 10, 2005. Online: < www.acpm.com/ACPM/ >.)
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A resulting trust is a trust implied by law (as determined by a court) that a person who holds title or
possession was intended by agreement (implied by the circumstances) with the intended owner to hold the
property for the intended owner. Thus, the holder is considered a trustee of a resulting trust for the proper
owner as beneficiary. Although a legal fiction, the resulting trust forces the holder to honor the intention and
prevents unjust enrichment. Example: Mahalia leaves $100,000 with her friend, Albert, while she is on a trip
to Europe, asking him "to buy the old Barsallo place if it comes on the market." Albert buys the property, but
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At the same time, the Court held that, in the absence of provincial legislation stating otherwise, a
pension plan may explicitly or implicitly permit an employer to take a contribution holiday or may
explicitly or implicitly prohibit this practice:
When permission is not explicitly given in the plan, it may be implied from the wording of
the employer’s contribution obligation. Any provision which places the responsibility for
the calculation of the amount needed to fund promised benefits in the hands of an actuary
should be taken to incorporate accepted actuarial practice as to how that calculation is made.
That practice currently includes the application of calculated surplus funds to the
determination of overall current service cost. It is a practice that is in keeping with the
nature of a defined benefits plan, and one, which is, encouraged by the tax authorities. 428
The Court ruled that contribution holidays and other uses of surplus in an ongoing plan are not a
revocation of trust, because in an ongoing plan, actuarial surplus exists only on paper. This
compromise resulted in stringent restrictions on employer entitlement to surplus on windup but
gave employers more latitude when dealing with surplus in the context of an ongoing plan.

Canadian courts have struggled to implement this compromise in subsequent cases. In short, what
was supposed to end all surplus ownership disputes, instead fuelled another 20 years of litigation.
This post-Schmidt litigation centered primarily on how to apply classic trust law principles to
pension plans (which are not well suited to many pension common law principles), considering
pensions are also subject to pension standards legislation and are a component of the employment
law (contractual) relationship between employee and employer.429

has title put in his own name, which the court will find is held in a resulting trust for Mahalia. (The Free
Dictionary, Online: < www. legal- dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Resulting+Trust >.)
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Application of Schmidt Principles in Court Cases 430
The following decisions applied the contribution holiday principles set out in Schmidt. They found
that the pension plan text permitted the taking of contribution holidays because the wording in the
plan did not mandate a specific employer contribution formula, but made the employer’s
contribution subject to the advice and discretion of an actuary.
Schmidt v. Air Products431
The Company shall contribute from time to time, but not less frequently than annually, such
amounts as are not less than those certified by the Actuary as necessary to provide the retirement
benefits accruing to Members during the current year pursuant to the Plan…
Askin v. Ontario Hospital Association432
Each Contributing Member Hospital shall make contributions to the Plan as determined by the
Actuary from time to time.
Maurer v. McMaster University433
The University shall pay into the Fund each year the amount required to fully fund the current
service cost of the Plan, as determined by the Actuary, after allowing the Members required
contributions.
Kerry (Canada) Inc.434
The Company shall contribute from time to time but not less frequently than annually such amounts
as are not less than certified by the Actuary as necessary to provide the retirement income accruing
to members during the current year pursuant to the Plan…
Correspondingly, a number of decisions found that pension plan texts implicitly or explicitly
prohibited the taking of contribution holidays because the plans mandated an exact employer
430
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contribution formula and did not make the employer’s contributions subject to the advice of an
actuary.
Ontario Hydro435
The Corporation shall contribute towards the cost of the benefits…the amount of the difference
between the amount of the contributions of the employees and the amount of the cost of the benefits
as determined by actuarial calculations.
Trent University436
…the University shall deposit each year into the Fund the balance of the cost of benefits earned that
year, after allowing for Members’ Required Contributions.
Hockin v. Bank of British Columbia437
The employer shall contribute the balance of the cost required to provide benefits under the plan.
Note that the pension text in each of these cases mandated that the employer make contributions
each fiscal year, thereby prohibiting contribution holidays.

3. Monsanto (2004)-S.C.C.438

The issue in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Superintendent of Financial Services was whether or not
employees affected by the partial windup of their DB plan were entitled to a pro-rata share of the
actuarial surplus. The Court ruled in the affirmative.

In 1997 and 1998, Monsanto laid off 146 employees and took steps to partially wind up its pension
plan. At the time of the partial wind-up, the plan contained an actuarial surplus of over $19 million.
The pro-rata share of the surplus relating to the portion of the plan that was being wound up was
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just over $3 million. The Superintendent of Financial Services refused to approve Monsanto's
partial wind up report on the basis that it did not provide for the distribution of the pro-rata portion
of the surplus on the partial wind-up as required by section 70(6) of the Ontario Pension Benefits
Act at that time, which provided:

70(6) On the partial wind up of a pension plan, members, former members and other
persons entitled to benefits under the pension plan shall have rights and benefits that are not
less than the rights and benefits they would have on a full wind up of the pension plan on
the effective date of the partial wind up.
However, a majority of the Financial Services Tribunal ordered the Superintendent to approve the
report. It held that section 70(6) of the Act provided no more than a right to participate in surplus
distribution when (if ever) the pension plan fully winds up.

The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision and the Court of Appeal dismissed
Monsanto's appeal. Monsanto then took the case to the Supreme Court of Canada. It argued that it
had no obligation to distribute surplus to employees on a partial wind-up; rather, it maintained,
section 70(6) merely gave affected employees a vested right to participate in any full wind-up in the
future.439 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Looking at the plain language of section 70(6),
the legislative scheme and the object of the Act, the Court concluded that employees affected by a
partial wind-up are entitled to their share of the surplus at the time of the partial wind up. The Court
concluded:

Section 70(6) requires the distribution of a proportional share of actuarial surplus when a
defined benefit pension plan is partially wound up. The ordinary and grammatical meaning
of s. 70(6) indicates that the assessment of rights and benefits is to be conducted as if the
pension plan was winding up in full on the effective date of partial wind-up. The realization
of rights and benefits, including the distribution of surplus assets, then occurs for the part of
the plan actually being wound up. Therefore, the affected members, if entitled, may receive
439
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their pro rata share of the surplus existing in the fund on a partial wind-up, as if the plan was
being fully wound up on that day. The members affected by a partial wind-up are thus
accorded the rights and benefits that are not less than the group would have if there were a
full wind-up on the date of partial wind-up.440
In essence, the Supreme Court of Canada held that for partial wind ups, a pro rata share of any
existing actuarial surplus must be distributed to terminated employees. However, the decision was
not clear about whether the distribution should be in proportion to liabilities or assets.

The Monsanto decision almost certainly impacted the future funding of defined benefit pension
plans because it took away employers’ incentive to maintain a surplus. Consider a plan that was in
surplus years ago that is in deficit position today. In the event of a partial wind-up at the time of a
surplus say, 10 years ago, the sponsor would have been required to distribute some of the actuarial
surplus to those former members affected by the partial wind-up, thereby reducing plan assets and
increasing the level of the plan’s current deficit. The Ontario PBA and federal PBSA have since
retracted the distribution of surplus to employees upon partial plan wind-up.
4. Buschau (2006)-S.C.C.441

The issue in the 2006 case Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. was whether or not trust law
could be applied to permit members to unilaterally terminate their pension plan and take the
actuarial surplus. The Court’s decision was ‘no.”442

The recent trend in the case law to apply traditional trust law principles to pension trusts without
regard to the regulatory context in which such trusts were created and maintained was halted, or at
440
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least significantly curtailed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Buschau. In Buschau, the Court
specifically stated that its prior decision in Schmidt v. Air Products Canada Ltd. 443 does not mean
that all trust law principles are applicable to a pension trust. Rather, regard must be had to the
context and purpose of pension plans, the terms of the particular plan documents and the specific
legislation governing the pension plan.

McSweeney notes that the Buschau v. Rogers Communications case is perhaps the most notorious
of the pension surplus cases in Canada, as plan members attempted to take ownership of their DB
plan’s actuarial surplus by invoking a very old trust law principle called the Rule in Saunders v.
Vautier. The Rule in Saunders v. Vautier, from an 1841 English case, states that notwithstanding
what the wishes were of the person who set up the trust, if all of the beneficiaries want to, they can
vary the terms of the trust or terminate the trust, and use the trust funds as they see fit. The pension
plan members in Buschau wanted to use this rule (after attempting to get all of the pension plan
members to agree to wind up the plan) to distribute the surplus amongst themselves. McSweeney
comments on the application of trust law in Buschau:444
While the Court of Appeal found that the members hadn’t managed to obtain the necessary
consents from all the plan’s beneficiaries, it nevertheless held that this old trust law
principle could in fact apply to modern pension trusts. The Court of Appeal was clearly
uncomfortable with the idea, but felt bound by the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in
Schmidt which, as noted above, held that pension trusts were classic trusts, and not some
special kind of trust. If they are indeed classic trusts, then all trust law rules are applicable,
including Saunders v. Vautier. Plan sponsors found this very surprising, since up until then
the assumption was that plan terminations were in the control of the employer, which could
decide if and when to terminate the pension plan. It was unheard of for plan members to
have the unilateral right to terminate their own pension plan.
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The Supreme Court, when deciding the appeal of the Buschau decision in 2006, introduced
into the pension area what many plan sponsors felt was a badly needed dose of common
sense. The Supreme Court first went back to its decision in Schmidt and the seminal finding
in that case that pension trusts were “true” or “classic” trusts. In Schmidt, the Court held that
“when a pension fund is impressed with a trust, the trust is subject to all applicable trust law
principles.” In its decision in Buschau, it added to the Schmidt decision by saying “It is thus
necessary to determine which trust law principles are applicable before considering how
they apply.” It is unlikely that the Supreme Court in 1994 had intended that the word
“applicable” would carry so much weight. However, in Buschau it became central.
In essence, the Court held that it is necessary to look at the statutory and regulatory framework for
pension plans, and not just look at them as trusts existing in a legislative void. In some instances
where the statute contains rules and guidelines in a given area, trust law principles are simply not
applicable and cannot be used to circumvent the statutory process. In those circumstances where
pension legislation contains detailed rules regarding when a pension plan can be terminated, the
Supreme Court held that the members could not apply an old trust law concept to unilaterally force
a wind-up of their pension plan to access the actuarial surplus. In other words, the Court ruled that
the legislation trumped the trust agreement with respect to the application of Saunders v. Vautier. 445
Subsequent to Buschau, plan sponsors wondered whether the case signalled a trend towards more
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practical and common-sense interpretations on actuarial surplus, or whether the case was simply an
anomaly. 446
5. Kerry (2009)447-S.C.C.

The issues in Nolan v. Kerry were whether or not a sponsor could use actuarial surplus to pay the
plan’s administration expenses and also, whether or not the Ontario food products company
violated trust law when it moved surplus cash from its DB plan (closed to new employees) to a new
DC plan (opened for new employees)? The Court ruled “yes” and “no” respectively.

The Kerry case involved a DB plan established in the 1950s funded through a trust. The plan was
amended in the 1970s to permit plan expenses to be paid from the fund, and again in 2000 to
introduce a DC component for new employees, using the DB surplus to fund DC contribution
holidays. The plan members complained about the payment of expenses from the trust and also
about the employer taking of contribution holidays in the new DC plan using the old DB plan’s
funds. On appeal from the Financial Services Tribunal, the case made its way to the Ontario
Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court made some rather startling findings, again on the basis that the pension trust
was a classic trust established generally for the benefit of the plan members. It held that in creating
a new DC component in the plan, the sponsor created two pension plans, with two pension funds
and two classes of members. It also held that because the historical trust language in the DB
component said that funds must be used for the “exclusive benefit” of members, the employer could
not use it for any other groups, including the members in the DC component. In other words,
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adding a new DC component to a an old DB pension plan and treating the pension fund as a single
fund was rejected by the court on the basis that only the originally defined group of trust
beneficiaries could benefit from the DB actuarial surplus. 448

The sponsors appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal which held that an employer
could stop paying pension plan expenses in the DC plan and take the money from the original DB
if the plan text itself did not specifically forbid it. The Court also ruled that Kerry would not have
to refund any money it took from the DB fund to pay for contribution holidays taken in the DC
plan. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed, saying there was nothing in the plan preventing the
company from transferring funds from one part of the plan to the other. The Court cited the
leading case of Schmidt v. Air Products, which held that an employer may take contribution
holidays if permitted by the terms of the plan. In the event that the plan is silent on the issue, the
right to take a contribution holiday is not objectionable so long as actuaries continue to accept the
application of existing surplus to current service costs as a standard practice.
The Court continued that nothing prevented the Company from taking a contribution holiday where
the actuary certified that no further contributions were necessary to provide the required retirement
income to members. It also stated that the creation of two different pension components (i.e., a DB
and a DC component) does not necessarily result in two distinct pension plans and trusts. In
addition, where surplus in the DB portion is used to fund DC contributions under the same trust,
there is no violation of the “exclusive benefit for employees” trust provision, providing that it is not
otherwise prohibited by the plan and trust documents. 449 Justice Rothstein ruled that “the plan
documents do not preclude combining the two components in one plan and nothing in these
448
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documents or trust law prevents the use of the actuarial surplus for the contribution holidays.” The
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision also stated Kerry was not obligated to pay pension expenses
out of pocket because those expenses were incurred for the benefit of pension plan members. The
Court held:
The payment of plan expenses is necessary to ensure the plan's continued integrity and
existence, and the existence of the plan is a benefit to the employees. It is therefore to the
exclusive benefit of the employees that expenses for the continued existence of the plan
are paid out of the fund.

6.Burke (2010)-S.C.C.450
The issue in Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Company was whether or not transferred employees had access
to the surplus in their original DB plan when a successor plan was established for them in their new
company. The Court ruled “no.”
The 2005 lower court decision in Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Company followed in the same vein as
the earlier pension surplus cases relying on the characterization of pension trusts as classic trusts in
Schmidt, meaning all trust rules were applicable.
In 1987 the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) sold its Northern Stores Division to the North West
Company. The HBC pension plan was in surplus at the time. Employees who were transferred to
the new company had their accrued pension benefits and assets of equal value transferred into their
new employer’s pension plan. However, no surplus was transferred into the new plan. The
transferred members sued, claiming that their share of the surplus should have been transferred into
their new pension plan.
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The basis for the members’ claim was that from time to time HBC had improved benefits for
pensioners, using the surplus in its pension plan. Transferring members to the buyer’s pension plan
without their share of the surplus, they argued, meant that their share of the surplus would
ultimately be used to improve other members’ benefits in the original plan, rather than their own
benefits. In order to understand why this case caused plan sponsors such concern, it is very
important to note the following facts: 451

1. The affected members conceded that HBC had no contractual obligation to make future
benefit improvements for pensioners.
2. The court held that HBC had the legal right to use surplus in its pension plan to pay
administrative expenses and to take contribution holidays. That is, it could simply have used
the entire surplus and members would have had no recourse.
3. The amount of assets transferred by HBC into the buyer’s pension plan was negotiated at
“arms” length and permitted by pension statute. There was no legal requirement to transfer
any surplus.
The lower court held that “the employees had some expectation that improvements would be made”
to their pensions and that they had been deprived of “the possibility of improvement to the new
plan.” In short, the failure to transfer surplus “represented a breach of trust on the part of HBC.”
Therefore, relying on the fact that the HBC pension trust was a “classic trust,” the court held that a
mere expectation had to be protected, and ordered that surplus be transferred out of the HBC plan
into the buyer’s plan. 452
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Note that the Long-awaited amendments to the Ontario Pension Benefits Act ("PBA") regarding the
transfer of assets between pension plans became effective on January 1, 2014. New supporting Regulations
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However, in 2008 the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision. The first
important finding of the Court of Appeal was that the expectation of certain beneficiaries is not a
“legitimate basis for creating legal rights and obligations at odds with the provisions of the plan
documentation.” This is a common-sense result based on the fact that HBC had a duty to ensure that
the transferred employees’ defined benefits were adequately funded, not that an actuarial surplus be
funded. In other words, HBC’s fiduciary duties as plan administrator did not obligate it under the
duty of even-handedness453 to confer benefits upon a class of employees who had no rights under
the Plan. The Court ruled that neither the retained nor the transferred employees had an equitable
interest in the ongoing plan’s actuarial plan surplus. Waters comments on the application of the
duty of even-handedness in Burke: 454

The duty of even-handedness must be anchored in the terms of the pension plan
documentation. It does not operate in a vacuum. The duty of even-handedness requires that
where there are two or more classes of beneficiaries, each class receives exactly what the
terms of the documentation confer. In its role as pension plan administrator, HBC was a
fiduciary and had fiduciary obligations. However, just because HBC has fiduciary duties as
plan administrator does not obligate it under any purported duty of even-handedness to
confer benefits upon one class of employees to which they have no right under the plan. It
was the obligation of HBC to carry out the terms of the pension plan documents and to
ensure that in the administration of the plan they do not give an advantage or impose a
burden when that advantage or burden is not found in the terms of the plan documents.
Neither the retained nor the transferred employees had an equitable interest in the plan
surplus. Accordingly there is no duty of even-handedness applicable to the surplus. HBC’s
legal obligations with respect to its employees, including the fiduciary duties that it owed to
Regulations. In other words, Section 80 of the Ontario PBA legislation (mandating the transfer of DB pension
surplus to the transferred employees’ new DB plan) trumps the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2010 decision in
Burke.
453
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the transferred employees, were satisfied by protecting their defined benefits. Based on the
plan documentation, HBC did not have a fiduciary obligation to transfer a portion of the
actuarial surplus (Waters at p. 966).
Professor Ron Davis notes that although recognizing the interests of employees in receiving the full
benefit of past contributions, the courts have held that the retention of control by the employer over
prospective benefit design and the utilization of surplus assets to fund benefits in ongoing plans
does not involve a trespass on the reasonable expectations of plan members in a defined benefit
pension plan and recognizes legitimate employer interests in controlling its costs and utilizing the
plan as a human resource asset for all of its employees.455

McSweeney notes that the application of even handedness is itself rooted in traditional trust law
concepts, it is a departure from the lower court’s reasoning which, according to the Court of Appeal,
seemed to be rooted more in “basic notions of fairness” than in any firm legal concept. The Court
addressed the lower court’s “fairness” concern that failing to transfer surplus would benefit only the
members retained in the original plan, holding that since there was no termination of the pension
plan, and thus no "crystallization" of surplus, the “actuarial” surplus was properly retained in the
original plan to be accessed for improvement of benefits or contribution holidays. The transferred
employees had benefited equally from the surplus up to the date of the transfer.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision regarding the transfer
of surplus. It held that it was necessary to examine all previous and current HBC plan documents
(as per Schmidt) to determine whether the transferred employees had an “equitable interest” in the
plan’s surplus. Noting that the “exclusive benefit” language in the HBC trust agreement was
restricted to “promised” benefits and did not give employees entitlement to surplus, the Supreme
Court of Canada concluded that no such equitable interest in surplus existed. The SCC made it clear
455
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that its decision was specific to the wording and context of the HBC pension plan documents, which
did not grant a specific right to surplus to plan members. However, it is noteworthy that on the issue
of whether a transfer of surplus is required when the plan language entitles employees to surplus,
the court stated “that is best left to another case in which the issue arises.” 456
In particular, Justice Rothstein rejected the affected employees’ argument that HBC had a duty to
“hold an even hand” between transferring and non-transferring employees in its allocation and use
of surplus. He noted that such duty is fiduciary in nature, and while HBC has a fiduciary duty in its
role as plan administrator, that role required only that the company protect the members’ defined
benefits. Its actions in regard to surplus were held not to be fiduciary in nature, and therefore not to
be subject to the duty of even-handedness. Gary Nachsen of Benefits Canada comments:
This analysis reflects the well-known “two hats” doctrine of pension law, even if it does not
expressly use that terminology. That is, the same corporation may act administrator of a
pension plan for certain purposes and will be considered as a fiduciary for those purposes,
while it may act as sponsoring employer for other purposes and it will not be considered as a
fiduciary for those other purposes. It would appear that the Supreme Court has implicitly
blessed the two hats doctrine and, in doing so, has offered some novel thoughts on how that
doctrine should be applied.457

7. Sutherland (2011) ONCA458
The issue in Sutherland v. Hudson’s Bay Co. was whether or not surplus funds from the original
Simpson’s DB plan could be used to pay for employer contributions to the defined contribution
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pensions of Zellers and Kmart employees (subsidiaries of HBC, the company which had taken over
the ownership of Simpsons). The Ontario Court of Appeal’s answer was “no.” 459
In 1971 Simpsons Ltd. established a defined benefit pension plan for its employees. In
1994 and 1998, HBC, as the successor to Simpsons under the pension plan, amended the plan by
adding a defined contribution section to the plan and introduced employees of its wholly owned
subsidiaries (Zellers and Kmart) to the plan, which was also renamed. Between January 1, 1994,
and December 31, 2006, approximately $111 million of surplus assets in the HBC plan was applied
to pay employer annual defined contribution costs for Zellers and Kmart employees. Simpson’s
retirees who were members of the Simpsons pension plan (the plaintiffs) commenced a class action
against HBC, alleging, inter alia, that HBC improperly used surplus funds that had accrued in the
trust fund for the Simpsons pension plan to pay for the employer contributions to the defined
contribution pensions of Zellers and Kmart employees. 460
In 2011 the majority of the Court of Appeal held that Plan members were entitled to plan surplus
assets based on principles from the 1994 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schmidt v.
Air Products of Canada Ltd. The language of the original trust agreement and the Plan text,
including “exclusive benefit” language, demonstrated the intention to establish a trust for the
benefit of the members, including the surplus. However, the plan text said that HBC could amend
the Plan, meaning it had the power to revoke the trust. The Court ruled that the original trust
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agreement, not the Plan text, “trumped.” Level Chan of Stewart McKelvey Lawyers commented on
the Sutherland case:
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Burke v. Hudson’s Bay
Co., although the language in the Plan text was similar. The Supreme Court found in Burke
that employees who were transferred when HBC sold its Northern Stores division did not
have an interest in the surplus while the Plan was ongoing. HBC was therefore not required
to transfer any share of the surplus when the employees were transferred. The Court of
Appeal in Sutherland distinguished the language in the different plan documents. The
original plan documentation in Burke limited members’ entitlements to the promised
pension benefits and therefore excluded entitlement to surplus assets. There was no
“exclusive benefit” language in the originating documents, unlike the Simpsons Plan.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision re-affirms the principles from Schmidt, and the
application of trust principles to pension plans. The same principles were applied by the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Smith v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in Burke and Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. suggested
a more flexible application of trust law principles to pension plans and recognized the
interests of employers and plan sponsors in pension plans. In denying leave to appeal, the
Supreme Court has therefore confirmed the same framework from Schmidt continues to
apply and that the differences with its decision in Burke are the result of key differences in
the language of plan documents. The cases re-affirm the importance of carefully considering
plan language and the history of how that language has changed to determine plan member
entitlements.461

Since the Dominion Stores case (Collins and Pension Commissioner of Ontario-ONCA) in 1986,
wherein Conrad Black absconded his company’s pension surplus of 50 million dollars, the Supreme
Court of Canada has implemented a policy of protecting DB plan surpluses (in ongoing plans) from
being removed by both employers and employees. The S.C.C.’s policy began in 1994 in Schmidt
(surpluses generally belong to employees on plan termination and are subject to all trust principles;
however, employers using actuarial surplus to fund ongoing plans is not a revocation of the trust).
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The courts have been consistent in implementing pension surplus policy since Schmidt, from
Buschau (statute trumps trust law) to Kerry (surplus can be transferred by employer from original
DB plan to a new DC component of the same plan) to Burke (transferred employees have no access
to surplus) to Sutherland (S.C.C. agreed with ONCA that all surplus remains in the original
members’ DB plan). It is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario Court of Appeal
have applied trust law, legislation and plan text based on the circumstances of each case in order to
protect actuarial surpluses. I argue, therefore, that the decisions in Burke (plan text trumps law of
trusts) and Sutherland (law of trusts trumps plan text) are not so much the result of “key differences
in the language of plan documents” as Chan suggests, but rather, the result of the Supreme Court’s
application of trust law, legislation and plan text (based on the circumstances of each case) to
implement its policy of protecting actuarial surpluses for use in DB plan funding.
8. Manitoba Telecom (2014) (SCC)462
The issue at hand in Telecommunications Employees Association of Manitoba Inc. v. Manitoba
Telecom Services Inc. was whether or not Manitoba Telecom company’s employees were entitled
to their public DB plan’s “actuarial surplus” when it was transferred into a private plan (note that
“surplus” only exists when a plan is wound up).The Supreme Court of Canada’s answer was “yes”.

Crown MTS was privatized in 1997, resulting in approximately 7,000 employees and retirees of
Crown MTS and its subsidiaries having their assets and pension rights transferred to a new pension
plan. The plan members’ initial contribution to the new fund was an “actuarial surplus” of $43
million dollars (i.e. an amount transferred from the old plan solely attributable to the members) on
the implementation date of the new plan. This contribution was not matched by MTS. Rather, MTS
462
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used the Initial Surplus to take contribution holidays, reducing its contributions to the new plan. In
other words, only MTS benefitted from the actuarial surplus.

In the old plan the government as employer did not contribute to the plan fund. Rather, the
government paid its share of the benefits on a “pay-as-you-go” basis, meaning that instead of
matching employee contributions at the time they were paid into the pension fund, the government
instead paid half of the benefits owed to retirees at the time they became due. The effect of this
arrangement was that the Old Plan’s pension fund, referred to as the Civil Service Superannuation
Fund (“CSSF”), contained only employee contributions and “interest” based on the returns on the
fund’s assets. Those funds were used to pay for 50 percent of the plan’s liabilities to its plan
members, with the other 50 percent being paid for by the government on an ongoing basis.463

During the privatization process, the Plan Members received several assurances from Crown MTS
and the government that any surplus that existed in the old plan would not be used to reduce MTS’
costs of and share of contributions in the new pension plan. Pursuant to the statute that governed the
privatization of Crown MTS, the Manitoba Telephone System Reorganization and Consequential
Amendments Act (the “Reorganization Act”), all of the old plan’s assets attributable to the plan
members, including the actuarial surplus were transferred to the new pension plan. Section 15(2)(a)
of the Reorganization Act states that MTS is required to establish “a new plan which shall provide
for benefits which on the implementation date are equivalent in value to the pension benefits to
which employees have or may be entitled to under [the old plan].”
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The Supreme Court considered a number of cases in which the applicable legislation and plan texts
do not give plan members the right to an actuarial surplus in a typical defined benefit pension plan
(see Buschau, Kerry above). However, the Court noted that entitlement to an actuarial surplus must
always be decided based on the governing legislation and that in this case the governing legislation
led to a different conclusion regarding the treatment of the actuarial surplus. In Manitoba Telecom
the applicable legislation required the establishment of a new plan providing benefits on its
implementation date, equivalent in value to the benefits provided under the prior plan. In other
words, the actuarial surplus that existed at the time of the transfer of assets from the prior plan must
be taken into account when determining whether the new plan fulfilled this requirement.
The Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the 2010 order of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
that the Initial Surplus plus interest (140 million dollars) be used to enhance members’ pension
benefits and that the parties negotiate the related implementation process. Justice Rothstein stated:

The New Plan can only be held to comply with the requirements of s. 15(2)(a)
if the Initial Surplus is used for the exclusive benefit of the plan members, or if plan
members received some other compensatory benefits of equivalent value. Therefore, the
outcome of the privatization of Crown MTS is found to violate section 15(2)(a) of the
Reorganization Act.464
In other words, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the applicable legislation trumped the
application of trust law.

B. Amendments to the Federal Income Tax Act (ITA), the Ontario PBA and the Federal
PBSA Regulations on Surplus

Regulatory amendments to the Federal Income Tax Act (ITA), the Ontario PBA and the Federal
PBSA on Surplus were introduced from 2010 to 2012. These amendments allowed employers to
maintain larger surpluses in their DB plans. However, as discussed above, the real underfunding
464
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problem is not related to the amount of surplus, but rather, inability of employers to access surplus.
Consequently, these amendments did virtually nothing to alleviate the underfunding problem. See
Appendix 6 on page 299 for details.

Section 3-Pension Surplus Policy in Canada
Schmidt implemented the policy that pension trusts as classic trusts, imposing severe restrictions on
removing surplus from ongoing plans. In Buschau, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) further
developed the policy established in Schmidt that pension plans funded pursuant to trust agreements
are classic trusts and, as such, are subject to all common law trust principles. The Court in Buschau
recognized that DB pension plans are regulated by a unique set of legal principles in federal and
provincial jurisdictions that cannot and should not automatically be overridden by traditional
common law trust principles. Accordingly, the SCC ruled that plan members could not use trust
principles to effect the termination of the pension trust to access actuarial surplus and that the
legislative scheme established the appropriate process for dealing with this issue. 465 The Supreme
Court of Canada in Buschau held that its prior decision in Schmidt v. Air Products Canada
Ltd.466did not mean that all trust law principles were applicable to a pension trust. Rather, it ruled
that regard must be also be had to the context and purpose of pension plans, the terms of the
particular plan documents and the specific legislation governing the pension plan. Pension surplus
policy in Canada is summarized below:

1. Collins (1986)-Employer cannot access actuarial surplus without surplus sharing agreement
with employees.
2. Schmidt (1994)-Pension trusts are classic trusts and therefore employees own the surplus upon
wind-up unless the pension plan text says otherwise.
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3. Monsanto (2004)-A pro-rata share of actuarial surplus must be distributed to employees on
partial wind-up (Trumped in 2012 by Ontario PBA legislation).
4. Buschau (2006)-Plan members cannot effect termination of a pension trust using general trust
principles in order to access actuarial surplus (i.e. plans are not simply trusts existing in a
legislative void-statutory and regulatory frameworks must both be considered to access
actuarial surplus). LEGISLATION TRUMPS LAW OF TRUSTS
5. Kerry (2009) - Nothing in trust law prevents sponsors from taking contribution holidays or
paying expenses using actuarial surplus, even if the plan has both DB and DC components.
6. Burke (2010)-As per the trust agreement, transferred employees have no access to actuarial
surplus (i.e. plan documentation can displace classic trust principles). PLAN TEXT TRUMPS
LAW OF TRUSTS
7. Sutherland (2011) - Plan assets were impressed with a trust in favour of the plan members,
and therefore they were entitled to any surplus assets. LAW OF TRUSTS TRUMPS PLAN
TEXT
8. Manitoba Telecom (2014) – Plan members are entitled to actuarial surplus if mandated by
legislation. LEGISLATION TRUMPS LAW OF TRUSTS
Actuarial Surplus Policy Recommendations

The Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) has recommended the creation of pension security trusts
(PSTs). Under its proposal, these trusts would only be funded by employers and would be separate
from regular defined benefit pension funds. Any additional contributions over and above those
arising from going concern valuations would be placed in a PST, including any amounts required to
fund solvency deficiencies. Funds in the PST would be released back to the employer if actuarial
solvency valuations showed that any excess amounts were no longer needed. Amounts contributed
to the PST would be tax deductible, while amounts released back would be taxable. 467

Steve Bonnar proposes taking this idea a step further by only allowing sponsors access to actuarial
surplus in excess of an established margin that would vary in accordance with the asset/liability
mismatch of their DB plan’s investment policy. At one extreme, that of a fully immunized
investment policy, the funding target would be 100% of the solvency liability. For a typical asset
mix, the funding target might be 110% of the solvency liability. In the case of an extremely
467
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aggressive asset mix, the funding target might approach 125% of the solvency liability. These are
meant to be examples only, but should reasonably represent the expected range of margins that
might be appropriate. This type of surplus regime would promote more stable funding policies by
giving sponsors incentives to better fund DB plans beyond minimum levels. 468

Conclusion

Chapter 6 examined the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding
that courts’ surplus policy (from the Dominion Stores case in 1986 to Manitoba Telecom in 2014)
has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting underfunding and insolvencies.
Professor Ron Davis notes that the exercise of an actuary’s professional judgment and discretion is
the first source of insolvency risk for a pension plan’s members. Therefore, unless the actuary uses
conservative assumptions, the plan members face the risk that minute variations in actual
experience will require large unexpected contributions from the plan sponsor and either the plan
sponsor will not be able to make them due to its insolvent status, or the size of the payments will
drive the plan sponsor into insolvency proceedings. In short, by giving employers very limited
access to surplus while making them wholly responsible for deficits (Schmidt), actuaries (as agents
of employers) are often pressured by employers to project higher than market estimates of
investment returns (thereby reducing plan contributions and surpluses). 469 In other words, the
Supreme Court of Canada’s application of trust law to DB plan surpluses (Schmidt) has
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compromised the role of the actuary to make objective funding estimates. The Canadian Institute of
Actuaries states:470
Objectivity is the ability to work without regard to any personal considerations and without regard
to any influence from, interest in or relationship with another party, such as a client or employer,
which would affect one’s professional judgment. There will always be an actual or perceived
challenge to an actuary’s objectivity where a client represents a significant percentage of the
actuary’s firm’s business, or the actuary’s firm wishes to expand its business with the client, since
the actuary and the firm have a self-interest in preserving and increasing the revenue derived from
the client. That challenge may be even more difficult to manage where the firm provides multiple
services to the client. Nonetheless, the actuary must manage the challenge.
The obvious remedy to this conflict of interest position is to mandate that a third party (such as an
independent external actuarial oversight board) mandate that pension regulators appoint and pay
(through fees levied on employers) DB valuation actuaries. This would give plan members
assurance that their plans’ funding valuations would be more objective and reliable. However,
implementing such a policy would almost certainly increase employers’ funding requirements,
making DB plans unaffordable for many sponsors in these times of low investment returns.
Another possible legal remedy would be to allow sponsors access to actuarial surplus in excess of
an established margin (determined by an independent external actuarial oversight board) that would
vary in accordance with the asset/liability mismatch of their DB plan’s investment policy. At one
extreme (that of a fully immunized investment policy) the funding target would be 100% of the
solvency liability. For a typical asset mix, the funding target might be 110% of the solvency
liability. In the case of an extremely aggressive asset mix, the funding target might approach 125%
of the solvency liability. These funding targets are only meant to be examples, but should
reasonably represent a range of appropriate margins. This type of surplus regime would
470
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undoubtedly promote more stable funding policies, providing DB pension sponsors with more
incentive to fund their plans beyond minimum levels.
No issue in recent history has been more divisive and polarized in the governance of defined benefit
pension plan funding than surplus. Surplus issues will almost certainly continue to dominate the DB
pension funding landscape in Canada as long as the policy of asymmetry continues to give
employers very limited access to actuarial surplus while making them wholly responsible for
deficits.
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CHAPTER 7
TARGET BENEFIT PLANS

Overview
Chapter 6 examined the impact of the governance of surplus on actuarial underfunding, concluding
that courts’ surplus policy (from the Dominion Stores case in 1986 to Manitoba Telecom in 2014)
has restricted employers’ access to surplus, inadvertently promoting underfunding and insolvency.
Chapter 7 discusses the merits of “target benefit plans” (TBPs) as a legal remedy to underfunding.
TBPs can be an attractive legal remedy to both members and employers. Members receive many of
the same benefits as if they had participated in a traditional DB plan, including pooling of
investment and longevity risk, but the employer no longer bears all of the funding risks associated
with DB benefits (this funding risk is seen as a key motivating force behind the decline in DB plans
in the private sector). The actuarial valuation of a TBP determines the ability to fund promised
benefits, with no concept of actuarial "deficit" or "surplus" as at the valuation date. In other words,
funding is fixed and benefits vary based on the trigger points identified in the benefit/funding policy
including:
1. Benefit/funding test conducted by actuaries on a regular cycle and incorporating a projection
valuation.
2. Sensitivity and/or stochastic testing conducted by actuaries to estimate the probability that the
plan benefits are sustainable.
3. A moderate approach when setting reserve levels, to minimize the probability of benefit cutbacks.
The ideal would be to achieve a wide range where the target benefit level would be maintained.
4. Benefit affordability testing must be highly sensitive to member equity. This would include past
versus future benefits, application of benefit reductions and improvements, and reserving levels that
strike the balance between being conservative without being unduly risk averse.

212

It is important to note that target benefit plans are not being proposed as a panacea to replace fully
funded single employer defined benefit pension plans already meeting sponsors’ and members’
retirement goals. However, TBPs do offer both funding and benefit certainty in the wake of
underfunded and/or underperforming DB pension promises.
A. The Failed Promise of the Classic Single Employer Defined Benefit Plan
Actuary Malcolm Hamilton of the C.D. Howe Institute argues that although legislation, regulation,
plan design and poor governance are often cited as important contributors to the decline of defined
benefit plans, they are not the root causes. He argues that as important as it is to improve in these
areas, no amount of improvement will return the DB plan to the position of prominence it once
enjoyed or cause the next generation of companies to establish new DB plans:

471

The goal was to deliver safe, adequate, affordable pensions—to insulate plan members from
risk in an uncertain world. This was to be accomplished by investing DB pension funds in
securities that while risky and volatile in the short term, were thought to generate high,
reliable returns in the long run. The argument for DB plans is similar to the case for
investing retirement savings in common stock, as articulated in Jeremy Siegel’s 1994 classic
book, Stocks for the Long Run. Over long periods of time (25 years or longer), equities will
usually outperform safe investments such as bonds, treasury bills and GICs. Those with long
investment horizons can turn this to their advantage by investing heavily in equities and
patiently waiting for the superior returns to materialize. However, as individual retirement
savers grow old and retire, their investment horizons contract and their ability to bear risk
diminishes. Thus, while it makes sense for young investors to emphasize equities in their
retirement portfolios, they are well advised to de-risk as they age.
The DB experiment failed because the economic foundation on which it was built proved
faulty. The concept, while plausible, did not work as advertised. It did not work because
equities can, in unusual circumstances, underperform safe investments for decades. It did
not work because, in the private sector, neither pension plans nor their sponsors can be
relied on to continue perpetually as going concerns. It did not work because shareholders,
aided by investment analysts and accountants, came to realize that the pension risks they
471
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were bearing without compensation were real, large and expensive. Most importantly, it did
not work because DB plans, even plans that continue perpetually as going concerns, are not
forever young. They, and the organizations that sponsor them, do not grow old in the same
manner as people do, but they age nonetheless. The symptoms of pension plan aging are
well known to those who have experienced them. The pension fund grows large relative to
payrolls and corporate profits. The ratio of retired to active members increases, first to 0.5,
then, for some plans, to more than 1.0. The proportion of the pension fund held for those
who are at or near retirement moves well past 50%. The operating cash flow (the excess of
contributions over benefit payments) becomes decidedly negative (i.e., the pension plan
pays $2 or $3 in benefits for each $1 of regular contribution). The process is gradual but
irreversible and, as it proceeds, DB plans become less able to tolerate and bear investment
risk.
Hamilton’s point on the symptoms of aging is illustrated in the Ontario Teacher’s Plan (OTP), the
largest DB plan in Ontario with $140 billion in assets. A 1970s actuarial report predicted that
OTP’s members would live an average of 20 years after retirement. However, OTP retirees are now
living an average of 32 years post- retirement, resulting in their numbers (129,000) rapidly catching
up to the number of active members (182,000). 472

B. What Exactly Are Target Benefit Plans?
Barry Gros of Aon Hewitt 473 notes that target benefit (TB) plans are not simply the “flavour of the
day.” Rather, they are one viable alternative for mitigating pension plan risk—and mitigating risk is
crucial to providing sustainable retirement income. Further, he states that the TB concept follows
the same principles as those required to effectively manage any pension arrangement on a
sustainable basis. In other word, a sustainable pension plan is one that can consistently deliver, both
in favourable and adverse circumstances, an appropriate range of benefits within an acceptable
472

Alan Freeman,The Coming War Over Retirement, Sage Magazine, 2015. Online: <
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Aon unites to empower results for clients in over 120 countries via innovative and effective risk and people
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www.aon.com/human-capital-consulting >.)
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range of costs over the long term. The whole point of sustainability is to avoid severe corrections to
contributions and benefits. Gros discusses the advantages of TB plans over traditional DB plans: 474
The TB approach involves fixed contributions, or a fixed range of contributions, similar to a
DC plan, which are not expected to vary over time. Benefits are then based on what the plan
is projected to be able to afford. In this way, contributions and benefits are directly linked in
a way that doesn’t currently exist in traditional DB and DC plans. Furthermore, TB plans
never have a deficit per se as the plan liabilities can never exceed the plan assets. Any
identifiable surpluses not used to improve benefits are treated as reserves, providing a buffer
against future adverse experience. No excess assets would ever revert back to the plan
sponsors as their commitment to the plan is the fixed funding rate; once contributions have
been made, the sponsors no longer have any direct interest in the plan fund. Key elements of
a TB plan include:
1. Fixed employer and/or member contributions. These fixed contributions can also exist
within an acceptable, narrow predefined range.
2. Target DB plan formula, but without the same degree of risk. This means less emphasis
on (1) options where members can select against the plan, as with traditional subsidized
early retirement or spousal benefits and (2) benefits that are both hard to cost and have
greater volatility, such as indexing. The promise can also be constructed as a minimum
guaranteed benefit and a target benefit that will be delivered if the plan can afford it.
3. Margins built into the costing of the benefit options used in setting and testing the
sustainability of benefit levels.
4. Benefit variability based on affordability with pre-set reserve levels and a predetermined
order of benefit adjustments (both improvements and cutbacks).
5. Full integration of benefit, funding and investment policies.
In short, target benefit (TB) pension plans are a type of hybrid plan containing both DB and DC
characteristics. However, traditional hybrid plans in Canada consist of two separate DB and DC
plans, whereas the target benefit approach leverages the best aspects of DB and DC plans. TB plans
have fixed contributions, a targeted defined benefit level, and a benefits/funding policy that
prescribes the methods for varying benefits based on affordability, with pre-set reserve levels and a
474
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pre-determined order of benefit adjustments. A key principle of target-benefit plans is a greater
ability to share risks through rebalancing the benefit/funding equation depending on economic
conditions. This is one of the few ways that intergenerational equity can be managed. 475 Actuary
Malcolm Hamilton discusses target benefit plans:

The current DB plan tells members that they will get a specific benefit and that the sponsor
will guarantee it. But the guarantee is just not sustainable…. Target benefit plans remove
that guarantee and instead have a specific benefit goal for each member that the plan
sponsor tries to deliver. If the pension fund performs as expected, members get the target
benefit. If the experience is better or worse than expected, benefits are adjusted up or down
in a gradual and reasonable way. The message is quite straightforward….The plan will try to
deliver the target benefit but reserves the right to pay more or less depending on the
circumstances. I think employees can live with that, and it makes pension plans much more
resilient.476
However, Hugh Wright of McInnis Cooper notes that the implementation of target benefit plans
gives rise to important questions such as:477

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

How will active members, retirees and unions be involved in plan governance?
What level of transparency for members and retirees should be required?
Is intergenerational equity a concern? If so, how is it to be achieved and at what cost?
What benefit design features may support the success of a target benefit plan?
What is the required funding level to support the targeted benefit?
Under what circumstances may benefits be reduced, a key provision of such plans?
Should the rules be prescriptive, as in New Brunswick, or will the parties be able to take into
account their particular circumstances?
8. On conversion of a defined benefit plan, what is the treatment of existing benefits and any
employer covenant related to those benefits?
475

In order to measure the risk of intergenerational inequity, current contributions can be split into the portion
to fund the normal actuarial cost and the portion to fund any deficits (or reductions to take advantage of any
surplus). The greater the amount by which current contributions differ from the normal actuarial cost, the
greater is the wealth transfer among past generations, current generations, and future generations. In
addition, it would be of value to stakeholders to understand the potential for changes in this relationship due
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As mentioned above, most Canadian jurisdictions do not currently permit single employer target
benefit plans.478 In each of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario, target benefit
provisions have been introduced into the legislation. However, only in Alberta has the legislation
been brought into force with accompanying regulations. Pension lawyer Jana Steele discusses the
current legal landscape of target benefit pension plans in Canada: 479

In Canada, TBPs are not new in the multi-employer environment. However, pension
standards legislation has not traditionally permitted single-employer plans to provide target
benefits. Alberta, B.C., Nova Scotia, Ontario and P.E.I. have introduced legislation
recognizing TBPs…. Quebec introduced a “member-funded” TBP in 2007 with fixed
employer contributions for workplaces with collective agreements or employee associations.
The legislation in Ontario, P.E.I. and Nova Scotia sets an employer’s contribution obligation
to a fixed amount as indicated in a collective agreement— therefore restricting TBPs to
unionized workplaces. Alberta480 and B.C. legislation does not include this limitation.
New Brunswick introduced a model known as a shared risk plan (SRP) in 2012. 481This
design contains elements of the target benefit design, such as a DB-type formula, fixed
contributions (subject to adjustments in accordance with the funding policy) and the
478

Outside of New Brunswick, Alberta and B.C. appear to be the most progressive on this front and are seen
as the mostly likely to be first to enact the needed legislation. Ontario is on a similar track but has been in a
holding pattern for the past year. Meanwhile, Quebec has seen the implementation of target-benefit plans
but these have been limited to the pulp and paper sector. Curiously, Ontario’s prospective pensionlegislation reform would restrict target-benefit plans to unionized workplaces. (Dan Ovsey, Will Legislators
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Alberta moved forward with sweeping pension reforms in the new Employment Pension Plans Act (EPPA)
and regulations, which came into effect on Sept. 1, 2014. Alberta’s new approach of providing
comprehensive and specific rules for various types of pension plan designs is a welcome change from the
one-size-fits-all model employed in many other Canadian jurisdictions.
481
The legislation implementing the model forms a second part to the existing New Brunswick Pension
Benefits Act and was proclaimed in force as of July 1, 2012. The new legislation was enabling legislation and
detailed regulations were filed in August, which were also deemed to have come into force on July 1, 2012.
The shared-risk model adopted in New Brunswick was, in part, developed based on the highly-regarded
Dutch pension regime. It is the first of its kind in Canada and the New Brunswick Nurses Union, the New
Brunswick Union, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 1252 and the New Brunswick Pipe
Trades have said that this new model will be adopted for specific plans. (Jana Steele, New Brunswick’s
Innovative Answer to Pension Reform, Benefits Canada, 2012. Online: <
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possibility of benefit adjustments. However, the province’s model also incorporates
sophisticated risk management requirements to help ensure that the targeted benefits will be
provided. Regulations require that SRPs have a primary risk management goal of ensuring
that there is at least a 97.5% probability that base benefits will not be reduced over a 20-year
period. There are also enhanced disclosure requirements for SRPs as well as strict
governance and funding requirements tailored to these plans.
Ari Kaplan, a pension lawyer representing New Brunswick retirees, is blunt about the impact of the
new TBP legislation on them:
It’s no different than the government passing legislation allowing it to remove money out of an
older person’s account. It expropriates their money. It’s money they earned. It was deferred wages.
It was part of their hourly wage…This is not a gratuitous gift from the employer.482
However, Keith Ambachtsheer, Director Emeritus of the Rotman International Centre for Pension
Management, counters that retirees are also at risk of losing money in defined benefit plans when
their employers declare insolvency, rendering them unable to guarantee full pension payments in
underfunded plans.483

In August, 2014 Alberta introduced sweeping pension reforms in its new Employment Pension
Plans Act (EPPA). Regulations came into force on Sept. 1, 2014. Among the many changes in the
new EPPA was the introduction of a comprehensive target benefit plan (TBP) regime. Alberta is the
second jurisdiction, after New Brunswick, to implement comprehensive TBP rules as a design
option for plans registered in the province. Under the EPPA, TBPs will not be limited to
collectively bargained workforces, as has been proposed in some other jurisdictions. Jana Steele
compares TBPs in Alberta to those in New Brunswick:484
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Unlike New Brunswick, the Alberta TBP rules do not, at this time, permit the conversion of
a traditional DB plan provision to a target benefit provision on a retroactive basis. However,
a traditional DB plan may convert to target benefit for future service and new hires. Bill 10,
the Employment Pension (Private Sector) Plans Amendment Act, 2014, which is currently
under review by the all-party Standing Committee on Alberta’s Economic Future, proposed
amendments that would permit such retroactive conversion of accrued DB benefits to a TBP
regime.
The new Alberta rules also contemplate temporary improvements in retiree pensions under
TBP provisions. Where the target benefit component of a plan has accessible going-concern
excess, the plan can be amended to provide for a temporary improvement in pension
payments, provided that it will continue to have accessible going-concern excess after
taking into account the costs of the temporary improvement.
Alberta has adopted an adverse deviation approach (PfAD) to risk management, as opposed
to the probabilistic approach adopted by the New Brunswick TBP legislation. The PfAD
under the Alberta rules is determined by two components: (i) a certain percentage based on
the percentage of the fund that is invested in equities and (ii) the amount, if any, by which
the assumed discount rate exceeds the benchmark discount rate. For example, if a plan’s
equity allocation is 20%, and the assumed discount rate exceeds the benchmark discount
rate by 0.01%, the PfAD would be 10.15%. Based on a table in the regulations, the equity
allocation of 20% requires that 10% be added to the PfAD. The second component is the
addition of 0.15% to the PfAD for every 0.01% that the assumed discount rate exceeds the
benchmark discount rate. The regulations also require that stress testing be performed in
respect of elements that the actuary believes may pose a material risk to the TBP’s ability to
meet funding requirements. Such testing must be done in a manner satisfactory to the
Alberta superintendent.
Under the new Alberta TBP rules the normal cost of the target benefits and PfAD are
required to be funded. Where there is an unfunded liability, either the actuarial valuation
must show that the expected contributions will be sufficient or a plan text amendment must
be filed concurrently to reduce or eliminate benefits or increase contributions, such that the
funding requirements can be satisfied. Although not required to fund on a solvency basis,
Alberta’s target benefits are required in actuarial valuations either to include a statement that
the target benefit component does not have a solvency deficiency or disclose the total
amount of the target benefit component’s solvency deficiency.
The new legislation requires all types of pension plans to have a written governance policy
that meets the prescribed rules. In addition, for plans that contain a benefit formula
provision (i.e., a target benefit provision or traditional DB provision), a funding policy that
complies with prescribed requirements is required. Although such policies need not be filed
with the regulator, Alberta registered plans must have them in place by Aug. 31, 2015.
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Steele notes that the Alberta Employment Pension Plans Act (New Act) and its associated
regulation also states that the administrator of a plan, other than a TBP, that contains a benefit
formula (i.e. defined benefit plans) may set up a solvency reserve account within the pension fund.
A solvency reserve account is an account to which are deposited payments made in respect of a
solvency deficiency. Despite the wording of the plan text, the prescribed portion of the actuarial
excess or surplus in the solvency reserve account may be withdrawn, subject to the
Superintendent’s consent. Effectively, this amendment mitigates the risk of “trapped surplus” if a
plan’s solvency ratio improves considerably in between valuations. The cost certificate must
account separately for the solvency reserve account, and the actuarial excess in relation to a
solvency reserve account is to be calculated on a plan termination basis. This should go a long way
in addressing the issue of asymmetry, wherein employers are currently reluctant to fund DB plans
above minimum levels because of their limited access to surplus (as per the application of trust
principles in Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada). 485 In other words, there should be less pressure
on actuaries to project higher investment returns in order to reduce employer funding requirements.

On September 30, 2015 British Columbia introduced sweeping changes to its Pension Benefits
Standards Act, many of which mirror Alberta’s amended Employment Pension Plans Act and
regulations. The amendments are part of an effort by British Columbia and Alberta to harmonize
their respective pension laws, including the introduction of target benefit regimes. However, a
distinguishing feature of British Columbia’s amendments is the ability to convert accrued DB
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benefits to target benefits (In Alberta, a proposed amendment which would have permitted the
conversion of accrued benefits was defeated).486

In 2014 the federal government launched consultations regarding a potential framework for target
benefit plans. TBPs are being proposed as a voluntary, sustainable and flexible pension option
available to federally regulated private sector employers and Crown Corporations under the Pension
Benefits Standards Act (PBSA).487

Steele continues that potential tax issues associated with single employer TBPs will need to be
addressed, noting that federal tax legislation is designed to accommodate only DB and DC plans in
the single employer environment. Also, she reveals that DB tax rules are generally designed for a
plan in which an employer assumes all funding risk, meaning that pension adjustments (PAs)—
which must be calculated each year by the employer (and which reduce members’ RRSP room)—
do not consider the difference in value between different types of DB plans, such as plans that
provide final average benefits as compared to those providing career-average benefits.
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The Canada Revenue Agency would likely regard a TBP as a DB plan for PA reporting purposes.
Tax regulations also generally limit employee contributions to 50% of the pension cost in a plan
that provides DB-type benefits. This may restrict plan design options, because if benefits under a
TBP are reduced, an employee may effectively have contributed more than half where contributions
are shared. New Brunswick has worked to address this issue by requiring that the employee
contribution share not exceed 50% of the total amount of contributions. 488
Steele concludes that jurisdictions across Canada should move quickly to permit single employers
to implement TBPs, noting that a TBP model with robust governance and risk management
processes—as seen in New Brunswick’s model—may be an important step to increasing pension
benefit security for pension plan members and plan sustainability for employers. 489
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There are currently no proposals for amending the Income Tax Act (ITA) to specifically provide for target
benefit pension plans. There are target benefit plans operating under the current environment; however, to
be most supportive of target benefit pension arrangements, the following questions should be clarified: What
Pension Adjustment (PA) rules apply to target benefits? We suggest that the most appropriate approach
would be for the PA to equal the annual contributions made to the plan on behalf of the member, as for a
defined contribution plan. This avoids the need to determine retroactive PA adjustments (PSPAs and PARs)
when benefits are altered.




There is currently a provision in the ITA that specifies pension benefits cannot be variable. This
provision could be problematic for target benefit plans that wish make retroactive benefit reductions.
How would "excess surplus" be defined?
Would a funding Provision for Adverse Deviations (PfAD or margin) be recognized as a plan liability
and be included as an "eligible contribution"?

We understand that Finance is reviewing several of these questions. We also note that Specified MultiEmployer Pension Plans (SMEPPs) have different treatment which addresses most of the above questions
and allows them to operate as true target benefit pension plans. (Aon Hewitt, Legislation and Standards,
Target Benefit Plans, 2013. Online: < www.aon.com/canada/products-services/.../legislation_print.html >.)
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Target Benefit Design Options

Aon Hewitt notes that private sector single employer DB plans seem particularly ripe for
conversion to the TB model, considering only 18% were fully funded as of March 30, 2015,
compared to 36% a year earlier.490

Under traditional DB plans, benefit and funding policies are often separate documents, and
often one or the other, or both, might not even exist. In developing a TB plan, it is critical to
outline a policy for the relationship between benefits and funding. In a TB plan, the
contribution rate is fixed and the target benefit, while a desired outcome, is ultimately a
variable commodity. This means that under a TB plan the two policies covering benefits and
funding are inseparable and must be dealt with together. Furthermore, the risk sharing
arrangement between the sponsor(s) and members must be properly documented and fully
and openly communicated.491
The ideal private sector situation for a DB plan is one where a single employer is suffering from a
poorly funded plan, hasn't been able to invest its way out of its pension deficit, is contemplating
getting out of DB, and has strong unions and/or a culture that limits the viability of a move to DC.
Aon Hewitt presents a TB funding policy in Appendix 7 on page 304.492
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C. Governance and Risk Alignment 493
In a target benefit plan, members clearly have the greatest exposure to financial risk (i.e. the risk of
not receiving the benefits at the targeted level). However, Aon Hewitt points out that employers
involved with setting up a target benefit plan also bear risk- reputational and talent risk. (From both
a human resources perspective and a financial perspective, the employer will not want the plan to
appear to have failed and will therefore also have a large stake in its success).
Governance and risk alignment presents several considerations impacting the governance of a target
benefit plan. For example, whether or not the arrangement is collectively bargained will clearly
impact the governance structure. The need to align governance with the unique risk sharing
arrangement inherent in the target benefit plan design suggests that a substantial measure of
governance control be transferred from the employer. One possible answer lies in New Brunswick’s
new target benefit legislation which requires an independent plan administrator. The choice of
administrator would be influenced by a plan’s stakeholders’ views on balancing security,
transparency, and control. Aon Hewitt discusses three possible choices for administrator:
1. Commercial Trustee
The Commercial Trustee model involves contracting the work to a trust company, an option
which could be expected to provide a high degree of security.
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2. Pension Committee
The Pension Committee option contemplates a committee with member representation that is
assigned the powers of administrator, as already provided for in Manitoba and Quebec pension
legislation. A well-functioning Board of Trustees or Pension Committee, with member
representation, provides the most opportunity for transparency to members. One of the most
vital aspects of the target benefit concept is that members understand the true nature and extent
of the plan’s promises.

3. Employer Management Team
An employer management team would give the employer the most control. Some might be
concerned about the concept of the employer as administrator. While there are certainly reasons
an employer might not want the role of administrator, there are reasons supporting the idea:
A. There are no such concerns in respect of the typical DC pension plan, where the employer is
often the administrator, even though employees bear more risk than with a target benefit plan.
B. By setting up a target benefit plan, the employer takes on the role of helping individual
employees manage their pension risks. This is perhaps a paternalistic view, but it is also one of
the reasons for considering target benefit instead of DC.
Policymakers will likely want to protect members by implementing a fairly strict regulatory burden
regarding benefit/funding policies and ongoing sustainability testing, while allowing more
flexibility with governance. However, a key question which needs to be addressed is the extent to
which plan members would be bound by decisions made by pension committee members,
particularly in cases where no union (and no voting) exists. Pension standards legislation clarifying
this issue could strengthen the hands of non-union and retiree representatives.
The Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions Report suggested that the presence of plan member
appointees on the governance body is one of the strongest governance safeguards possible, noting
that the allocation of risk between employer(s), employees, and potentially retirees, makes member
involvement in the administrator’s function critical to the long-term success of target benefit plans.
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There is also a role for the administrator to play in providing professional assistance to members to
manage their risks. The governance of target benefit plans requires a distinction between the
administrator and the stakeholders, with clear responsibilities and powers for each. Barry Gros
notes that rigorous legislation of governance and risk management expectations should
considerably lessen concern about exactly who must be involved in the governance of such plans. 494
He discusses the governance of TB plans as follows:
In Canada, we have regulated the DB and DC design to death, but with little positive impact on
actually delivering sustainable retirement systems. While it is time for change, we don’t necessarily
need radical change. We actually have the tools in place – we just need to use them more effectively
and permit more flexibility in their application. The policy applies a moderate approach when
setting reserve levels, to minimize the probability of benefit cutbacks. The ideal would be to
achieve a wide range where the target benefit level would be maintained. Benefit affordability
testing must be highly sensitive to member equity. This would include past versus future benefits,
application of benefit reductions and improvements, and reserving levels that strike the balance
between being conservative without being unduly risk averse. 495

The Association of Canadian Pension Management outlines the funding requirements of target
benefit plans in Appendix 8 on page 306.
Conclusion

A debate currently underway within the pension industry concerns the relative merits of traditional
actuarial practices (which tend to obscure the economic value of defined benefit (DB) pension plans)
and the valuation principles of financial economics. Actuaries frequently stretch their professional
judgement (as agents of employers) in estimating higher equity returns than actual market returns,
thereby underestimating DB funding requirements.496 In other words, actuarial discretion has
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become an integral part of the funding policy of defined benefit pension plans, distorting true
market valuations.
TBPs can be an attractive legal remedy to both members and employers. Members receive many of
the same benefits as if they had participated in a traditional DB plan, including pooling of
investment and longevity risk, but the employer no longer bears all of the funding risks associated
with DB benefits (this funding risk is seen as a key motivating force behind the decline in DB plans
in the private sector). The actuarial valuation of a TBP determines the ability to fund promised
benefits, with no concept of actuarial "deficit" or "surplus" as at the valuation date. In other words,
funding is fixed and benefits vary based on the trigger points identified in the benefit/funding policy
including:
1. Benefit/funding test conducted by actuaries on a regular cycle and incorporating a projection
valuation.
2. Sensitivity and/or stochastic testing conducted by actuaries to estimate the probability that the
plan benefits are sustainable.
3. A moderate approach when setting reserve levels, to minimize the probability of benefit cutbacks.
The ideal would be to achieve a wide range where the target benefit level would be maintained.
4. Benefit affordability testing must be highly sensitive to member equity. This would include past
versus future benefits, application of benefit reductions and improvements, and reserving levels that
strike the balance between being conservative without being unduly risk averse.

It is important to note that target benefit plans are not a panacea to replace fully funded single
employer defined benefit pension plans already meeting sponsors’ and members’ retirement goals.
However, TBPs do offer both funding and benefit certainty in the wake of underfunded and/or
underperforming DB pension promises.
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CHAPTER 8-CONCLUSION

A. Current Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Canada

Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have consistently overestimated returns on private
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plan investments, lowering employer
contributions below the “fully funded” level required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets
must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and
insolvencies. In short, funding has become opaque.

Defined benefit (DB) plans (in which retirement benefits are guaranteed for a worker’s life based on
income and years of service) provide advantages to both employers and employees. Employees
receive security with respect to mortality and investment risk, while employers are better able to
recruit and retain high quality employees. In addition, DB plans offer employers funding flexibility
(through actuaries, who they hire, using their discretion to estimate lower than market contribution
levels). DB plans have recently faced serious funding challenges resulting from a perfect storm of
weak equity markets, low interest rates, and weak economic conditions. In 2000 asset values began
a downward trajectory while liabilities continued their steady rise, resulting from ever increasing
years of service, wages, and longevity, among other factors. Consequently, annual accrued assets
were often lower than annual accrued liabilities, resulting in asset-liability mismatching and
associated underfunding. As asset values began to fall below liability values, employers were
required to make additional contributions (special payments) to meet their plans’ annual liabilities
(i.e. assets must equal liabilities for full funding). Unfortunately many employers were unable to
afford these additional funding requirements. In response to funding deficits, companies moved a
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higher percentage of their asset allocations into riskier equity investments in an attempt to increase
returns. Actuarial projections of returns on these equities were often higher than actual market
returns, resulting in further underfunding and insolvencies. The Economist Magazine describes the
scenario stating:
False precision and reckless approximation have defined the actuarial profession’s role in the DB
funding crisis that has enveloped corporate pensions on both sides of the Atlantic. Although
actuaries have not been the only cause—companies, trustee boards, governments and accounting
rules have all played their part—they have been surprisingly hapless at their main task: forecasting
funds' future liabilities and assessing how many assets will be required to meet them. Their failure
has hastened the collapse of final-salary (defined-benefit) pension schemes, many of which have
ballooning financial deficits.497
Professor Divya Anantharaman of Reuters Business School concluded (from her survey of the
American actuarial profession) that economic bonding created by fee dependence does appear to
affect the chosen discount (interest) rate, a primary driver of the reported pension obligation and the
resulting funding status. Clients from whom actuarial practice offices derive a large fraction of their
revenues receive recommendations for obligation-reducing (higher) discount rates when the plan
sponsor has strong incentives to understate the pension obligation, and for obligation-increasing
(lower) discount rates when the plan sponsor has incentives to overstate the pension obligation.
Anantharaman’s study revealed that actuaries’ pension assumptions are a conduit for earnings
manipulation for many reasons. First, statutory accounting requirements for pensions and postretirement benefits are complex, and even sophisticated investors have trouble understanding them
fully (Brown 2004; Franzoni and Marin 2006; Picconi 2006). Second, actuarial assumptions involve
very long-term forecasts about the future. Disentangling deliberate manipulation of these forecasts
from honest errors is difficult (Brown 2004). The “take away” from Anantharanman’s study is that
497

The Economist, Actuaries and the Pension Crunch-When the Spinning Stops, 2006. Online: <
www.economist.com/node/5436947 >.
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the conflict of interest between the actuary and the employer (i.e. the actuary is paid by the
employer) tends to bias actuarial projections of investment returns toward the high side, resulting in
lower employer contributions and the underfunding of DB plans in these times of low investment
returns.498 Although no such study has been conducted in Canada, there is plenty of anecdotal
evidence suggesting that similar actuarial biases exist in the valuation of private sector single
employer DB pension plans (See Arthurs, Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, 2008).
Incidentally, actuarial biases also exist in public sector DB pension valuations. Actuary Malcolm
Hamilton of the C.D. Howe Institute discusses the federal Public Service Pension Plan (PSPP):
The payroll for members of the federal Public Service Pension Plan (the largest in Canada with
more than 300,000 active and 170,000 retired members) was about $20 billion in 2012, with
pension contributions totaling about $4 billion. At fair market value, pension contributions would
have been about $8 billion. As a consequence, the federal government underestimated the 2012
compensation of these members by $4 billion and reached a long list of erroneous conclusions
about the cost of its pension plans and the compensation of its employees.
Actuarial and accounting standards do not explicitly advocate or endorse the use of funding or
accounting numbers in compensation studies but the standards-setting bodies and the professionals
involved know, or ought to know, that numbers prepared for one purpose are being used for other
purposes to which they are ill-suited. In this sense, actuarial and accounting standards have become
the enablers of bad financial practice even though the standard-setting bodies do not advocate or
condone bad practice.499
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A survey of private sector sponsors of Canada’s 100 largest defined benefit pension plans, based on data
at the end of fiscal 2001, found that:
• for 31 sponsors, the fair market value of pension assets was at least 20% of the sponsor’s total corporate
assets,
• for several of the 31, the percentage was in the 30-50% range, and
• for two sponsors, the pension assets were essentially equal to the total corporate assets.
The survey found as well, that 58 of these 100 plans had an aggregate pension asset shortfall (off balance
sheet) of $11.2 billion at the end of fiscal 2001 and 27 of the 58 reported a pension-related asset on their
balance sheets of $2.8 billion. (Wiedman et al, "Whither the Pension Plan? Accounting rules mask increasing
debt," Research into pension sponsors disclosures, Ivey Business Journal, January/February 2003.)
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The legal issue emanating from systemic underfunding of private sector single employer defined
benefit pension plans in Canada is whether or not actuaries have been using their discretion in a
manner which is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the
legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. This thesis argued that the complex
and often times confusing regulatory regimes currently governing pension actuaries in Canada
affords them too much scope for discretion, contributing to DB plan underfunding, insolvency, and
retirement income losses in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

The federal PBSA and Ontario PBA both introduced numerous regulatory amendments in an
attempt to address DB plan underfunding. For example, they increased the time allowed to fund
accumulated deficits by 5-10 years, permitted annual deficits to be spread over a number of years
(smoothing), and required actuaries to provide sensitivity analyses of the impact of a range of
discount (interest) rates on funding requirements. The PBSA also implemented an extension of
smoothing techniques to apply to the calculation of solvency deficiencies (i.e. funding shortfalls),
allowing actuaries to average annual solvency deficiencies over the previous three years in
calculating minimum funding requirements. In other words, it permitted a reduction in the level of
payments required to extinguish an annual shortfall under the assumption that a pension deficit is
only an aberration or temporary departure from the normal value of a plan’s equity investments (i.e.
market forces will eventually increase investment returns, eliminating any deficits). However,
critics claim there is no empirical evidence to justify such an assumption (Bader and Gold, 2009).
The reality is that numerous regulatory amendments have only served to push funding problems
down the road, as investment returns have remained stubbornly low since 2000.
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Canadian pension accounting standards, including the ability to defer and amortize experience gains
and losses, the inclusion of expected additional returns from risky assets in the expected return on
assets (EROA) calculation, and the ability to use a smoothed value of assets to calculate the EROA
have also contributed to DB plan underfunding by permitting companies to under-report pension
liabilities on their balance sheets. In other words, until 2011 employers were pressuring actuaries to
use these accounting rules to underestimate their plans’ liabilities in order to improve their
companies’ reported profits. In 2011 the adoption of International Accounting Standards Section 19
(IAS 19) disallowed the use of these accounting standards to artificially inflate corporate
profitability through the underfunding of defined benefit pension plans.
Underestimating costs of changing demographics (i.e. operating on the assumption that plan
members will die sooner than they likely will) has also contributed to DB underfunding. Mark
Yamada, CEO of PUR investing (a firm specializing in DC plan investments) comments on this
underfunding phenomenon:
There’s no actuary who correctly anticipated the nature of the changing demographics. I’ve not seen
a single actuary take responsibility for this problem….As the car is careening down the road, the
actuary is yelling directions to the driver while staring out the back window (Benefits Canada,
2015).
In 2014 the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) issued the first-ever mortality tables based solely
on Canadian pensioner mortality (actuaries previously used United States-based pension mortality
tables to help them arrive at their assumptions). As a result, pensioners’ life expectancies will
typically increase by about 2 years, increasing DB plan liabilities by approximately 3% to 10%.500
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B. Governance of Funding Valuations
In the 1980s and 1990s Canadian regulators introduced minimum funding levels (i.e. solvency
valuations) required to pay a plan’s liabilities in the event a plan was discontinued (wound-up) for
any reason. Solvency valuations 501 estimate a plan’s asset and liability values using market rates,
whereas actuarial discretion is used to estimate asset and liability values in going concern
valuations. All single employer plans must be funded at the higher of the two valuations. In other
words, if the going concern funding level502 falls below the solvency funding level, the DB plan
must be funded at the higher solvency level.
Market discount rates have been in a downward trend for many years, whereas actuaries’ estimates
of discount rates have only dropped slightly, resulting in lower going concern funding requirements
than solvency valuation requirements (because the higher the interest (discount) rate, the lower the
level of current funding required to meet future pension obligations). Consequently, the higher
solvency valuations have become the driving force in the funding of DB plans. When solvency
funding rules were first designed in the 1980s, their primary objective was to protect plan members’
benefits in the event of plan termination. This benefit security was to be achieved by requiring
additional employer contributions to the plan (over a 5-year horizon) if a solvency test, required to
be conducted at each actuarial valuation, revealed a deficit. Unfortunately, the theory behind
solvency funding rules has not turned out as well in practice as was hoped. The unexpected high
incidence of insolvent organizations winding up their underfunded DB pension plans has subverted
this benefit security objective. It was probably never contemplated that solvency valuations could
501

Solvency valuations, introduced in the 1980s to establish a minimum funding level, are conducted by
comparing a DB fund’s assets with its liabilities based on market rates. They are done as if the plan is being
wound up on the date of the valuation. Any deficiency of assets below liabilities must be amortized over no
more than five years.
502
Going concern valuations assume the plan will continue indefinitely and are based on future economic
and demographic assumptions.
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result in a measurement of liabilities that far exceeded going concern liabilities, mandating
repayment in 5 years instead of 15. In 2013 50% of DB plans in Ontario (Canada’s largest pension
jurisdiction with 1.5 million private sector single employer DB member workers and retirees) were
less than fully funded on a going concern basis, compared to 91% on a solvency basis. 503 Similarly,
95% of DB plans in Canada were less than fully funded on a solvency basis in 2013.504
Corporate plan sponsors with otherwise healthy balance sheets have been put into difficult financial
situations because of the funding requirements and short funding periods required for solvency
deficits, resulting in repeated rounds of solvency relief granted by governments. In short, as DB
pension plans have matured in a low interest rate environment, “as and when needed” solvency
funding exemptions have become the norm. These underfunding issues are, to some extent, the
result of trying to support benefits that were implemented in an era when costs were substantially
lower than they are today, raising the question of whether the funding problems that DB pension
plans have encountered since 2000 are truly a funding requirement issue or in reality, a benefit issue.
Numerous regulatory amendments have not prevented plans from being insufficiently funded for
long periods of time, and they certainly have not prevented plans from terminating with deficits.
C. The Superintendent of Financial Services
The Superintendent of Financial Services is the actor with the most significant and numerous
responsibilities with respect to the regulation of defined benefit pension plans both federally under
the PBSA and in Ontario (Canada’s largest pension jurisdiction) under the PBA. For example, the
Superintendent may require the preparation of actuarial valuation reports on an annual rather than a
503

Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Overview and Selected Findings, 2013 Report on the Funding
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triennial basis if a plan’s solvency ratio (assets/liabilities) falls below a certain threshold. In 2013,
816 defined-benefit plans or 60% of all active Ontario plans with solvency concerns were required
to file annually rather than triennially. Federally regulated plans (which constitute 6% of all
regulated pension plans in Canada) are held to a higher standard than Ontario plans, being required
to file annually if their solvency ratio is below .120. OSFI estimates that approximately 61% of
federally regulated defined benefit plans were underfunded on a solvency basis at December 2013,
compared to an estimated 90% at December 2012. At December 2013, 7% of plans had an
estimated solvency ratio of less than 0.80, compared to 61% at December 2012. 505 Amazingly,
nearly all of Ontario’s active plans (except 33) would be required to file annual actuarial valuation
reports if the federal solvency threshold of .120 was applicable in Ontario. According to the Auditor
General the proportion of underfunded defined benefit pension plans in Ontario increased from
74% to 92% from 2005 to 2013, while the total funding shortfall increased from $22 billion to $75
billion over the same period.

In 2011 the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) carried out reviews of 30% of the
1700 actuarial reports it received, ensuring that actuaries’ data, methods and assumptions met its
standards. However, since 2011 FSCO has conducted detailed reviews of a much smaller number of
actuarial reports (on a sample basis), no longer formally tracking the number of reviews it performs
or reporting the results. In contrast, the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
(OSFI) conducts detailed actuarial valuation reviews on 30% of its DB plans annually, publicly
reporting its observations to help educate plan sponsors and actuaries on its standards. The Auditor

505

Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Info Pensions-Issue 11, 2014. Online: < www.osfibsif.gc.ca >.

235

General of Ontario’s 2013 Report expressed grave concerns about the Ontario Superintendent’s
regulatory standards:
FSCO’s Superintendent has limited powers under the Pension Benefits Act (Act) to deal
with administrators of severely underfunded plans, or those who do not administer plans in
compliance with the Act. FSCO’s federal counterpart, the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions, has the legal authority to terminate a plan, appoint a plan
administrator or act as an administrator even if the plan is not terminated, and to require
more frequent actuarial valuations of pension plans. FSCO can only prosecute an
administrator or must order a plan to terminate before it can then appoint or act as the
administrator. In addition, FSCO cannot impose fines on those who fail to file information
returns on time; we noted that FSCO took little or no action against late filers.
….FSCO should make better use of the powers it already has under the Act to monitor
pension plans, especially those that are underfunded. Over the last three fiscal years
(2010/11-2013/14), FSCO conducted on-site examinations of only 11% of underfunded
plans on its solvency watch list; at this rate, it would take about 14 years to examine them
all. As of September 2014, it was still in the process of finalizing its risk-based methodology
for selecting higher-risk plans to examine. The examinations FSCO did conduct did not
adequately cover significant areas, such as whether investments complied with federal
investment rules required for pension plans…. The information provided by plan
administrators and made public by FSCO is of little use to plan members for assessing and
comparing the performance and administration of their pension plans with other plans or
relevant benchmarks; nor would members find it of value in assessing whether FSCO had
adequately protected their interests.506

In 2008, FSCO was given the power to impose administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) in the
mortgage sector, resulting in a 95% compliance rate by mortgage brokers submitting statutory
filings in 2013/14. However, no such action has been taken in the pension sector. In 2014, 1,384
Ontario pension plan administrators had not submitted one or more statutory filings on their due
dates and were past due for over one year. FSCO followed up on only 13% of these cases (176
plans) by sending a letter requesting compliance with filing requirements. No action was taken on
the other 1,208 plans, including 127 with pension assets of more than $1 million. Furthermore,
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FSCO levies no penalties on administrators who file persistently late and has taken legal action
against plan administrators only twice who fell years behind in filings (the courts imposed fines in
these cases). In contrast, OSFI has a five-stage rating system to determine the level of intervention
required:
• Stage Zero: No significant problems. Ongoing monitoring of the plan continues.
• Stage One: Early warning. Deficiencies in the plan’s financial position are identified and it
could be placed on a watch list. OSFI increases monitoring of the plan and may require additional relevant filings.
• Stage Two: Risk to solvency. OSFI intensifies its supervisory interventions, requiring that
the administrator take actions such as submitting a revised or early actuarial report or holding
meetings with plan members.
• Stage Three: Future solvency in serious doubt. OSFI escalates its intervention because of
immediate threats to plan members’ benefits. OSFI can remove the plan administrator and
appoint a replacement; designate an actuary to prepare a report for funding purposes; bring
action against the administrator; or terminate the plan.
• Stage Four: Permanent insolvency. OSFI facilitates the wind-up of the plan.

In short, the Auditor General left no doubt that FSCO’s oversight of actuarial discretion has been
sub-standard.

D. Governance of Actuarial Discretion
As noted above, current pension funding policy in Canada permits actuaries to use their discretion
to estimate higher than market investment returns to reduce employers’ contributions, with the goal
of sustaining financially troubled DB plans. However, the fact that the number of workers enrolled
in private sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plans in Canada has declined by
500,000 (from 2 to 1.5 million) since 2000 is evidence that this policy is not working. The
economic impact of losing private single employer defined benefit pensions is significant,
considering they pay each retired member approximately ¾ of a million dollars more than defined
contribution plans (see CFIB study in Appendix 1-page 269). Greater transparency would flag
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many of these financially troubled plans before they become insolvent. Nicholas Le Pan, former
OSFI Superintendent of Financial Services discusses the issue of transparency:
The days of basing assumptions and valuation solely on “actuarial judgment” are just about over.
That doesn’t mean there isn’t room for judgment, but judgment needs to be adequately supported
and explained. Too many people still perceive a lot of this to be the “actuarial black box”. Most
users that I talk to still perceive it that way, and that’s partly their fault, but it’s partly actuaries fault
because communication requires both sides to be committed to try to better explain what they’re
doing.507
In short, the risk that is currently carried on defined benefit pension fund balance sheets in Canada
has not been clearly articulated, resulting in most plan members naively believing that the current
regulatory arrangements are designed to guarantee full funding under the current formula for
contribution rates. This belief is simply false.508
There is no doubt that Canada’s current DB pension funding policy is dated. It was implemented in
the early 2000s as a short term solution to a short term problem (i.e. low investment returns) which
has morphed into a chronic problem. In other words, the policy may have been successful if
investment returns remained low for only a short time period (i.e. 2 -3 years) and subsequently
returned to more normal (i.e. higher) levels, thereby eliminating actuarial deficits. However, the
reality is that actuaries’ estimates of investment returns have been consistently higher than actual
returns over the past 15 years, resulting in chronic underfunding and insolvencies. The actors
governing pension funding in Canada have clearly failed to address this reality.
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Although the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (a self-regulating, professional body) changed its
standards in 2011 to improve the transparency of actuarial valuations (by updating how actuaries
determine assumptions, apply actuarial methods and prepare their reports for all funding actuarial
valuations), it has been complicit in permitting actuaries to use wide discretion in estimating higher
than market discount rates in order to potentially reduce funding requirements. The exercise of an
actuary’s professional judgment and discretion is the first source of insolvency risk for defined
benefit pension plan members. Therefore, unless the actuary uses conservative assumptions, the
plan members face the risk that minute variations in actual experience (from actuaries’ estimates)
will require large unexpected contributions from the plan sponsor and either the plan sponsor will
not be able to make them due to its insolvent status, or the size of the payments will drive the plan
sponsor into insolvency proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s surplus policy over the past 20 years (from Schmidt in 1994 to
Manitoba Telecom in 2014) has restricted employers’ access to surplus, while making them wholly
responsible for deficits (i.e. asymmetry). Employers, fearing trapped surpluses, have responded by
pressuring actuaries (agents of employers) to use their overly broad discretion to project higher than
market estimates of investment returns to reduce plan contributions levels. In other words, the
Supreme Court of Canada’s surplus policy has (advertently or inadvertently) compromised the
ability of actuaries to make conservative funding estimates.
Numerous Ontario PBA and federal PBSA regulatory amendments (see Appendix 3-page 278) over
the past decade have not prevented plans from being insufficiently funded for long periods of time,
and certainly have not prevented plans from terminating with deficits. The reality is that legislators
have refused to adopt potentially more effective remedies to control actuaries’ discretion such as
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making actuaries fiduciaries, abolishing employer-actuary agency, increasing the Superintendent’s
oversight powers and mandating the use of lower discount rates.
E. Legal Remedies
1.Adopting Single-Employer Target Benefit Plans
Adopting target benefit plans as a legal remedy to actuarial underfunding would serve to eliminate
the impact of actuarial discretion on DB plan underfunding, considering that benefits are adjusted
up and down to match investment returns (i.e. continually adjusting the level of benefits based on
investment returns effectively eliminates actuarial surpluses and deficits), guaranteeing full funding.
Clare Pitcher of Benefits Canada sums up the benefits of target benefit plans: 509

Opening up access to private pension plans via the TBP for the remaining 60% of Canadian
workers will cost nothing to the government or taxpayers, as there is no Pension Benefits
Guarantee Fund safety net. In fact, the ultimate beneficiary —along with the newly covered
employees themselves—will be future taxpayers, as the potential need for government
social assistance down the road will be reduced significantly.
What’s needed now is to take this “new” plan design from the point of conception to the
actual birth of the new TBP for use in the single- as well as multi-employer environment—
and in the non-union as well as union environment—thereby increasing the pie and
broadening pension plan coverage across the province and the country.
However, Robert Drummond (Professor emeritus at York University) tempers Pitcher’s enthusiastic
portrayal of target benefit plans, noting that they are really only defined contribution plans in
disguise:
To say, ‘This is the target benefit, but if we don’t reach it, well, too bad’— then, in effect, you’re
saying it’s a DC plan.” While the targeting may give employees a sense they’ll achieve the income
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they’re aiming for, there’s no guarantee. And without the guarantee, you still put the risk on the
shoulders of the employee. 510
It is important to point out that target benefit pensions are not being proposed in this thesis as
replacements for the vast majority of private sector single employer defined benefit pensions which
provide their members with ¾ of a million dollars more in retirement income than DC plans (see
the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses’ 2013 study discussed on page 9 of Chapter 1).
However, they are certainly an attractive alternative to DB plans which are chronically underfunded
and in danger of insolvency. It is time for governments to adapt the multi- employer target benefit
model for use by employers in serious financial trouble in order to arrest the continuing decline of
private sector single employer defined benefit pensions in Canada.
2.Fixing Discount Rates
Public policy in Canada has made actuaries an important factor in the sustainability of DB plans by
permitting them to estimate higher than market discount rates (For example, a 2% increase in the
discount rate reduces an employer’s steady state pension contribution rate by a whopping 30-40%).
Unfortunately, this policy has resulted in excessive DB plan underfunding and insolvencies. While
mandating fixed rates (effectively eliminating actuaries’ discretion) would eliminate underfunding
resulting from actuaries estimating higher than market returns, it would also greatly increase the
cost of funding DB plans, making them unaffordable for many employers.
3.Eliminating Agency and Making Actuaries Fiduciaries
Actuaries are impacted by two major legal factors. Firstly, actuaries are agents of plan sponsors,
meaning that they are prone to being influenced by their employers’ wishes to make minimum
510
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contributions. Secondly, because actuaries are not fiduciaries, they are not liable for plan deficits.
These two factors have been instrumental in allowing employers to pressure actuaries into
estimating lower, more affordable contribution levels (by projecting higher investment returns on
pension assets than actual market rates). In short, actuarial discretion has (either advertently or
inadvertently) become an important factor in the funding policies of both the Ontario PBA and the
federal PBSA, allowing financially challenged plans to remain solvent through unrealistically low
employer funding.511 The problem with this type of funding policy is that chronically low returns
have resulted in large deficits. Many DB sponsors have responded by switching to defined
contribution (DC) plans, freezing their DB plans (i.e. not allowing new employees to join), or
declaring bankruptcy (note that pensioners are unsecured creditors). Two potential legal remedies
to this underfunding problem include eliminating employer-actuary agency by mandating that
regulators hire pension actuaries and also making actuaries fiduciaries (thereby making them legally
liable for any funding deficits). However, to date legislators have been more fixed on permitting
actuaries to use their wide discretionary scope to underfund DB plans in an attempt to sustain them,
rather than curbing their discretion.
4.Increasing Superintendent’s Regulatory Oversight
The Ontario Superintendent of Financial Institutions should be given more effective oversight
powers to more quickly identify those plans with serious underfunding problems.
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Because actuaries are self-regulating, they make many of the rules that govern their own profession. This
is a recipe for conflict; actuaries competing for lucrative HR consulting work may not have the guts to deliver
hard news to the same employer who is also administering a pension plan. Nothing could be more
dangerous to the industry than this cozy relationship. (Murray Gold, The Law-A World of Concerns, Benefits
Canada, 2005).
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5.Restricting the Use of Smoothing to Push Funding Problems Down the Road
A technique called smoothing has been incorporated into actuarial practice in Canada to insulate
employers from sharp fluctuations in the values of DB pension assets and liabilities, and the
resulting plan contributions required to meet funding obligations. However, smoothing
methodologies for going concern valuations are not carefully defined by actuarial practice.
Consequently, the potential exists for smoothing to be used to opportunistically hide funding
problems. More importantly, smoothing can detract from a clear understanding of a plan’s funded
position if it is not fully explained in a valuation report so pension members are capable of
understanding the true risk inherent in their pension contract. Stricter regulation of smoothing
would make DB funding problems more transparent to regulators.
6.Establish An Actuarial Oversight Board
Since the 2000 bear market in Canada, actuaries have consistently overestimated returns on private
sector single employer defined benefit (DB) pension plan investments, lowering employer
contributions below the “fully funded” level required by legislation (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets
must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), to the point of causing chronic underfunding and
insolvencies. In short, funding has become opaque. I argue that the best remedy to this systemic
underfunding is the establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board comparable
to the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) established in 2003 to regulate auditors.

The issues surrounding the professional independence of actuaries are not, in principle, unlike those
that faced the auditing profession before regulatory changes were legislated in the early 2000s
(Gunz, McCutcheon and Reynolds 2009). Actuaries render a professional opinion for a fee, leaving
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them susceptible to the conflict between providing advice based on objective analysis on the one
hand, and serving the needs of their plan sponsor clients on the other hand, whose objective may be
to justify ways of spending as little as possible on the plan (Financial Times 2004). A recent review
of the U.S. actuarial profession stated “as long as a client can threaten to find another actuary to
provide actuarial services, the implied leverage might well have an effect on the actuary’s work
product” (CRUSAP Task Force 2006).

The Canadian Board’s mandate would be similar to the U.K. Actuarial Public Oversight Board
(POB) established in 2005 “to promote more effective scrutiny and monitoring, to ensure that
actuarial information is produced in accordance with the relevant technical and ethical standards,
and to examine the current framework of self-regulation by the actuarial profession with respect to
potential issues such as professional standards that have been weak, an absence of proactive
monitoring of compliance and professional standards, and a profession that has been too
introspective, not forward-looking enough.512
Similar to the U.K., Canada’s Oversight Board would be responsible for providing more effective
scrutiny of actuarial discretion, as well as establishing clearer lines of accountability of actuaries to
regulators, to the profession and to clients and employers. It could conduct detailed studies on how
to best to govern actuaries’ discretion, addressing issues such as the conflict of interest that
surrounds actuaries as agents of employers. The U.K. model (discussed below) could be adapted to
Canada:
While the U.K. Actuarial Profession is still responsible for setting and operating its own regulatory
arrangements, these are subject to review and scrutiny by the POB. If it has any concerns–in the
512

Society of Actuaries, The Morris Review of the UK Actuarial Profession, 2009. Online: <
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public interest–about the efficacy of the arrangements, it may make recommendations to the
Profession. The Profession will then comply with the recommendations within a reasonable period,
or explain in writing why it is not doing so, on the basis that its reasons will be published and be
subject to public scrutiny and media comment. The Profession will naturally think very carefully
before it decides not to follow a POB recommendation.
The Profession's staff supplies the POB with explanations and statistics about its regulatory
operations and have regular meetings. This activity has added to operating costs, but can be a useful
discipline as it provides an external challenge to our work which might otherwise be lacking in a
member-led organisation. For example, two recent FRC/POB consultations–on promoting actuarial
quality, and the monitoring and scrutiny of actuarial work–have looked at how the Profession's
activities fit with the work of financial services and pensions regulators, and the responsibilities of
senior management and governing bodies, auditors and actuarial consulting firms. 513
More specifically, an independent external oversight board could mandate that all provincial
pension regulators implement a five-stage rating system (similar to that of Canada’s federal pension plan
regulator (OSFI)) in order to standardize intervention into underfunded DB plans (before potential
insolvency results in secured creditors claiming all of a company’s assets):514

• Stage Zero: No significant problems. Ongoing monitoring of the plan continues.
• Stage One: Early warning. Deficiencies in the plan’s financial position are identified and it
could be placed on a watch list. Provincial regulator increases monitoring of the plan and may
require additional relevant filings.
• Stage Two: Risk to solvency. Provincial Regulator intensifies its supervisory interventions,
requiring that the administrator take actions such as submitting a revised or early actuarial
report or holding meetings with plan members.
• Stage Three: Future solvency in serious doubt. Provincial Regulator escalates its intervention
because of immediate threats to plan members’ benefits. Regulator can remove the plan
administrator and appoint a replacement; designate an actuary to prepare a report for funding
purposes; bring action against the administrator; or terminate the plan.
• Stage Four: Permanent insolvency. Regulator facilitates the wind-up of the plan.

Similar to the U.K., a Canadian actuarial oversight board could be combined with the Canadian
Public Accountability Board (CPAB) for efficiency reasons.
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Caroline Instance, Regulatory Environment of the U.K. Actuarial Profession: Background, 2007. Online: <
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Supra, See note 506.
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E. Conclusion
One can only wonder how many post United Steel pension funding fiascos are currently brewing in
Canada. Considering that private sector single employer defined benefit pension plans must be fully
funded by law (i.e. the value of a plan’s assets must be sufficient to meet its liabilities), the legal
issue emanating from their systemic underfunding is whether or not actuaries have been using their
discretion in a manner which is within a reasonable interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre
contemplated by the legislature, in accordance with the principles of the rule of law.
This thesis argued that the complex and often times confusing regulatory regimes governing
pension actuaries affords them too much scope for discretion, contributing to DB plan underfunding,
insolvencies, and retirement income losses in the hundreds of billions of dollars. It concluded that
the best legal remedy to arrest the underfunding and decline in the number of private sector single
employer defined benefit pensions in Canada (by half a million since 2000) would be the
establishment of an independent external actuarial oversight board.
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APPENDIX 2
ACTUARIAL COST METHODS USED IN FUNDING DEFINED BENEFIT
PENSION PLANS

Overview
One of the main reasons sponsors have abandoned (or frozen) DB plans in favor of DC plans is the
volatile impact of DB plans’ uncertain costs and funding contributions on their financial statements
(especially since the mandatory adoption of “marked to market” accounting principles by public
companies in 2011). DC plans do not necessarily have lower costs than DB plans, but they do have
more predictable contribution levels. As discussed in previous chapters, DB contributions, which
are directly linked to the funded status of DB plans, are notoriously difficult to predict.
Actuarial cost methods are used to smooth DB contributions and to dampen their volatility. These
methods vary in their degree of transparency and on their impact on the schedule and volatility of
contribution levels. It is important to note, however, that the ultimate cost of a pension plan is
dependent on the level of benefits promised. In other words, the ultimate cost of a DB plan is not
affected by the actuarial cost method. Actuarial cost methods simply allocate different portions of
the total cost of a pension scheme to different fiscal years throughout the life of the scheme. 515 Juan
Yermo comments on actuarial cost (funding) methods:
Actuarial funding methods should foremost be transparent. Actuarial funding methods that
lead to sensible and smooth contribution patterns could be encouraged by regulators,
although the specifics of a country’s pension system must be taken into account. For
515

Juan Yermo and Clare Severenson, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Defined Benefit Plans and the
Need for Counter-Cyclical Funding Regulations, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private
Pensions, No. 3, OECD Publishing. Online: < www.dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km91p3jszxw-en >.
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example, in Sweden pension costs in the main collectively bargained DB plan that covers
700,000 white-collar workers are required to be made using an actuarial cost method that
spreads the cost of salary increases over employees’ remaining years until retirement. This
means that young people have very low pension costs whereas old people are significantly
more expensive, especially should they receive a large pay increase. As Swedish DB
accruals are directly linked to pension costs, this actuarial cost method is required in the
collective agreement and would be difficult to change without restructuring the pension
system.
In jurisdictions such as Canada, where a range of actuarial funding methods are available,
plan sponsors most often use the straight-forward, yet somewhat volatile projected unit cost
(PUC) method for funding purposes, since that method is typically required for accounting
valuations. The PUC definition of accrued liabilities is clear and readily comparable with
the accumulating fund assets, making favourable and unfavourable experiences easy to
identify and understand. Finally, the PUC is the method selected by the major accounting
bodies for the international pension expensing requirements 516 that were recently imposed
on plan sponsors.517

A numerical example may help clarify a key practical difference between the Projected Unit Cost
method and another actuarial method called the Entry Age Method. Suppose a plan sponsor needs
to contribute $15,000 for a particular employee who will retire in five years, and that the sponsor
fully funds the cost specified by either method. Under the Projected Unit method, the sponsor
recognizes and funds, say, $1,000 in the first year, $2,000 in the second year, $3,000 in the third
year, $4,000 in the fourth year, and $5,000 in the fifth year. Under Entry Age Normal, the sponsor
would pay a level amount of contributions over the five year period at a rate of $3,000 per year. In
other words, the sponsor using the Entry Age Normal method would have an actuarial accumulated
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liability of $9,000 and accumulated assets of $9,000 after 3 years. Using the projected unit credit
method, the plan would have a cumulative liability of $6,000 and assets of $6,000 after 3 years.
It is clear that the two approaches have different patterns of asset accumulation and liability
recognition over time. Assuming the same funding ratios, the Entry Age Method attempts to create
level contributions each year. In contrast, the Projected Unit Method is back- loaded (i.e. costs are
lower early in an employee’s career and increase dramatically as retirement nears.) 518 This method
is obviously detrimental to employee’s ability to receive their accrued pensions if a plan becomes
insolvent in their early years of service.

In summary, an actuarial cost method is analogous to a mortgage on a house. A mortgage is simply
a way of assigning the cost of the house to different years so that it is paid off over a certain period
of time. In the case of a DB funding method, a methodology is used to assign the cost of a
member’s benefits to different years. The Projected Unit Cost Method is the most popular method
used in DB plans in Canada for the following reasons:519
1. It is more transparent than most other methods, and it produces a form of balance sheet that
most people can understand.
2. Its definition of accrued liabilities is clear and readily comparable with the accumulating
fund assets.
3. Favourable and unfavourable experience is easy to identify and understand.
4. It is the method selected by the major accounting bodies for the pension expensing
requirements that have been imposed on plan sponsors.
The major funding problem associated with the Projected Unit Cost Method is that it is backloaded, meaning that most of the costs of an employee’s pension are paid in his or her later years of
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service. In other words, in the event of insolvency an employee’s accrued years of service will not
generally be funded.
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APPENDIX 3
Federal PBSA, Income Tax Act and Ontario PBA Amendments Addressing Underfunding

A. Income Tax Act Amendments

1. Increase to the Pension Surplus Threshold

Policy-makers have always sought to limit pension contributions to the amounts necessary to
provide pension benefits because pension funds are sheltered from tax. In other words, they wanted
to prevent over contributions for the purpose of tax avoidance. This is a legitimate policy objective,
and it was the rationale for the original 10% surplus rule. However, the amended Income Tax Act
(ITA) increased the allowable surplus from 10% to 25% in 2010.520 James Pierlot of Benefits
Canada discusses the reasons for increasing the surplus limit:
A typical plan’s funded ratio can expect to change by more than 10% one year in three with routine
variations in investment return and bond yields….There is a 25% likelihood that a 10% actuarial
surplus in a plan valued on a going-concern basis and with assets smoothed will evaporate over any
three-year valuation cycle. If a plan’s assets are valued on a market basis, the likelihood is higher—
33%. It’s clear that whether a plan’s assets are valued on a smoothed or on a market basis, 10% is
not a sufficient margin to prevent a plan from going into deficit on a regular basis. A larger funding
buffer can make pension contributions more predictable by reducing the need to increase pension
contributions when there is an economic downturn or market correction—exactly when many
employers are looking to reduce costs.521
Unfortunately, the amended 25% surplus threshold did not mitigate employer’s limited access to
surplus.

520

However, employers are unlikely to build up surpluses in DB plans unless and until the issue of ownership
of, and access to, surplus is better clarified in legislation. So far, pension reforms have not addressed this
thorny issue. (Paul Litner, Seeing Change, Benefits Canada, 2010). Online: <
www.benefitscanada.com/pensions/...law/bill-c-9-seeing-change >.
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2.

Investment Rules

The amendments removed the quantitative limits in respect of resource and real property
investments, now limiting pension funds to investing a maximum of 10% of the market value
(rather than book value) of assets of the pension fund in any one entity. 522 The changes also
prohibited self-investing, meaning that an employer will no longer be permitted to invest any
amount of the pension fund in its own debt or shares. Previously such investments were permitted
provided the employer’s shares were sold on a designated stock exchange.

The federal government stated in its Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement that the reason for these
changes was that in a prudent person environment,523 the quantitative limits in respect of real estate
and resource properties are considered cumbersome and no longer required. However, the 30%
concentration limit on ownership of the securities of a single entity remains, also for “prudential
reasons.” Amanda Darrach of Benefits Canada commented on these new federal investment rules:
As the regulators have moved into this “prudence” environment, those responsible for
pension fund investment must pay attention to what, exactly, prudence is. The British court
in Cowan v. Scargill, in discussing in which types of investments a pension fund could
invest, required a trustee to “take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he
were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally
bound to provide….”
For the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA), prudence
contains the following elements, which plan administrators will recognize as elements of
fiduciary duties owed to plan members: “a duty to act prudently and with due diligence
when managing the pension fund and its assets, a duty of loyalty to the pension fund and its
members and a duty to be fair and even-handed when dealing with competing interests.”
522

Previously, a pension plan could hold no more than 5% of its portfolio in a single parcel of real estate or a
Canadian resource property, no more than 15% total in Canadian resource properties and no more than 25%
total in a combination of real estate and Canadian resource properties.
523
The November 2009 release of the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities’ (CAPSA)
consultation paper called The Prudence Standard and the Roles of the Plan Sponsor and Plan Administrator
in Pension Plan Funding and Investment (CAPSA Paper) was quickly followed by the federal government’s
announcement that the federal investment rules (FIR) would be amended to remove the quantitative limits on
real estate and resource income properties.
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There appears to be two aspects to prudence. One is the type of investments chosen by a
pension fund. The other is the process by which those investment decisions are made…..The
changes to the federal investment rules (FIR)…. may give plan administrators a little more
room to manoeuver when making investment decisions. However, these changes should also
remind administrators that each decision should be well considered, well documented and,
yes, prudent.524
The federal government’s emphasis on “prudential reasons” in this amendment appears to be
edging sponsors and their agents (i.e., actuaries), ever closer to having a fiduciary duty.
B. Federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA)525
1. Effective 2010 -Power to Replace Actuary

Bill C-9 amended the PBSA to give the Superintendent the authority to designate an actuary
to prepare an actuarial report or termination report in respect of a plan where the
Superintendent believes that this is in the best interests of plan beneficiaries. The
administrator is entitled to review a draft of the designated actuary’s report and may also
provide comments. Once finalized, the plan administrator will be required to fund the plan
in accordance with the designated actuary’s report.
Bill C-9 also provided that the administrator must pay the reasonable fees and expenses of
the designated actuary associated with preparation of the Superintendent-commissioned
actuarial report out of the pension fund, which may be intended to override plan or trust
language that would otherwise prohibit the payment of administrative expenses from a
pension fund.
This amendment imposed a safeguard against accepting actuarial funding estimates which, in the
opinion of the Superintendent, are not realistic based on current market conditions.

2. Effective 2010-New Solvency Funding Standard to Reduce Defined Benefit Funding
Volatility

One of the most significant changes to the PBSA funding rules was the introduction of a new

524
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standard for calculating solvency deficiencies. The purpose of the new standard was to reduce
funding volatility for sponsors of defined benefit pension plans. Solvency funding is now
determined based upon a three-year average of the funded ratios. Annual valuation reports are now
required to be filed regardless of the solvency ratio.526 Each valuation establishes a new payment
schedule of equal annual payments required to fund the plan based on the average solvency ratio,
with the deficit being consolidated annually. This change will likely increase plan administration
expenses, as prior to 2010 plan valuations could be prepared and filed once every three years if the
plan was well funded. This new methodology is intended to provide plans with some relief from
fluctuations in the markets and interest rates.

Although these relief measures are an attempt to relieve some of the pension funding burden faced
by plan administrators during difficult economic times, it should be noted that they also increase the
risk of plans terminating with funding deficiencies because contributions are deferred to future
years. Plan administrators (who bear fiduciary obligations to their members) should be aware that

526

Subsection 12(2) of the PBSA and Section 2 of the Directives of the Superintendent pursuant to the
PBSA (Directives) generally require that an actuarial report be prepared as of the effective date of the plan
and annually thereafter as at the plan year-end (except under certain circumstances, as described below).
A plan administrator will generally be permitted to file an actuarial report every three years if:
1. The solvency ratio disclosed in the most recent actuarial report filed with OSFI was 1.20 or greater.
2. The pension plan meets the definition of a designated pension plan (Designated Plan) under
Regulation 8515 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) (Designated plans are generally executive compensation
DB plans not maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, in which the total of the pension
credits of all specified individuals in the plan is more than 50% of the total of all pension credits of all
individuals the plan for the year.) (Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Pension Plans Glossary.
www.cra-arc.gc.ca.).
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as solvency deficits increase, administration decisions will come under increased scrutiny, making
them more susceptible to legal challenges. 527

3. Introduction of a Solvency Margin
A solvency margin concept has been introduced for federally regulated pension plans. The solvency
margin effectively restricts an employer’s ability to take a contribution holiday unless the plan is
105 percent or more funded on a solvency basis. While a 5% margin is no doubt a good idea, it
discourages employers from maintaining surpluses, exacerbating underfunding.

4. 2014-Proposed Amendments to the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA)
In response to the significant cost pressures put on plan sponsors to meet DB plan funding
requirements (caused by record low interest rates, volatile equity markets and increasing longevity)
the federal government released a potential framework for target benefit pension plans (“TBPs”) on
April 24, 2014. A TBP is a “middle ground” between defined benefit (“DB”) and defined
contribution (“DC”) plans. Benefits from TBPs are “targeted,” but not guaranteed (or “defined”)
and may be adjusted based on the financial status of the plan. Unlike DB plans under the current
legislation, accrued benefits can be reduced. Required contributions in TBPs are capped or fixed in
accordance with the terms of the plan.528

527
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C. 2010-Amendments to Ontario Regulated Plans Under the PBA529
1. New Rules for Payment of Surplus to an Employer
The provisions of the PBA have been changed to clarify the rules regarding the payment of surplus
to an employer in three circumstances: a continuing plan; a full plan wind up; and a partial wind up.
The new provisions enacted by Bill 120 changed many of the rules as amended by Bill 236. Under
the new surplus rules now in force, surplus can only be paid to the employer if one of the following
two conditions is satisfied:

(a) the employer demonstrates that it is entitled to the surplus under the terms of the pension plan
(which involves a review of all current and historical documents relating to the plan and the pension
fund), or
(b) a written agreement that allows surplus to be paid to the employer (which requires the
agreement of at least two-thirds of the plan members and an appropriate number of former members
and other persons entitled to payments under the plan).
Section 77.12 of the PBA also provides that if the allocation of surplus is not addressed within a set
period of time (to be determined by the regulations) following the partial or full wind up of a
pension plan, the Superintendent has the authority to determine whether an arbitrator ought to be
appointed to resolve the issue. FSCO has indicated that, until it issues a formal surplus refund
policy, the Superintendent considers the agreement of two-thirds of the total number of former
members and other persons entitled to payments under the plan to be “appropriate”. In other words,
employers’ access to surplus is severely restricted, promoting minimum funding.
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2. Immediate Vesting
Under the old PBA rules employees registered in a plan less than two years were entitled only to a
refund of their pension contributions plus interest. Bill 236 amendments provided immediate
vesting and locking in of benefits for both DB and DC plans. In other words, upon termination of
their membership, all members are entitled to the actuarial equivalent of their benefits (at a
specified retirement age) based on their number of years of service.
3. Grow-in Rights530

Grow-in benefits entitle certain employees, who are terminated before they meet the eligibility
requirements for enhanced benefits, to become entitled or in essence, to “grow into” the enhanced
pension benefits even though their employment is terminated before they meet the eligibility
requirements. Members of DB plans will qualify for grow-in early retirement benefits if their age
plus service equals 55 points at the time of termination of employment. This means that if the plan
provides enhanced benefits, such as unreduced early retirement to members who meet certain
conditions, members who are terminated before meeting those conditions, but whose age plus
service equals 55 points, can grow into and qualify for such enhanced pension benefits after their
employment is terminated. An example is presented below:

Assume a plan provides for unreduced pension if the employee completes 30 years of
credited service. If an employee is terminated before achieving 30 years of service, but has
530

Jason Hanson, Ontario Employment Terminations: Implications of New Pension “Grow-In” Rules, Osler,
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55 points, the employee “grows into” the unreduced pension based on the actual service
prior to termination. If the employee had 25 years of service at termination, then 5 years
after termination the employee may receive an unreduced pension based on 25 years of
service.
The old PBA rules provided grow-in benefits to members affected by full and partial wind-ups only
if they met certain criteria, whereas the new rules will provide grow-in rights to all members who
are involuntarily terminated in Ontario. Effective 2012, grow-in rights were provided to all
members who were terminated without cause and whose combined age and service totaled at least
55. These new rules expanded grow-in coverage. This amendment could significantly increase a
DB plan’s liabilities considering the thousands of lay-offs in Ontario’s manufacturing sector.

4. Special Orders

One such measure is granting the Superintendent the authority to issue special orders to file reports.
Specifically, new subsection 87(6) of the PBA now allows the Superintendent, in prescribed
circumstances, to order a plan administrator, employer or any other person to prepare and file a new
actuarial report or another prescribed type of report in respect of a pension plan if, in the opinion of
the Superintendent, there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe:

(i) there is a substantial risk to the security of benefits payable under the plan; or
(ii) there has been a significant change in the circumstances of the plan.

5. Actuarial Methods and Assumptions Used in Preparation of Reports
The Pension Reform Legislation amended subsection 87(4) of the PBA to permit the
Superintendent to make an order requiring an administrator to take action, where the
Superintendent is of the opinion that the assumptions or methods used in the preparation of a
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report are not consistent with accepted actuarial practice and to permit the Superintendent to make
an order requiring the administrator to take action where the Superintendent is of the opinion that
the assumptions or methods used in the preparation of a report are inappropriate in the
circumstances, regardless of the use of accepted actuarial practice.

6.

Permitted Use of Letters of Credit

The Pension Reform Legislation contains provisions that enable an employer to use one or more
letters of credit in lieu of cash contributions towards a solvency deficiency. The employer can use
letters of credit (meeting prescribed criteria) in order to cover up to 15% of solvency liabilities.
While most of the fees or expenses associated with obtaining or holding a letter of credit cannot be
paid from the pension fund, fees associated with their enforcement may be. Unfortunately form plan
members, letters of credit may be defaulted on in insolvency proceedings.
D. 2011 PBA Amendments531

1. Trigger for Annual Actuarial Valuations532
Effective December 31, 2012, the Ontario PBA Regulations were amended to specify that annual
actuarial valuations as of a date on or after December 31, 2012 for all pension plans (excluding
JSPPs and specified Ontario multi-employer pension plans) are required where the actuarial
valuation either excludes liabilities in respect of plant closure or permanent layoff benefits, or is
funded less than 85% on a solvency basis.
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2. Enhanced Disclosure Regarding Funding533
Effective January 1, 2012, the prescribed requirement for pension plan annual statements was
amended. Annual statements were required to include information regarding the transfer (solvency
asset/liability) ratio of the pension plan set out in the two most recent actuarial valuations, and an
explanation of the transfer ratio and how it relates to the level of funding of members’ benefits.

E. 2014 Proposed PBA Amendments
1. Target Benefit Pension Plans534
The Pension Benefits Act (Ontario) (PBA) currently permits multi-employer pension plans
established pursuant to a collective agreement or trust agreement to provide target benefits.
Amendments to the PBA in 2010 introduced new target benefit provisions, available only to plans
the contributions under which are collectively bargained, and subject to prescribed requirements.
However, as of May 1, 2014 those provisions had not been proclaimed in force, no enabling
regulations had been published and no framework had been developed for single employer TBPs. It
is still unclear if the government intends to eliminate the requirement under the 2010 amendments
that contributions to a TBP be collectively bargained, limiting their availability as a design solution
to unionized employees.

2. Defined Benefit Plans535
The 2014 Ontario Budget proposed the following amendments applicable to DB pension plans,
including:

533
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535
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1. New regulations defining the level at which a "contribution holiday" may be taken and its
duration. There is no indication as to what this threshold may be.
2. New regulations requiring accelerated funding of benefit improvements in underfunded
pension plans.
3. Additional rules to support the long-term sustainability of DB plans following stakeholder
consultations. It is unclear what these additional rules may be.
4. An extension (to December 31, 2017) of the temporary exemption on (i) multi-employer
plans; and (ii) jointly-sponsored pension plans (JSPPs), that are not subject to solvency
funding, from the requirement that plans with solvency ratios of less than 85 per cent file
valuations annually rather than triennially. The government will consult on permanent rules
for such plans.
5. Amendments to the PBA to permit the conversion of single-employer pension plans (SEPPs)
to JSPPs. Among other things, conversion would require: preserving beneficiaries’ accrued
benefit entitlements; providing advance notice to plan beneficiaries and trade unions; and
obtaining the consent of the Superintendent of Financial Services and a requisite number of
plan beneficiaries. New regulations would also permit employers to transfer SEPP liabilities
to an existing JSPP.
6. As discussed above, the PBA currently exempts certain named JSPPs from solvency funding
requirements. The 2014 Budget announced that the government may introduce broader
solvency funding exemptions for JSPPs. If so, this could be the primary reason for the
sponsor of a SEPP to consider converting to a JSPP.
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APPENDIX 4
Discount Rates in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States

1. Discount Rates in Great Britain
Dimitri Vittas of the World Bank notes that the United Kingdom has a long history of debating the
proper valuation of pension liabilities, which is difficult to summarize in a way that does justice to
the complexity and richness of the ongoing debate. The UK authorities imposed a Minimum
Funding Requirement (MFR) in the mid-1990s, but this was short lived because it was cast in rather
simplistic and inflexible terms that did not reflect changing market conditions. The MFR has been
replaced with a more flexible approach that places strong emphasis on the strength of the employer
covenant.536 Vittas discusses DB plans: 537
In occupational pensions, pension plan trustees are required to adopt prudent assumptions,
assisted with some guidance provided by the regulators. Trustees, in consultation with
sponsoring employers, are allowed to set technical provisions either on the basis of the
characteristics of the pension liabilities or on the assets backing the liabilities. 538 In general,
the discount rates should be below the expected long-term returns on plan assets to reflect
the various risks facing the pension plans and to meet the legal requirement for "prudence".
Although the margin for prudence is not defined, an equity premium of around 1.5 percent
over government bond rates is widely used for the liabilities of active members and a much
smaller minimal risk premium for the liabilities of retired members. However, great
emphasis is placed on the strength of the sponsor covenant. 539 This is another way of
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Dimitri Vittas, Discount Rates and the Valuation of Pension Liabilities, World Bank, 2010. Online: <
www.previdencia.gov.br/arquivos/office/4_101201-142645-419.pdf >.
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Technical provisions are the scheme-specific funding standard which pension schemes must target.
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For example, Towers Watson has developed sophisticated proprietary tools allowing it to integrate
covenant risk directly into Asset-Liability Management (ALM) analysis. It incorporates specific sponsor
financial strength and risk exposures, and projects forward the likely range of future financial states of the
sponsor. This is done in a way that is entirely consistent with the projected assets and liabilities of the
pension plan. It investigates those projected scenarios when the sponsor is expected to default and
assesses the likely reduction in benefits that members subsequently receive. This allows Towers Watson to
develop measures that are more tailored and informative for fiduciaries. Linking these with more traditional
upside ALM metrics such as expected return gives fiduciaries a next-generation risk/return tool that pushes

286

underscoring the exposure of pension plans to the solvency and integrity risks of the
sponsoring employers. Pension liabilities are allowed to be valued at discount rates that are
linked to the expected returns of pension plan assets, but the UK Pensions Regulator
requires financially weak companies to use least-risk discount rates for the valuation of their
pension liabilities. In addition, sponsoring employers are required to make up any shortfall
on least-risk discount rate valuations before they transfer the liability through an insurance
buy-out.
In other words, the UK Pensions Regulator adopted the opposite approach of most actuaries by
invoking a low discount rate (i.e. higher contributions) when employers face financial difficulties
and a high discount rate (i.e. lower contributions) when they are financially strong. This
conservative regulatory regime should, in theory, promote full funding of financially troubled plans.
However it begs the question of whether or not a sponsoring employer experiencing financial
difficulties will be able to make the higher contributions necessary using a lower discount rate.
Vittas continues:
The UK authorities monitor the performance of pension funds but have not imposed the
maintenance of buffer reserves. The trustees of pension plans are required to obtain actuarial
valuations at least every three years. They must establish recovery plans in consultation with
the sponsoring employer showing how any funding shortfall will be eliminated. In the event
the recovery period exceeds 10 years, it may be investigated by the regulator and may be
amended. 540
Several European countries have, however, taken action to address the issue of the proper valuation
of pension liabilities and the maintenance of adequate buffer reserves. Most notable among them
are the Netherlands and Denmark.541

the envelope. (Towers Watson, Sponsor Strength Covenant-Asset Liability Modelling (ALM), 2012. C-ALM
Online: < www.towerswatson.com/DownloadMedia.aspx?media >.
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Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries, Actuaries and Discount Rates, 2013. Online: <
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2. Discount Rates in the Netherlands
Edward Pond notes that similar to other OECD countries, the Dutch pension system is a multi-pillar
system. Occupational pension plans are for the most part organized as multi-employer pension
funds that are governed by collective labour agreements. These funds had long been based on final
salary DB pension plans with special provisions for vesting and portability that did not penalize
transfers across funds and thus did not discourage labour mobility.
During the boom years of the 1980s and 1990s Dutch pension funds increased their investments in
equities, seeking higher returns, expanded benefits and contribution holidays. However, similar to
other pension plans around the world, Dutch plans experienced a solvency crisis in 2001-2004 as a
result of both a large drop in equity prices and low interest rates. This crisis caused funding ratios to
decline significantly, from 131 percent in 2000 to 97 percent in 2002. 542
The fall in the funding ratio reflected to some extent the adoption of 'fair value' accounting,
replacing the traditional actuarial approach which aimed at stabilizing both the contribution rate and
the funding ratio of pension funds by using actuarial estimates of assets and liabilities. The old rules
mandated pension funds to discount liabilities at a constant rate of 4 percent rate and to report assets
at actuarially adjusted values. The new rules require pension funds to use fair market values 543for
both assets and liabilities. Use of the euro swap yield curve is compulsory. 544
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Edward H.M. Ponds and Bart Van Riel, Sharing Risk: “The Netherlands New Approach to Pensions,
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College”, 2007. Online: < www.crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2007/04/ib_2007-5.pdf >.
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In the Netherlands the Financial Assessment Framework (Financieel Toetsings Kader -- FTK) (part of the
new Pension Act) was introduced in January 2007. It mandated a market-based valuation of pension
liabilities for funding purposes, without any amortisation or smoothing options. As in other countries,
estimated future salary growth is not to be considered in the measure of accrued liabilities. Future benefits
are discounted using the current yield curve on default-free capital market instruments, rather than the fixed
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The solvency and supervisory regime in the Netherlands has also been tightened. Pension funds are
required to maintain a minimum solvency requirement of 5 percent of technical provisions as well
as a buffer over liabilities, which depend on their asset composition and the extent of asset liability
mismatches. The buffer is designed to reduce the probability of underfunding to only 2.5 percent
within a one year horizon. Funds that invest more in equity or in fixed income assets with a shorter
duration than the duration of liabilities must maintain stronger buffers.
Pension funds may opt to comply with a standardized model or build their own internal models to
compute their solvency requirements, although these models need to be approved by the
supervisor.545 In the standardized model, the solvency buffers are calculated through a stress test

rate of 4 percent as has been historically the case. The market yield is corrected for expected inflation if
indexation of accrued pensions is unconditional; that is, if it does not depend on the performance of the
pension fund. Liability measures are also expected to take into account further increases in longevity.
Sponsor companies are also required to separate the liabilities that are "conditional" on the investment
performance of the pension fund from those that are "unconditional". Funding requirements are applied only
to unconditional liabilities (Juan Yermo, Reforming the Valuation and Funding of Pension Promises, OECD
Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 13, OECD Publishing. Online: <
www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/39427286.pdf >.)
544

The yield curve is a curve showing several yields or interest rates across different contract lengths (2
month, 2 year, 20 year, etc...) for a similar debt contract. The curve shows the relation between the (level of)
interest rate (or cost of borrowing) and the time to maturity, known as the "term" of the debt for a given
borrower in a given currency. For example, the U.S. dollar interest rates paid on U.S. Treasury securities for
various maturities are closely watched by many traders, and are commonly plotted on a graph which is
informally called "the yield curve". More formal mathematical descriptions of this relation are often called the
term structure of interest rates. ((Wikipedia) Online: < en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yield_curve >.)
An interest rate swap is a contract between two parties to exchange streams of interest payments. Typically,
one stream of payments is based on a fixed rate of interest and the other stream on a floating rate of
interest. Only the net cash flows are paid; the notional principal on which the interest payments are
calculated is not exchanged. A forward rate agreement is equivalent to a single-period interest rate swap, in
which interest payments are exchanged only once. A swap can be characterised as a portfolio of forwards.
(Eli Remolona, The Euro Interest Rate Swap Market, BIS Quarterly Review, 2003. Online: <
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0303f.pdf >.)
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The year 1923 saw the creation of insurance supervisor Verzekeringskamer, whose remit was expanded
in 1952 to include pension funds. In 2001, the name was changed accordingly, to Pensioen- &
erzekeringskamer (Pension and Insurance Supervisory Authority of the Netherlands). On 20 October 2004,
this PVK merged with De Nederlandsche Bank. (De Nederlandshe Bank, History of the PVK, 2007. Online: <
www.dnb.nl/en/about-dnb/organisation/history >.
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based on six broad risk factors and a formula for aggregate risk that takes partially into account
correlations across asset classes. The methodology implies that the typical Dutch fund will need to
maintain a sizable buffer amounting to 30 percent of technical provisions (funding requirements). In
order to reduce the size of the buffer, pension funds will need to reduce their asset/liability
mismatches by shifting from equities to bonds or by increasing the duration of their bond portfolio.
Pension funds with a funding shortfall are required to return to 100 percent funding within 3 years,
while they are given 15 years to rebuild the solvency buffer to the required level. 546
The new solvency approach, especially the compulsory use of the euro swap yield curve, have been
criticized by the pension funds for being inflexible and for failing to take properly into account the
long-term nature of pension liabilities. Nordic regulators, in particular, have been concerned for
some time about persistently low interest rates and the lack of liquidity547 at the long end of the
curve (long term investments, usually over 10 years) as insurers and pension funds in the region
typically discount their liabilities using market rates.548 Dutch pension funds, for instance, are
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Gregory Brunner et. al., World Bank, Risk Based Supervision of Pension Funds: A Review of International
Experience and Preliminary Assessment of First Outcomes, Policy Research Working Paper 4491, 2008.
Online :< www.elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4491>.
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The degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in the market without affecting the asset's
price. Liquidity is characterized by a high level of trading activity. Assets that can be easily bought or sold are
known as liquid assets. (Investopedia. Online: www.investopedia.com/ >.)
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The yield curve is simply the yields on bonds of varying maturities (typically from three months to 30
years) plotted on a graph. The yield curve illustrates what is called “the term structure of interest rates,” or
the idea that a bond’s maturity and yield are connected. Typically (but not 100% of the time), short-term
bonds offer lower yields, while longer-term bonds pay higher yields. As a result, the typical shape of the yield
curve is a curve that begins on the lower left and moves to the upper right. This is typically referred to as a
“normal” yield curve. Keeping in mind that prices and yields move in opposite directions, different factors
influence movements on either end of the yield curve. Short-term interest rates (also called “the short end of
the yield curve”) tend to be influenced by expectations for U.S. Federal Reserve policy. Short-term rates tend
to rise when the Fed is expected to raise interest rates, and fall when it is expected to cut rates. Longer-term
bonds (or the “long end” of the curve) are influenced to some extent by the outlook for Fed policy, but other
factors play a role in causing long-term yields to move up or down. Foremost among these are the outlook
for inflation, economic growth, supply-and-demand factors, and investors’ general attitude toward risk. Very
generally speaking, slower growth, low inflation, and depressed risk appetites will help the performance of
longer-term bonds (and cause yields to fall). Faster growth, higher inflation, and elevated risk appetites will
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required to use a discount curve based on the euro swap market.549 This low rate setting has meant
soaring liabilities and deteriorating funding ratios. As a consequence of the continuing credit crisis,
this swap curve has reached record lows, resulting in low coverage ratios for many Dutch pension
funds (which under current regulations have to be remedied within three to five years). This has led
a large number of pension funds to announce benefit cuts for 2013 and beyond. This is certainly not
true for all funds, however, as investment policy and hedging policies have diverged widely during
the past few years.550 ABP, the largest Dutch pension fund, recently called on the authorities to
adopt a more pragmatic approach and reconsider the mandatory use of the current swap curve,
which has been depressed to very low levels by policy measures to contain the 2008 global
financial crisis. ABP warned that cuts in benefits might have to be implemented since despite a
strong investment performance on its asset portfolio it was unable to eliminate its reported funding
shortfall.
3. . Discount Rates in the U.S.
Prior to passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, DB plans in the United States were
permitted to smooth assets over five years and to discount liabilities using a five-year weighted
average of interest rates. This smoothing produced a distorted picture of the financial health of
plans during the early 2000s and led to very inadequate minimum funding contributions. This was a
significant factor in the termination of the plans of United Airlines, US Airways, and Bethlehem

hurt performance (and cause yields to rise). All of these factors push and pull simultaneously to influence the
direction of longer-term bonds. (Thomas Kenny, What is the Yield Curve? 2014. Online: < www.
bonds.about.com › About Money › Bonds › Advanced Bond Investing >.)
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The euro interest rate swap market is one of the largest and most liquid financial markets in the world.
Indeed, the swap curve is emerging as the preeminent benchmark yield curve in euro financial markets,
against which even some government bonds are now often referenced.
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Europe (2012). Online: < www.ipe.com/the-netherlands-pensions-turmoil/44229.fullarticle >.
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Steel, all of which continued to increase benefits to members even though they were significantly
underfunded on a solvency (termination) basis. The United States’ Administration at that time
strongly urged the Congress to reduce the permitted smoothing in the funding rules. Subsequently,
the Pension Protection Act prescribed two year smoothing for discount rates.
Corporate pension plans in the U.S. determine the current value of their liabilities by using the rate
of return on corporate bonds; otherwise known as the discount rate. As historically low bond rates
over the past several years forced higher funding contributions, U.S. corporations lobbied Congress
to change the discount rate. Pension discount rates were recently amended in the U.S. Highway
Bill 551which was signed into law by President Obama on June 27, 2012. Under this new legislation,
pension plans will be able to use a rate based on the average of the past 25 years instead of
discounting long-term liabilities using a rate based on the average of the past two years, This is
expected to increase the discount rate used to determine DB liabilities by more than two percentage
points, increasing the current discount rate from the 4 percent range to roughly 6 percent. Since
liabilities are sensitive to discount rate assumptions, a plan's liabilities will change roughly 15
percent for every one percentage point change in the discount rate. For example, Boeing reports
that a mere quarter of a point increase in the discount rate could cut its pension liability by $1.7
billion.
Since 2002, Congress has, on several occasions, let specific corporations use a higher discount rate
to determine their contributions, including American Airlines which reduced its annual contribution
to employee pension plans by $2.1 billion. Unfortunately, the airline ultimately faced a shortfall in
its pension plan that it could not afford to fund. It filed for bankruptcy in 2011. This begs the
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question of why Congress would go along with a policy that provides short-term relief to employers
but much longer-term risk to the pensioners. For one reason, ensuring the financial health of
corporate America is vital to job creation prospects in these times of high unemployment.
Furthermore, if corporations put less money into their pension plans, the federal government is left
with more income to tax. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the result of shifting
pension funding money from pension funds to income statement results in $8.8 billion more in
taxes over the next 10 years. An example of the impact of a higher discount rate is provided below:
Let's say you promise to pay your employee $1 million in benefits in a lump-sum, 30 years
from today. Assume your investments will return 10 percent annually. If you invest
$57,300 today it will grow into $1 million over the next three decades. However, if you only
assume a return of 7 percent, then you would have needed to put in $131,400 today to have
the same payout.
In other words, increasing the discount rate to the Highway legislation’s unrealistic levels promotes
the underfunding of DB pension plans and places the burden of the shortfall on both current and
future generations, as many of these plans will undoubtedly face insolvency down the road. As
Jason Fitchner states “That's not good funding policy, no matter what the short-term fiscal gains are
for companies and government coffers.”552
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APPENDIX 5
Actuaries’ Assumptions

Actuaries’ Economic Assumptions
(i)

Assets

At the end of 2012, Canadian pension schemes held approximately 34% in fixed investments, 17%
in Canadian equities, 15% in global equities, 10% in real estate and the remainder in other
investments.553 Practical methods of valuing pension plan assets for funding purposes have been
described and classified, notably by Jackson & Hamilton (1968), Trowbridge & Farr (1976, p. 88),
Winklevoss (1993, p. 171) and in a recent survey by the Committee on Retirement Systems
Research (1998). Market-related methods are used most frequently in most jurisdictions. 554
In Canada, the current market value of plan assets is used or else an average of current and past
market values is taken in an attempt to remove short-term volatility. The assumptions the actuary
must make in the valuation of assets include the employee and employer annual plan contribution
rates, the rate of return on the assets and the discount rate to convert the future returns on the assets
into current dollars on the valuation date.
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(ii)

Liabilities

In a defined benefit plan, the company is responsible for funding its employees’ pension benefits.
The value of the pension benefits earned (the “service cost”) is typically specified in the plan text in
terms of years of service and percentage of salary. However, in any given accounting period in
which pension benefits are earned by an employee, the total length of service, the final average
salary, and the number of years a pensioner will live after retirement are obviously, all uncertain.
This means that the cost of the pension benefits (liabilities) can only be estimated based on the
pension plan formula in the plan text and on actuarial assumptions about the determinants of the
pension liability such as discount rates, inflation, and expected pay increases. 555 These three
actuarial assumptions are discussed below:
1. Discount Rates
For pension funding, this assumption is used to discount future benefits to determine the value of
plan liabilities on the current valuation date. The discount rate should be a reasonable
approximation of the future rates of return on the pension plan’s assets. The discount rate is often
referred to as the valuation interest rate. Different plans will have different discount rates,
reflecting different investment strategies and varying opinions of future rates of return on plan
investments. It is typically selected as a long-term reflection of the value of plan assets and
liabilities.
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Ibid.
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2. Salary Scale
This assumption is used to project an individual’s future compensation based on current
compensation. The salary scale assumption reflects expected inflation, productivity, seniority,
promotion and other factors that affect wages.
3. Inflation
Inflation is a fundamental component of all economic assumptions made by actuaries and is
generally estimated from government and private sources.
(iii) Pension Liability Calculations
A pension plan’s liabilities can be calculated in different ways, but the same principles always
apply. The actuary calculates the expected future pension payments for each participant in the plan
using the company’s participant data and plan provisions. These future benefit payments consider
the individual’s compensation and service history, and when that individual might be expected to
die, quit, become disabled or retire. All projected future pension payments are discounted to current
dollars using a discount rate estimated by the actuary. Actuaries call this discounted amount the
present value of future benefits (PVFB). The PVFB represents the present value of all accrued
benefits (as of the valuation date) expected to be paid from the plan to current plan members, retired
or working. If actuarial assumptions are correct, the company will eventually need to set aside
enough money (assets) to equal the PVFB (to cover all of the projected pension payments to current
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workers and retirees). Actuaries have developed cost methods to divide the PVFB into the
following three categories-past, present and future liabilities:556
(i) Actuarial Liability (AL) is the portion of the PVFB that is attributed to past service.
This is the estimate of the value of the compensation that was earned in prior working years
and is often referred to as the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO). Different cost methods
(see Chapter 2 on page 249) calculate the AL differently, but it always reflects only past
service. It reflects past service up to the current valuation date and reflects expected future
pay increases. The AL reflects future pay increases because most pension plan benefits in
Canada are calculated based on a worker’s final 5 years of earnings before retirement.
(ii) Normal Cost (NC) is the portion of the PVFB that is attributed to the current year of
service. This is the current value of the pension compensation being paid this year. Different
cost methods calculate the NC differently, but generally it reflects the current year of service
and may reflect expected future pay increases. It is also referred to as the Service Cost (SC).
(iii) Present Value of Future Normal Costs (PVFNC) is the portion of the PVFB that will
be attributed to future years of service. Quite simply, it covers compensation that hasn’t yet
been earned. This number is not normally disclosed and is rarely used in any cost
calculations.
The following example illustrates the differences in the above calculations. 557
Joe participates in a pension plan that gives him 1 percent of final salary for each year of
service he earns under the plan (1 percent x salary x service). Joe is currently age 55, has
worked for 20 years for the company, and his current pay is $50,000. The actuary assumes
556
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Joe will retire at 65, after working 30 years for the company, with an estimated future pay of
$75,000.
Joe’s present value of future benefits or PVFB is based on the salary he is actually expected
earn from the plan at the end of all of his years of service. His PVFB is the actuarial present
value of all the pension benefits he is projected to have earned at age 65. This projected age
benefit is calculated as 1 percent multiplied by his projected salary at 65 multiplied by his
projected service at 65, or 1 percent x $75,000 x 30 years = $22,500.

• Joe’s actuarial liability or AL can be calculated using several funding methods. In this
example, the most common method used in Canada, the Projected Unit Cost Method (based
on past service and expected future pay cost method). The liability is based on Joe’s
expected future salary, but only takes into account the service he’s earned up to the
valuation date. The AL is the actuarial present value of 1 percent x his projected salary at 65
x his years of service up to the current valuation date (at age 55) = (1% x $75,000 x 20) =
$15,000.
• The normal cost or NC is calculated under the same method as the AL, but only reflects
the projected funding requirement for the current year of service. So, continuing with the
Projected Unit Credit Cost method, the NC is the actuarial present value of (1 percent x his
projected salary at 65 x 1 year of service), or the actuarial present value of (1 percent x
$75,000 x 1 =$750.
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APPENDIX 6
Surplus Regulatory Amendments to the Federal Income Tax, the Ontario PBA, and the
Federal PBSA

1. Federal Income Tax Act (ITA)
All registered pension plans in Canada must comply with the rules found in the Income Tax Act
(Canada) and its regulations. Bill C-9 has increased the amount of surplus that can accumulate in a
defined benefit provision of a plan for contributions made in respect of post-2009 service from 10
percent to 25 percent of actuarial liabilities without triggering adverse tax consequences. This
amendment was designed to put less pressure on pension plan sponsors to deal with surplus
management issues. 558 However, new provincial regulations and case law have made it much more
difficult for sponsors to access surplus, casting doubt on whether they will be willing to accumulate
additional surpluses in their pension plans under improved economic conditions. A key current
impediment is the asymmetry faced by sponsors, whereby pension fund surpluses are increasingly
seen as the property of plan members, while deficits remain the sole responsibility of the sponsor.
For example in the landmark Supreme Court of Canada case Schmidt v. Air Products, the Court
held that pension trusts are classic trusts and therefore employees own the surplus upon wind-up
unless the pension text says otherwise.
2. Ontario PBA
The statutory framework governing occupational pension plans for Ontario employees remained
largely unchanged for about 20 years until 2010 when the Ontario government passed two
significant pension reform Bills (120 and 236), amending the Pensions Benefits Act (PBA). The
558
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Pension Benefits Act (PBA), as amended by the Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 2010 (Bill 236)
and by Securing Pension Benefits Now and for the Future Act, 2010 (Bill 120), introduced new
surplus withdrawal rules that came into force in 2010. Under the new surplus withdrawal rules an
employer can receive payment of surplus from a continuing pension plan or on the wind-up of a
pension plan in one of three ways: 559

1. If the documents that create and support the pension plan and pension fund provide for the
payment of surplus to the employer; or
2. If a written agreement between the employer and at least two-thirds (2/3) of members and an
appropriate percentage of former members, retired members and other persons who are
entitled to payments under the plan provides for the payment of surplus to the employer; or
3. if the payment is authorized by a court order declaring that the employer is entitled to
surplus while the plan continues (where the application is for consent to payment of surplus
to an employer out of a continuing plan), or when the plan is being wound up (where the
application is for consent to payment of surplus to an employer out of a plan that is being
fully wound up).
The major reforms impacting actuarial surplus are:
1. Section 77.1- elimination of partial wind-ups (i.e. S.C.C. Monsanto Decision which
awarded employees surplus no longer applicable)
2. Section 77.11- plan text rules supreme in governing surplus entitlement. If the text is
silent on payment of the surplus to the employer on wind-up, it shall be distributed
proportionally to members, former members and retired members.
3. Section 77.11(4) - If a pension plan is a successor pension plan and if it is being wound
up, the employer is not entitled to payment of surplus under the pension plan unless the
documents that created and supported the original pension plan and pension fund and those
that create and support the successor pension plan and pension fund both provide for
payment of surplus to the employer on the wind -up Agreement about surplus.
4. Section 77.11 (7) - A written agreement among the following persons may provide for
payment of surplus to the employer in the circumstances specified in the agreement and as
of the date specified in the agreement:
1. If the surplus is to be paid to the employer while the pension plan continues in
existence,
559
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i. the employer,
ii. at least two-thirds of the members of the pension plan (and, for this purpose, a trade
union that represents members may agree on behalf of those members), and
iii. the number which is considered appropriate in the circumstances by the
Superintendent of former members, retired members and other persons who are
entitled to payments under the pension plan as of the specified date for payment
of the surplus.
2. If the surplus is to be paid to the employer on the wind up of the pension plan,
i. the employer,
ii. at least two-thirds of the members of the pension plan (and, for this purpose, a
trade union that represents or represented members on the date of the wind up
may agree on behalf of those members), and
iii. the number which is considered appropriate in the circumstances by the
Superintendent of former members, retired members and other persons who are
entitled to payments under the pension plan as of the date of the wind up.
5. Section 77.11 (8) - A written agreement prevails over any document that creates and
supports the pension plan and pension fund and it prevails despite any trust that may
exist in favour of any person.
6. Section 6 (10) -An arbitration award prevails over any document that creates and
supports the pension plan and pension fund, it prevails over subsections (3) and (4), and
it prevails despite any trust that may exist in favour of any person.

7. Section 55.1 (1) - An employer required to make contributions under a pension plan, or
a person or entity required to make contributions under a pension plan on behalf of an
employer, may reduce or suspend, in the prescribed manner, contributions for the
normal cost of the pension plan if the pension plan has a surplus and if such other
requirements as may be prescribed are satisfied.
8. Section 80-The long-awaited amendments to the Ontario Pension Benefits Act ("PBA")
regarding the transfer of assets between pension plans became effective on January 1,
2014. New supporting Regulations under the PBA[1] (the "Asset Transfer Regulations")
also came into force on January 1, 2014 mandating that If the original plan has a surplus
as of the effective date of transfer, the amount of assets to be transferred must include a
portion of the surplus determined in accordance with the Asset Transfer Regulations. In
other words, Section 80 of the Ontario PBA (mandating the transfer of DB pension
surplus to the transferred employees’ new DB plan) trumps the Supreme Court of
Canada’s 2010 decision in Burke.

301

The underlying policy of this new Ontario surplus legislation is as follows:
a. A written agreement prevails over any document that creates and supports the
pension plan and pension fund and it prevails despite any trust that may exist in
favour of any person.
b. Employers must adhere to strict guidelines to access actuarial surplus in on-going
plans and terminated plans.
c. Employers are entitled to take contribution holidays under specific guidelines
prescribed in regulations.
In summary, surplus withdrawal is severely restricted by trust law, as per the Supreme Court
decisions above. However, trust law may be trumped by written agreements as per pension
standards legislation (Section 77.11(8)) above).
3.Federal PBSA
The federal government passed Bill C-9 in 2010 (which came into force in July, 2011), introducing
the following reforms to surplus and contribution holidays under the Pension Benefits Standards
Act:

1. Payments by employer
3.9(13.5)…the introduction of a solvency margin that precludes sponsors from taking contribution
holidays, unless the solvency ratio exceeds full funding plus the margin, which is set at a level of 5%
of solvency liabilities;
A solvency margin concept has been introduced for federally regulated pension plans. The
solvency margin effectively restricts an employer’s ability to take a contribution holiday unless the
plan is 105 percent or more funded on a solvency basis. This legislation provides a more stable
funding policy for DB plans by preventing employers from taking contribution holidays every time
a small surplus exists, reducing it to zero.
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2. Partial termination

(4.1) Only the Superintendent may declare part of a pension plan terminated.
Employers who sell a part of their business should consider the potential effect these new
restrictions will have on members. In the scenario where the transferring employer and the
purchaser do not agree to a transfer of assets and benefit liabilities, the employer will not be
permitted to declare a partial wind up to distribute benefits, including any actuarial surplus, to the
transferred employees. Under these cir*cumstances, the PBSA Sale of Business Provisions deem
transferred employees’ membership in the original employer’s plan not to have ceased and require
such members to continue to accrue service, including benefits and any actuarial surplus in the plan.
This “partial termination” legislation (similar to the “payments by employer” legislation above),
was intended to provide a more stable funding policy by protecting the interests of transferred
employees until the deal is completed.
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APPENDIX 7
Target Benefit/Funding Policy560
Table 1: Key elements of a TB benefit/funding policy

Nature

Funding methodology

A benefit/funding "test" to be used to measure
the long-term sustainability of the relationship
between "funds available" and "funds required",
where: "funds available" refers to more than the
existing assets and includes expected
contributions in the future; and, "funds required"
refers to the value of both past and future
benefits.

Actuarial assumptions

A basis for setting actuarial valuation
assumptions to value the "funds required".

Reserve levels and trigger points

Consisting of a pre-defined range/zone of
acceptable financial measures along with trigger
points that would signal benefit adjustments.

Benefit priorities

A pre-determined approach to benefit
adjustments at each trigger point.

“Disaster” plan

A clear accountability and responsibility for
"disaster" scenarios, where results fall far outside
of the range of the pre-defined trigger points.

Aon Hewitt specifically outlines two actuarial principles required for target benefit plan
sustainability testing:
1. The actuarial valuation determines the ability of plan funding to support benefits,
with no concept of "deficit" or "surplus" as at the valuation date. Plan funding is
fixed and benefits vary based on the trigger points identified in the benefit/funding
policy. The actuarial valuation takes a long term view. It includes a benefit/funding
test conducted on a regular cycle and incorporating a projection valuation.
2. Sensitivity and/or stochastic testing is conducted to estimate the probability that the
plan benefits are sustainable. From a regulatory point of view, there are already
guidelines and tools at hand to successfully implement TB.561 We believe the key to
regulating TB pension plans is the benefit/funding policy. The policy needs to be
560
561

Ibid.
Multi-employer plans are regulated target benefit plans.
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clear, sufficiently detailed, and reasonable in light of the risk-sharing deal between
plan sponsor and members. It needs to* be supported by a sustainability analysis that
involves adequate risk testing using projection valuations, and that analysis must be
revisited periodically. In addition to a solid benefit/funding policy, the governance
structure and member communications must also be aligned to the risk-sharing
nature of the pension deal.
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APPENDIX 8
Funding Requirements of Target Benefit Plans 562

1. Need for Flexibility
Rigid funding rules would be an important deterrent for employers who would consider
establishing TBPs (as was the case for member-funded pension plans in Quebec).563 In order for
TBPs to become a successful pension arrangement, an important degree of flexibility must be
allowed under the funding regulations that will be adopted in respect of TBPs.
2. Actuarial Assumptions

As discussed above, the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) and the Actuarial Standards
Board (ASB) have already set out numerous standards and guidance that should be followed for
the valuation of pension plans, based on the structure of the pension plan and the risks and
obligations that it entails. Target benefit pension plans have existed for decades in several
jurisdictions (e.g., MEPPs) and valuation assumptions are monitored in the current framework.
Given the delicate balance of delivering the promised benefits versus providing adequate
benefits and intergenerational equity, the policy objectives of any constraints that might be
imposed by regulators on the actuarial assumptions that may be used for valuation purposes
should be clearly articulated. However, it should be clearly understood by all stakeholders that
any mandated margins will reduce the benefits of the plan on a per dollar contribution basis,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the plan in delivering adequate retirement benefits.
With any margin, there will be a shift in intergenerational equity. It may be difficult to justify
why a desired margin should be established if the funding target is 100% over time (recognizing
562

The Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM), ACPM Target Benefit Plan Paper, ACPM,
2012. Online: < www.acpm.com/ACPM/.../ACPM_Target_Benefit_Plan_Paper(Final).pdf >.
563

A member funded pension plan (MFPP) is a defined benefit plan with a career average earnings or flat
benefit formula without automatic indexation in which the risks of plan funding are borne entirely by the
members. Employer contributions are set in advance and do not vary in case of actuarial deficit. Actuarial
deficits incurred while the plan is in force are funded by active members. Asset shortfalls on plan termination
result in a reduction of the pension payable to members and beneficiaries. On the other hand, surplus assets
while the plan is in force or on its termination are used to increase benefits or give members a contribution
holiday, subject to certain constraints. In other words, employee contributions fluctuate depending on
actuarial deficits and surpluses. (Normandin Beaudry, Member Funded Pension Plans, NB Bulletin Vol. 10
N. 2, 2007. Online: < www.normandin-beaudry.ca › Publications › Archives › 2007 >.)
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that any margin creates a lower benefit target). At the time when sponsors are determining the
TBP provisions, any desired funding margins should be documented in a funding policy to be
adopted for the plan.
The TBP text or its funding policy (or administrator to the extent allowed by the TBP text or
funding policy) should be allowed to determine when specific margins for adverse deviation are
required and their magnitude. In other words, no minimum margin should be required by the
legislation. However, margins can be developed and communicated in a funding policy to
reflect the economic realities, desired risk tolerance and the importance of intergenerational
equity. In addition, it is important for TBP members and sponsors to be informed that there is
no participation in the Ontario PBGF564 and that deficits on wind up are not required to be
funded.
3. Valuation Methods and Rules
The target benefits should be measured and funded on a going concern basis. A valuation on a
wind up basis should only be required for disclosure purposes. The actuarial method used (e.g.,
projected unit credit, modified aggregate, etc.) should not be defined in the legislation but
should be determined by the TBP sponsor (in consultation with actuarial advisors) and
articulated in the plan text or funding policy (or assigned to the administrator by the TBP text or
its funding policy), including a clear definition of what happens to benefits if funding deficits or
surpluses emerge. Again, we believe that CIA professional standards and guidance will suffice
to produce the proper valuation of the liabilities. If regulations were to prescribe the valuation
standards and methods they must clearly address the variety of inherently different risks by type
of plan, which we believe would be too constraining or cumbersome.
An amortization period should be determined by the TBP text, funding policy or administrator
based on the objectives of the plan. If the pension regulators should deem it necessary to impose
a maximum permitted amortization period, the current period applicable to going concern
deficits DB plans (i.e., 15 years) should be preferred.

564

This fund is exclusive to Ontario – no other province in Canada has a fund like this. Members outside
Ontario with DB pension plans unfortunately don’t have their pension guaranteed by the
government…..There are certain instances where your pension isn’t fully covered by the fund. The fund only
covers the first $1,000 per month of your pension – anything in excess is not covered. While required
employer premiums continue to rise, the $1,000 per month guarantee has remained the same since 1988.
There are several further instances where you won’t be covered: benefit improvements that came into effect
three years prior to the wind up date of your pension plan, pensions from federally-registered pension plans
(industries like airlines and transportation) and any pension plan indexing that place plan wind ups. The fund
is exclusive to DB pension plans – Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans are not covered. (Sean Cooper,
Million Dollar Journey, A Primer on the Pension Guarantee Fund, 2012. Online: <
www.milliondollarjourney.com/a-primer-on-the-pension-benefits-guaran...>.).
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4. Disclosure
A TBP sponsor, or else the administrator in some cases, should be required to adopt both a
funding and a benefit policy reflecting the terms of the TBP text, and such policies should have
to be communicated to all plan members and the participating employer(s).
5. Plan Termination
Rules as to treatment of benefits/funding on plan termination must be clearly set out in the TBP
text, and be subject to (i) prescribed minimum standards, and (ii) regulatory approval. Minimum
standards must set out those items to be included in the plan text, but should include some
flexibility. Once established in the plan text, there should be little or no discretion left to the
administrator, except where interpretation may be required. In other words the plan text should,
to the extent possible, address how deficits and surplus gets allocated on wind up. For example,
if there is a deficit, the plan text may require that benefit improvements within the 5 years
preceding wind up get reduced first or may establish other types of priorities.

6. Treatment of TBPs for Accounting Purposes
One of the reasons why some employers do not wish to continue sponsoring a DB pension plan
is the way that accounting rules impose recognition of financial risks (i.e. liabilities) on their
financial statements. If we would like employers to embrace TBPs, it is considered crucial for
employers (especially in the private sector) to be able to account for their participation in the
TBP using the accounting rules applicable to DC plans, as is the case for most MEPPs.
However, it will be important to ensure that no rules relating to TBPs that are incorporated into
the pension standards legislation could compromise the classification of TBPs as DC plans for
accounting purposes. For example, there should be no rule requiring a minimum benefit equal to
the member’s accumulated contributions. However, it would still be possible for some plans to
provide such a minimum guarantee if desired, although some employers may be reluctant to
participate in such plans if they are concerned about the accounting treatment.

It will also be important to verify whether certain transitional rules might have an impact on
whether a TBP retains certain DB features that make it impossible to apply the DC accounting
rules. For example, depending on enabling legislation, if an employer wishes to transition from
an existing DB plan to a TBP in respect of future service, but the transitional rules impose the
continuation of certain DB features (such as a minimum pension for past service or for existing
retirees), it is not obvious at this point that an employer could simply maintain two components
within a single plan or whether it would be necessary to completely segregate the two groups in
separate plans. Such potential uncertainty would need to be clarified when rules are drafted.
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7. Treatment of TBPs for Tax Purposes
TBPs are intended to be tax-assisted retirement savings plans and as such amendments to the
ITA will likely be necessary to recognize the TBP as a new type of retirement savings plan,
similar to the ITA amendments recently proposed for PRPPs. The ITA treatment of TBPs
should ensure that:
1. Employer and employee contributions to the TBP are deductible.
2. Investment income and gains on assets held by the TBP are non-taxable.
3. Benefits are taxed in the hands of the individual member upon retirement.
4. Benefits payable from the TBP are eligible for pension income credits and pension income
splitting, as with other types of pension payments.
5. Tax limits are calculated using either (i) DB tax limits (which are benefits focused), or (ii)
DC tax limits (which are contributions focused).

8. Transitional Rules
In order for TBPs to be a viable alternative for plan sponsors, it is considered essential to permit
the transition or conversion of benefits from a sponsor’s current DB plan to a TBP. It is
suggested the following rules be adopted for transitioning past service traditional DB benefits to
a TBP:

A. Structure and Funding of Past Service Benefits
For simplicity, in order to transition past service traditional DB benefits to a target benefit
design, a TBP should be a stand-alone pension plan. New hires who enter the TBP would accrue
all benefits on a target basis. Those employees who would “convert” or “transition” from the
employer’s traditional DB plan to the TBP should accrue future benefits (from the effective date
of transfer) on a target basis. The employer should be permitted to offer these employees and
inactive DB plan members the option of transferring past service benefit liabilities (and a
proportionate amount of the DB plan assets) to the TBP.
Where there is a funding deficit in respect of transferred DB liabilities, the employer should
continue to fully fund these liabilities by way of special payments for the remainder of the going
concern or solvency amortization period in accordance with the schedule of payments as of the
date of conversion. The key concept regarding the 100% past service benefit funding is that a
former DB member should commence participation in the TBP with a clean slate and assume
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the risk the TBP represents after this date. The funding payment schedule in respect of past
service benefits should not vary from what is in place prior to conversion. Any experience gains
or losses in respect of these benefits that occur after the date of entry should fall under the TBP
design and as such these past service benefits could be increased or reduced. Should the TBP be
terminated prior to the end of the past service funding payment schedule, the employer would
still be required to pay the remaining balance of its schedule of payments as at the date of
conversion.

B. Consent to Transition/Convert
Similar to the current rules for conversions from DB to DC benefits, if the DB plan sponsor
wishes to offer a DB to TBP conversion each active or inactive member eligible for the
conversion option should be given the right to elect whether or not to convert their past service
benefits to the TBP (regardless of whether or not he or she is represented by a union). Each
eligible member should receive a statement setting out the information needed in order for the
member to make an informed decision. The information to be contained in the statement should
be prescribed.

9. Implementation of Target Benefit Plans565

A. From an operational and design perspective:
1. Joint governance-There are additional fiduciary risks associated with a TB plan if the
employer manages it independently of members. The sharing of all plan risks between
employers and members can be achieved only if all parties actively participate in the
management of the plan in a meaningful way.
2. Scale-These plans need to be large enough to have meaningful pooling of plan risks, as well
as have the resources to handle the additional management costs.
3. Regular ongoing monitoring-The use of stochastic projection tools rather than typical
deterministic actuarial valuations are critical to understanding how to test the pricing of plan
benefits and to determine reasonable margins and reserves.
4. Distinct benefits/funding policy-With fixed contribution rates, the funding policy should
provide clear direction on margins to establish in the pricing of plan benefits and target reserve
levels and should also specify trigger points for benefit adjustments.

565

Barry Gros, Karen Hall, and Claude Lockhead, A New Approach for Sustainable Retirement Income,
Plans and Trusts, 2013. Online: < www.ifebp.org/inforequest/0163251.pdf >.
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5. Equity-driven designs-Intergenerational equity can be managed through a focus on career
pay, minimizing early reti+rement subsidies and having no subsidized spousal benefits.
6. Cost-sensitive designs-It is important that the TB design be based on conscious identification
and decisions regarding allocation of plan costs. This might involve providing benefit indexing
only nominally or on a conditional basis, or defining normal retirement age in terms that adjust
with mortality improvements.
7. Expanded member communication-The nature of a TB plan warrants clear and ongoing
communication, with the potential upside of much greater member engagement.
B. From a regulatory perspective:
1. Exemption from regular funding rules for traditional DB plans.
2. Acceptance as a DC plan for pension accounting purposes.
3. Acceptance as a DC benefit for tax-reporting purposes (i.e. pension adjustment).
4. Availability outside of collectively bargained situations, provided certain governance-related
criteria are met.
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